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# THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

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
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## *The Middle East*

(The boundaries of Israel and the disposition of Arab Palestine and Kashmir not finally determined)



# The Middle East Journal

VOLUME 5

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## LAND REFORM: KEY TO THE DEVELOPMENT AND STABILITY OF THE ARAB WORLD

*Afif I. Tannous*

THE ISSUE of land tenure in the Middle East is one of grave and immediate concern, not only to the various countries involved, but also to the United States and the United Nations. Becoming fully apparent to them is the relation of this problem to the development of a solid and stable foundation for peace in this strategic part of the world.

Most of the Arab countries have attained the first stage of their aspiration for sound national development—that of political independence—and the rest are forging ahead along that road. All of them, however, share to one degree or another a feeling of insecurity and uncertainty concerning the social, economic, and political aspects of their national existence. A state of ferment, of transition and anxiety prevails. They are becom-

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ing increasingly aware of the reality that, under the impact of international forces and ideologies, the maintenance of the present order of things within their boundaries is no longer possible. They are seeking a way out that would obviate destructive upheavals; they are groping for a situation of security and stability within which they can carry on progressive development.

We are suggesting land reform as the key answer to this vital national quest. To be sure, we do not hold this to be the only answer; but we are convinced that it is the most basic, and our argument will be developed accordingly.

The discussion will also be developed in the light of the manifestation of a new, positive trend on the part of Democracy, as expressed in the Point Four Program. We have here in a potential form what might develop into a great long-range plan for constructive action on a global scale. The law that has given legal birth to this program at the hands of the United States Congress is clear in its emphasis upon democratic principles of operation. It talks about sharing and cooperation with the underdeveloped countries on the basis of equality. It emphasizes the development of resources for the benefit of the countries concerned, and the raising of living standards among their peoples. The UN declared itself for the program, and stands ready to help in its implementation. Also the U.S. Congress has appropriated the necessary funds for a beginning. In fact, some projects have already been launched in the field.

The Middle East (particularly the Arabic speaking portion of it) constitutes a major and strategic field for this sort of democratic operation. Here a crucial test of the new trend will be performed. The need for economic development and social uplift is indeed great and urgent. Equally urgent is the need for political stability and more effective governmental organization. With a few relatively minor exceptions, the region as a whole stands on extremely shaky foundations, with a terrifying vacuum in its structure. This calls urgently for sound development and basic reforms. The gap between the small elite minority on top and the great deprived masses at the bottom is great. The levels of living among the vast majority of the people, who are mostly peasant folk, are extremely low. Their diet is defective, their

income is meagre, the incidence of disease among them is high, illiteracy prevails, their output per man is among the lowest in the world.

Within this deplorable state of affairs exists a promising potential for sound economic development and social reform. The region, as is well known, is rich in oil. It is also potentially rich in hydroelectric power. But its greatest potential lies in the development of its agriculture, and in the emancipation of the great human resource that is heavily tied up with that activity. Through schemes of irrigation, through the expansion of agricultural industries, and through the introduction of modern techniques of production and distribution, a tremendous job could be done to increase output and stabilize the tottering economic foundations of the region.

The United States and other countries supporting the Point Four and United Nations programs are challenged with an opportunity to render extremely effective aid through technical assistance. But to stop there would amount only to half the job done; would amount to failure on the part of Democracy to fulfill its real message. The crying need of the Middle East cannot be filled through technical aid, capital investment, and economic development alone. The overwhelming problem of the region cannot be solved fundamentally and permanently by the erection of dams, the expansion of irrigation, the development of industry, and the increased flow of oil.

The solution lies in economic development that is conceived and achieved for one sole purpose: *the emancipation and welfare of the people*. It is this second part of the formula — the genuine interests of the deprived human element — that one usually finds lacking, or accorded a minor place, in the economic and political systems of the region. Here, clearly, lies the issue that is basic to all other issues in the Arab world. Here, and nowhere else, begins the road to sound national development, to socio-economic and political stability. Herein lies the primary target and objective for Democracy in its new role of constructive expansion into the underdeveloped areas of the world. Failure to espouse consciously, daringly, and directly the cause of the great deprived peoples in these areas, in terms that are meaningful to

them in their hunger, disease, landlessness, and, above all, their yearning for human dignity, would certainly result in a grave impairment and ultimate failure of its message.

Inasmuch as agriculture is the greatest actual and potential resource of the Arab world, in which is engaged the great majority of the people; and inasmuch as most of the cultivators of the soil are landless tenants, sharecroppers, or laborers suffering from a destructive system of land tenure, we cannot but come to the conclusion that in land reform lies the key to an effective solution of the problem. This should be the direct and major concern of the Point Four program.

#### *BACKGROUND OF THE LAND TENURE SYSTEM*

To understand the Middle East fully and realistically, to grasp its problems in the right perspective, one must, among a few other basic matters, understand its system of land ownership. This endeavor will take one, inevitably, to the remote past, for an outstanding feature of this basic institution of life in the Middle East is that it consists of a continuous stream whose origins reach back into the dawn of human history. In the land system of today we see clearly the influences of thousands of years of human experience with respect to the initial issue of making a living from the soil.

In a large portion of the area, man made an early successful adjustment to its peculiar desert and semi-desert conditions through the development of a nomadic grazing economy. This was a total way of life, involving a solid tribal organization, and depending entirely upon seasonal migration with the herds and the flocks in search of pastures after the scanty rainfall. The right to graze livestock over the land was equally shared by all members of the tribe. The basic form and functions of what we now call democracy prevailed, economically, socially, and politically. The chief assumed his position and played his role mainly by virtue of his personal qualities as a leader. He held no exclusive ownership right to any portion of the tribal territory. Blood — descent from the same ancestor — was the main bond that held the tribe together. Thus in its pure form, the major features of which are still maintained in several parts of



the region, the tribal economy presents no significant problem of land tenure; it is only when the shift to settled agriculture is made, under the influence of peculiar outside forces, that the problem tends to arise.

In his effort to adjust to his environment and make a living from the land, Middle East man followed another course, that of settled agriculture. The techniques of dry farming and of irrigation were gradually developed; in either case, settlement by the family or the tribe on a fixed area of land was an essential condition. A sense of attachment to the soil and a desire for ownership were the natural result.

From the early days of agriculture, in each country of the Middle East, we find this desire expressed in two forms — collective, by the settling tribe or the established village community; and private, by individual family units. In both, the major objective of land ownership (that of a sense of security and the right to enjoy the products of one's labor) was attained to one degree or another.

But the cultivator of the soil in the Middle East (who has always been the producer of the basic wealth of the region, and who has always represented the majority of the population) was not left alone to enjoy ownership of the land and the products of his labor in peace. Since the early days of Babylon and Egypt, through the long centuries of the empires of the Persians, Romans, Arabs, and Ottoman Turks, down to the present day, we see him travelling along an extremely rough road. In general, he has been the object of oppression and neglect. He has been precluded from owning his land and prevented from making it prosper. Cycle after cycle, in this long history of the region, we see clearly that with the abuse and decline of the peasant went an abuse and decline of the great land resource, and consequently a serious weakening of the total national organization.

A main root in this situation goes back to the abuse of the remote concept of divine ownership, by which the land resource belonged to the god of the community, the nation, or the state. Members of the community held that resource in trust, and shared equally in the enjoyment of its products. As conquerors became entrenched in power, as kingdoms and empires de-

veloped, we observe a definite shift from that concept to the practice of absolute possession by the sovereign as representative of the Deity. Around the sovereign arise a group of elite, of fighters, of court favorites, who are granted the right to live on the produce of certain areas. Gradually they develop into feudal lords, holding full sway over the land and the cultivators. This is what happened during the Arab Empire, and later during the Ottoman regime. The process is still in operation, in modified forms, in the Arab world.

Another root of the system is traceable directly to the fact that the Arab and Ottoman empires depended mainly upon land taxation for the maintenance of their governments and military operations. At times taxation was so heavy that it tended to kill hope and initiative in the hearts of the cultivators. Furthermore, the rulers of these lands resorted to the practice of farming out land taxes to certain influential people. These were able, by one means or another, to lay claim to the land, regardless of the rights of the cultivators.

In the third place, when the Ottomans, during the second half of the 19th century, attempted and largely failed to implement a comprehensive land reform (along the lines of their famous Land Code of 1858), abuse of the land and of the peasants was accentuated. From that time on we witness the rise of a powerful class of absentee landlords. Registration of the land in the name of actual cultivator-occupants was undertaken as the basic step in the intended reform. But through bribery, intimidation of the peasants, and other means, influential individuals in the cities and in the rural areas were able to defeat the spirit of the law and have most of the land registered in their names. At the same time, some of the powerful tribal chiefs were able to do the same. They got hold of the land supposedly in behalf of their tribes; actually, they became absolute owners, and their tribesmen sank to the level of serfs.

Undoubtedly there are other factors in the geography and history of the region which have contributed to the development of the present system. We believe, however, within our limited knowledge, that the major features and factors are the ones we have emphasized.

## MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM

The prevailing system of land tenure in the Middle East, and in the Arab world in particular, constitutes a most serious problem with far-reaching implications. In the first place is the problem of confusion in the title to the land. Over great areas that are actually under cultivation, or are potentially cultivable, it is not yet clearly established in some countries whether the land belongs to the state, to this or that absentee landlord, or to the occupant cultivator. The traditional grazing rights of the tribal groups are often confused with the right of cultivation and ownership. Several categories of land, dating back to the early Arab and Ottoman days, are still recognized and submit to differing legal procedures. One of these is the *waqf* land, dedicated to religious or charitable purposes, or held in trust for the benefit of a family line. This is land that cannot be sold, divided, or its character changed. Another is the vast state domain, called *miri*, which is vaguely defined and vaguely located. Claims over it are many and conflicting. These two are distinguished from bona fide private property, called *mulk*. There are also other minor categories, such as *mewat* (waste), and *metruka* (set aside for special community use).

This state of confusion has given rise to destructive disputes between claimants. It has also made it possible for powerful individuals to appropriate land at the expense of the peasant cultivators. Furthermore, as long as it persists it makes impossible the rational development of the great land resource, especially in such countries as Syria and Iraq.

In the second place is the problem of communal ownership, called *masha'*. This ancient practice still prevails in several parts of the region. In general, under this system no one individual owns a specific piece of land. Rather he, or the family unit to which he belongs, owns one or more shares in the communal territory. For a few years he cultivates one area, then moves on to another, in accordance with a community system of rotation. The system worked well so long as simple grain culture was involved. Under present conditions, however, it has proved a serious handicap to agriculture improvement, which depends upon the initiative and enterprise of the individual. In its present

form it is neither fully communal, cooperative agriculture, nor fully private ownership.

In the third place is the problem of fragmentation of holdings. Almost invariably, where land is owned privately as *mulk* (in fee simple) by small cultivators, property exists in the form of small fragments scattered in various directions around the village, where farmers dwell. This situation has arisen as a result of a long process of dividing and subdividing the property for inheritance by descendants. It has been intensified by the acquirement of additional pieces through purchase and through marriage. The serious problem involved here is the waste of time and effort by the farmer, and his inability to manage his property and market his produce effectively.

The major, and gravest aspect of the land tenure problem, however, is the prevalence of the semi-feudal and absentee ownership of the land resource. In this we discover a basic cause for the arrested socio-economic development of the region, and for its political instability. The evidence is clear and ample that, with a few minor exceptions, most of the agricultural land in the Arab countries is owned or controlled by a relatively small number of semi-feudal chiefs or large absentee owners. The majority of the cultivators (the producers of the agricultural wealth of the region and the mainstay of its economy) exist as sharecroppers and tenants of one type or another, as laborers and as owners of insufficient land. These are the landless millions at the foundation of the Middle East socio-economic and political structure. Neglected and deprived, barely making enough to live on, denied the opportunity to own the land they occupy and cultivate, unable to secure decent terms of tenancy, they have long lost heart and hope. They have ceased to be the initiators and sustainers of progressive improvements on the land, the builders of a sound agricultural economy. This, we believe, constitutes the greatest national loss in the Arab world.

At the same time, in *most* cases the heart of the absentee owner is not in the land. His interests, activities, and goals are somewhere else. He is rather a speculator, interested in ready income from his property. He neither supplies the necessary management to his estate, nor does he engage in actual farm work. In his



hands, and under his control, the land resource, and more important still, the human resource, of his country have been abused.

Let us now give substance to our general statement of the problem by presenting a few specific cases and facts.

The total area that is cultivated annually in Egypt amounts to about 6 million acres, each giving on the average a crop and a half under intensive irrigated agriculture. This is by far the major source of wealth in that country. Over 37 percent of this total area consists of large estates that are held by about 0.5 percent of all owners. Looking at the situation from the other side, we observe that over 70 percent of all owners possess 1 acre or less each. This is tantamount to being almost landless, as a holding of 3 to 5 acres is considered the minimum essential for the maintenance of a farm family in Egypt. The total area held by these people (i.e., 70 percent of all owners) amounts only to 12.5 percent of all cultivated land.

In addition to this large group of below-subsistence owners, there are the landless sharecroppers and the wage laborers. The three groups together constitute the great deprived peasant class of Egypt, which accounts for about 70 percent of the total population.

These people are in a constant state of struggle to make a bare living by renting land from the large owners, or by hiring themselves out for daily wages. In either case they are beaten in the game. As renters, they pay the owner in cash or in kind an amount that leaves the slightest, if any, margin of reward for their labor. Differing according to fertility and location of the land, rents run from \$10 to \$150 per acre per year. The most common rates fall between \$30 and \$90. The agricultural wage laborer is in the same deplorable situation, as the daily pay averages about 20 cents for boys, 25 cents for women, and 40 cents for men.

Under such conditions it is practically impossible for the Egyptian peasant to become an independent owner. He struggles against great odds, and rarely does he succeed, toward the end of his life, in saving enough to buy one half of an acre or one acre of the precious land.

Unlike Egypt, Iraq is a sparsely populated country relative to its land resource. Yet we find there the same conditions of landlessness, and low levels of living among the peasant folk. More serious still, we find in that country a great agricultural potential which is threatened by the prevailing destructive system of land tenure.

This fertile land of the ancient Tigris and Euphrates rivers has a total potentially cultivable area (mostly by means of expanded irrigation) of some 25 million acres. The present area that is under cultivation each year, however, is less than 6 million acres. There is no doubt that capital and technical aid from the West will make it possible for Iraq to realize this tremendous potential. The serious question, however, is whether development will be attempted on the present shaky foundations of feudalism, absentee ownership, and sharecropping, or on the sounder and more stable foundations of a thriving rural community that is emancipated through its ownership or control of the land. The answer, one way or the other, will be of grave consequence to the future of Iraq.

The following is a brief summary of the situation as it now exists. Less than 0.5 percent of the land is owned privately in fee simple. About 36 percent is state domain which has been leased out more or less permanently to individuals. Over 58 percent is held directly and fully by the state, and is leased out on a yearly basis. These figures indicate clearly that the fate of the land resource has not yet been fully decided as in the case of Egypt. The major portion of it is still in the hands of the state, which could dispose of it either in favor of the landless cultivator and tribesmen, or in favor of the absentee owner and the tribal chief.

The land that is now under cultivation (whether privately owned or leased from the state) is predominantly in the hands or under the control of the semi-feudal tribal chief and the large owner from the city. In either case, absenteeism prevails. The peasants, consisting of village folk and semi-settled tribal people, are in the majority of cases landless sharecroppers. They raise crops and receive a share ranging from 20 to 50 percent of the produce, depending upon whether they supply the seed, the

equipment, and the livestock. In reality the cultivator's share amounts to less than that, for he has to make certain contributions to local functionaries and to the agent of the landlord.

There is also clear evidence that unless the system is checked effectively at its roots, it will continue to perpetuate itself. Witness what has happened during the last 50 years or so. Irrigation has been expanded materially, mainly through pump installations, and total agricultural output has been increased tremendously; but the peasant has remained landless and impoverished. In general, he does not possess the ability or initiative to prove his legal claim to the newly developed land. In many cases, even when his right of ownership is recognized, the cultivator is not able financially to maintain the costly pump installation. He is obliged to work on a share basis with one who is able to supply the necessary capital and equipment, be he the chief or the merchant. Gradually, these become the owners of the land, and the original occupant becomes permanently a landless sharecropper. Through this process the virile and integrated tribal community of Iraq is being transformed into a demoralized agricultural settlement, under the control of an absentee landowner chief.

Syria affords another illustration of the magnitude of the problem. We witness here practically identical conditions of absentee ownership, sharecropping, and low levels of living among the peasants. The manner in which this system threatens the future of agricultural development in Syria is clearly indicated by recent happenings in the Jezira area. This has tremendous possibilities for irrigation and for dry farming. It is sparsely populated, and until recently has been utilized mainly for grazing by nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes. During the last few years cultivation has been expanded rapidly in the area. Modern machinery has been put on the land in large numbers, and bumper grain crops have been harvested.

On the surface, this appears to be the beginning of sound development. Upon closer examination, however, we encounter a different reality. The tractor has been put on that fertile soil mostly by speculators and absentee owners. Concern about the ultimate exhaustion of this great national resource is not upper-

most in their minds. Furthermore, they put the new land under cultivation through an understanding with the local tribal chief. He guarantees them "protection" of the crop in return for a portion of the produce. Nowhere does the peasant figure in this deal other than as a laborer or a sharecropper. Nowhere do we see signs of the emergence of that badly needed class of small, independent, cultivator-owners.

The situation in Lebanon presents a glaring and enlightening contrast between two systems. In the mountain area, the heart of the country, a strong tradition of private ownership by small independent farmers prevails. In most cases, the family farm averages about 10 acres. The soil is scanty and the terrain difficult; but the people have their hearts in what they own. They have blasted the rocks and built extensive terraces to prevent erosion; they have made the mountainsides produce abundantly of olives, grapes, figs, and apples. On the narrow coastal strips they have grown luxuriant orchards of citrus and bananas. More significant than all of this, we observe that the village folk in this area enjoy much higher standards of living. This is clearly manifested in their diet, health, housing, and a literacy rate of some 90 percent.

True, they have other sources of income, especially from emigrants residing abroad. Yet the independence they have gained through ownership of the land has endowed them with the initiative and the possibility to seek these other sources and better their living conditions. Unlike the sharecropper, who is doomed to his status, the small independent owner is free to move up the ladder.

Our argument in this respect gains support from the situation that prevails in the rest of Lebanon — in the Akkar plain of the north, in the Bika valley of the interior, and in the mountain area of the south. Here we witness the predominance of the same feudal-absentee-sharecropping system that exists in Syria and Iraq. Here also we witness the same conditions of deprivation, lack of development and low levels of living. Our argument gains further support from a consideration of living conditions in those village communities of northern Iraq, of some sections of Syria and Jordan, where the people are independent and own



the land directly. Invariably, we find the people here enjoying higher levels of living as compared with their neighbors. They are more enlightened, they possess greater initiative, and are interested in improving their agriculture and bettering their lot.

The case of Saudi Arabia is rather unique in the region, and throws light upon our discussion from a different angle. Here is an up and coming country that is still predominantly pastoral in its economy and tribal in its way of life. So far, its central government (an absolute monarchy not more than a few decades old) has been benevolent. The king, himself a product of desert and tribal life, retains much of its qualities in dealing with his people. On the purely tribal level, life is basically democratic. Within narrow limits of variation, social and economic equality prevails.

Where cultivation exists (and this is restricted to relatively small areas along the west coast and some oases in the interior), the land is owned mostly by small individual cultivators. The vast majority of the land, in all parts of the country, is utilized by nomadic tribes for the grazing of herds of camels and flocks of sheep and goats. Now, who owns this land resource, the potential for agricultural development? The king, the state, the Muslim community, the tribes? No clear and definite answer has been made yet to this question; the situation is still largely in a state of flux.

Under the impact of Western technology, and through the cooperation of the Arabian American Oil Company (which holds the concession to the huge oil resource of the country), Saudi Arabia is moving rapidly along the road of modern life. It is changing from a way of life that is predominantly pastoral to one that depends largely upon agriculture and related industries. In recent years several agricultural and other technical missions from abroad have visited the country and advised on developmental programs. A few irrigation projects are already functioning and others are contemplated. In the summer of 1950 a mission representing the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations negotiated with the government an agreement with respect to the extension of technical aid in agriculture and water development.

We maintain that it is of the utmost importance that the land tenure situation be clarified and a wise policy adopted by the government in this respect before any further water and agricultural development takes place. To wait until after the land has become productive will be to intensify the problem at hand. The traditional grazing rights of the tribe must be reconciled with the cultivation rights of new settlements or of expanding old settlements. The right of the settling tribesman in the ownership of the newly developed land must be clearly stated and assured. The form of ownership and cultivation, whether collective, private, or a combination of the two, must be agreed upon beforehand. A survey must be made in order to establish the grazing rights of various tribes, and to differentiate clearly state or public domain from privately owned land.

In other words, we see Saudi Arabia at the crossroads with respect to its future development, and we see that the land tenure issue is going to play a decisive role in the matter. Judging by what has happened in neighboring Arab countries, we have all reason to expect Saudi Arabia to follow the same road unless effective measures are taken along the above mentioned lines. The forces that make for feudalism, for absentee ownership of the land, for a shaky society with a small group of privileged elite and a vast majority of deprived people, will certainly assert themselves if not checked by a wise national policy. The advantage that Saudi Arabia possesses is that it still has the opportunity to make a choice in the matter.

#### WHAT CAN BE DONE?

The gloomy situation portrayed by the observations we have made is not a hopeless one, as may at first appear. True, the traditions of this destructive and oppressive system of land tenure are deep-rooted, reaching into the remote past, and the forces supporting them are strong. Upon careful study and appraisal of all factors involved, however, we see clear possibilities for a solution and for effective lines of action short of destructive upheavals.

1. *Land reform is being attempted.* Each one of the countries concerned manifests some recognition of the land tenure problem, and most of them have made beginnings at reform.

About two years ago the Government of Saudi Arabia proclaimed its readiness to grant state land to any citizen who undertakes to put it under cultivation. This policy was developed on the basis of the Koranic statement to the effect that land belongs to the one who revives it. It must be remarked in this connection that the religion of Islam is basically for the equitable distribution and utilization of the land resource. Saudi Arabia is an Orthodox Muslim country, regulating its life in accordance with the religious law. This opens the possibility for the development of a form of ownership that is at the same time Islamic and effective.

In the summer of 1949 Col. Husni Za'im of Syria was liquidated through a coup d'état, but not so the reforms he had initiated. The idea of reforming the land tenure system has been kept alive. The government that followed that of Za'im created a committee representing various agencies to study the problem and recommend possible solutions. This activity bore fruit in the form of Article 22 in the new Syrian constitution, which provides, among other things, for (a) encouragement of small and medium land holdings; (b) setting a maximum limit to the size of holdings, but not retroactively; (c) making it obligatory upon the owner to keep his land under cultivation, otherwise he would lose his claim over it; and (d) distributing state land among landless peasants. There are also indications that the present government intends to take effective action in this respect. There is already a plan for the resettlement of peasants on state land in the Homs-Hama areas.

A promising sign in Egypt is the consciousness of the problem that is now shared by government officials and by people in various walks of life, including the peasants themselves. This consciousness has developed as a result of a rapid increase in population, bringing about a tremendous pressure upon the land resource. As mentioned above, this resource is highly concentrated in the hands of the very few, including the state. The landless or near-landless peasant desires strongly a few acres of the coveted precious land.

In response to this tense situation, Egyptian leadership is beginning to take some action. In some cases the government has

distributed reclaimed state domain among the peasants. During the past few years the Ministry of Social Affairs, under energetic and progressive leadership, has been increasingly and effectively sponsoring the cause of the peasant. Among other things, it has proposed draft laws aimed at land reform and at improved tenancy terms. In July 1950, the Egyptian Parliament passed one of these bills, stipulating that estate owners should provide tenants with certain housing and health facilities, and with other services. During the last two years certain deputies have proposed two definite draft laws for land reform in Parliament. Similar proposals have been made by other responsible leaders. All of them aim straight at the heart of the problem — stipulating the distribution of state domain among peasants, the restriction of the size of holdings within minimum and maximum limits, the extension of credit to the new small owner, the protection of peasant property, the improvement of tenancy terms, etc.

A similar consciousness of the magnitude of the problem and the grave consequences it might entail has arisen in Iraq. As far back as 1932 a comprehensive program of land survey and registration was initiated and has been in operation since. At the end of 1947 about 20 million acres (close to 20 percent of the total area of the country) were surveyed and classified. This program constitutes a basic move in the right direction, as it results in clearing the great confusion over title claims.

In 1945 the Iraqi Parliament passed a bill (Law No. 23) authorizing the Government to distribute state domain among landless peasants or tribesmen on the basis of small private ownership. It was a small beginning as the application of the law was restricted to one specific area, the Dujaylah lands, in the Kut Liwa south of Baghdad. Some 180,000 acres were put under irrigation and divided into plots of about 60 acres each for distribution to farming families. After a probationary period of 10 years under government supervision, the farmer can acquire complete ownership of the land. At the beginning of 1947 about 400 cultivators were settled on the project land. Possibly an equal number has been settled since that time. In 1946 another project, the Hawijah Settlement Scheme, was finished. It involved the distribution of some 200,000 acres of irrigated state land among members of the 'Ubayd tribe.



On February 16, 1950, the Prime Minister issued a statement of governmental policy in which he gave emphasis to land reform. He stated that small family farm ownership will be made the basis for agricultural expansion as undertaken by the Government in the future. In June and July 1950 the Government issued decrees by means of which the application of Law No. 23 of 1945 was extended to additional areas of state domain: in the provinces of Hilla and Kerbala in the south, in Diyala in central Iraq, in Suleimaniya and at the Hawijah irrigation project in the north.

It might be argued that all of these measures do not amount to much as yet. This is true; but the important fact remains that the present governments of the region are doing something about the matter. This is an indication of at least some concern on the part of national leadership. Through the extension of moral, technical, and material support by the United States and other cooperating countries, these beginnings could be transformed into great national realities for the whole Middle East.

2. *Progressive elements and groups are working at land reform.* In Egypt and Syria, in Lebanon and Iraq, there are leading individuals and organized groups who have been giving serious thought to the problem. Some have begun to do something about it; others stand ready to lend their support once a national project is launched. Some have worked out sound plans and proposed draft laws for reform; others have established improved tenancy terms on their estates; and many others have written pointedly on the subject, depicting the problem and urging a solution. These enlightened elements have been increasing in numbers and in influence; they constitute the real hope of the Middle East. The encouraging reality is that we find these elements not only among the intellectuals and professional groups, but also among the tribal chiefs and large landowners.

In November 1950 a large group of professional and governmental leaders, representing most of the Arab countries, met in Cairo in a Social Welfare Seminar under the auspices of the United Nations. Reports already received indicate that the subject of land tenure and land reform received serious consideration, the gravity of the problem and possible solutions being discussed in detail.

3. *The solution need not involve expropriation or disruption of farm management.* As indicated above, state domain exists in each of the countries concerned. In some of them such domain is vast. On the basis of land already surveyed in Iraq, it is estimated that pure state land (*miri sirfa*) amounts to about 58 percent of the total. Such land could be utilized for distribution among the landless peasants without raising the problem of expropriation.

In Egypt, where state land is relatively limited, a supplementary solution could consist of the passing of laws to set maximum and minimum limits to the size of holdings in the future. This would tend to keep in check both fragmentation of holdings and concentration in the hands of the few. It would also make it possible for the peasant to purchase some of the land. Of course, he will need financial assistance in this respect.

The problem of disrupted farm management and the consequent decrease in agricultural output will not necessarily arise in the wake of land distribution in the Middle East. This is so because of the fact that distribution will involve largely state domain that has been lying idle or recently reclaimed. Even in the case of previously cultivated land the problem will not be significant because of the well-known fact that efficient management has not been an important feature in Middle East agriculture. In most cases, absentee owners do not make much of a contribution in this respect. Agriculture in the region is mainly the product of activity by the simple peasant, utilizing mostly simple equipment and traditional techniques. This is why the yield per acre and the output per man are in general much lower than in Europe or in the United States. Consequently, the peasant, as owner, cannot do worse than as sharecropper.

4. *Supplementary lines of action are necessary.* We have emphasized land distribution because we are convinced that it is the key to the solution of the land tenure problem. This, of course, does not mean that we wish to minimize the need for supplementary lines of action, which must be followed at the same time land distribution is put into effect. One of these is the development of adequate facilities for the extension of credit to the cultivator. With a few minor exceptions, such facilities

either do not exist or are not within the reach of the small peasant. He has to depend upon the landlord or upon the usurer for credit to buy seed and equipment or to tide himself over a bad crop year. In either case he pays exorbitant rates of interest.

Another is the development of cooperatives, through which the cultivators could market their produce more effectively, purchase their supplies more cheaply, obtain credit, and operate modern farm machinery. On the basis of field experience and observations, we are convinced that the agricultural cooperative can flourish at the hands of the Arab peasants and can render them valuable service in maintaining themselves as independent owners.

There is also the need for improving the conditions of tenancy and the need for training the cultivator in more effective techniques of production and marketing. In each case the margin for improvement is certainly wide, and the benefit accruing to the cultivator appreciable. All such activities and services, however, will not by themselves solve the basic problem. They will not take much effect so long as most of the cultivators are landless.

5. *Land tenure and reform can be made a major target for the Technical Aid Program.* The United Nations and the United States are now set for the implementation of the Point Four Program. Requests for aid are coming in from various underdeveloped countries. A few technical missions are already in the field and others are being organized. As agriculture is the dominant aspect of economy and of life in those countries, it will be the major target of the program. But — as we have shown above — so long as the present system of land tenure in the Middle East persists, sound agricultural development — *on a democratic basis for the benefit of the people* — cannot be achieved.

Thus the issue of land ownership stands squarely between the Point Four Program and the attainment of its true objective. It must be concerned with this issue; and it must be utilized as a strategic instrument for bringing about the desired reform. At the beginning, and for practical considerations, technical aid can be concentrated upon those projects already in operation

(as described above) which involve land distribution. Special consideration can be given to those landlords or tribal chiefs who are willing to go along with a sound land and peasant development program. The United Nations and the United States can also build up a corps of land tenure experts who could render the necessary services to the countries concerned. There is no doubt also but that the International Bank and the Export-Import Bank are in a position to exert effective influence in this respect.

It would be tragic, indeed, if the Point Four Program should be wholly spent upon the imparting of techniques for increased production without concern as to whether such production would be used for democratic ends. It would be ironical if this "bold new program" — a potent voice of Democracy in action on a global scale — should unwittingly serve as an instrument for the perpetuation of the present oppressive and undemocratic system of land tenure.

But we have strong hope and faith that this is not going to be the case. We feel confident that enlightened leadership on both sides of this cooperative enterprise appreciate the magnitude and gravity of the problem, and will guide the aid program accordingly. Leadership along this line of approach definitely exists and is expanding into greater proportions in the various organizations of the United Nations, in governmental agencies and private organizations of the United States, and in the various countries of the Middle East.



# PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN TURKISH INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

*Robert W. Kerwin*

ONE OF THE most significant aspects of recent political developments in Turkey is the swing to a policy of emphasis on private enterprise in the economic development of the country. Up to the present time Turkey has had a "hybrid" economy in which more emphasis was placed on development of state-owned factories than on industrial undertakings by private enterprise. In the future, however, if the words of the new Democrat Party regime can be taken at face value, the role of the Government in economic activity will be restricted, and priority in industrial development will go to privately-owned factories. The historical background of this turn from statism to free enterprise, the present status of private industry, and the problems arising from this change in economic policy are interesting aspects of the "new look" in Turkey's attempt to develop on the lines of Western countries.

## *GROWTH OF PREFERENCE FOR PRIVATE ENTERPRISE*

Ever since the establishment of the Republic, the Turkish Government has sought to encourage the industrial development of the country. To this end, it relied at first on a policy of state aid to private enterprise. In 1924 the semi-official İş Bank was established to invest in industrial plants. Private industry was accorded protection through tariff barriers. It was further en-

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couraged by government gifts of land, tax and customs exemptions, reductions in transport rates, and preferential buying by state institutions under a Law for Encouragement of Industry adopted in 1927. The accent was on development by the nation's own efforts, without foreign assistance. Foreign-owned concessionary companies, particularly railroads and municipal public services, were bought out by the Turkish Government.

By the early 'thirties a limited industrial development had taken place. Sugar factories and textile plants, in particular, had grown to some importance. But it was felt that economic development through reliance on private enterprise was too slow, and the Government began to move toward a policy of direct intervention in industrialization. The autocratic government of Kamal Atatürk finally decided to adopt a system of partial state-planning, and in 1933 Turkey launched a five-year plan of industrialization under a policy of *étatisme* — direct state participation in economic activity, especially in industry.

There were many reasons for the adoption of this policy. Development through private investment was hindered by shortage of capital. A system of economic control from the top no doubt appealed to the country's leaders, many of whom were military men. The military and administrative classes that ruled the country may also have feared the growth in power of the new middle class which a free enterprise system would have created. On the other hand, some of the country's intellectuals were impressed by the advocacy of and results of state planning in other countries, particularly Germany and Russia. Criticism of capitalism in the capitalist countries themselves added to this impression. An agricultural crisis in 1929-30 emphasized the lack of industrial development in Turkey and the country's dependence as a raw materials producer on the more industrialized nations. Distaste for such economic dependence stemmed from the days of the Ottoman Empire when capitulations, European financial intervention, and foreign concessions were a part of Turkey's economic scene. Precedent for state participation in industry was also found in Ottoman history when the Turkish Government had established military factories. These plants remained in operation under the Republic and formed a nucleus for future state enterprise.

The policy adopted in 1933 was not so much the upshot of ideology as a policy of nationalist expediency. It resembled neither communism nor the national socialism of Germany. *Étatism* was not substituted for private enterprise; the policy was directed toward new industrial developments. But it succeeded in suppressing private industrial expansion though continued aid was given to private industry through 1942. In the mixed economy that developed, the accent on public enterprise became greater and greater as further state-planning and public investment in industry and mining were undertaken. The Government mobilized savings through high taxes and by charging high prices for the goods which its factories produced. Capital was naturally short in Turkey, and the forced diversion of savings into state enterprise left little for private investment.

When, following World War II, freedom of speech and criticism of the government was permitted in Turkey, it became evident that an influential segment of the population had become dissatisfied with state economic activity. The basis of the resulting criticism of public enterprise lay in the failings of the state establishments themselves. Government enterprise was growing and feeding on itself. Special groups of individuals were building "kingdoms" in certain state industrial or mining activities. The development of marketing techniques had been subordinated to technological growth. The result was that factories were producing for inventory without regard to demand for the products. Stocks of finished goods piled up, but prices remained high. Demands on state financial resources mounted.

While *étatism* bettered the lot of the workers engaged in state industry, it did not materially aid the country as a whole. Despite heavy investment of funds, government industry probably did not succeed in substantially raising the real per capita income of the Turkish people. Most of the advances in productivity barely kept pace with the growth in population. All of the profits of state factories went into expansion of state investment or were used to cover losses of other government plants. No dividends on capital invested were paid to the Treasury. The earnings of workers were eaten up by heavy taxes on wages and general inflation.

After the war American observers also began to criticize Turkish *étatisme*. In view of the developing relations between the two countries, they had an important influence. It began to be generally felt that Turkey's internal regime should be more palatable to the United States in order to assure better understanding and to justify economic assistance. The writings of Max Thornburg were important in this connection, for his conviction that the curtailment of *étatisme* and the favoring of free enterprise in the developmental efforts must be a prerequisite of American aid<sup>1</sup> had an impact on a wide and influential audience.

Toward the end of its quarter-century regime, the Republican People's Party showed signs of being moved by these pressures and exhibited a growing tendency to cater to Turkish and foreign private enterprise. Despite continual expansion of state-owned industrial plants, statements were made by the Government that private industry would be encouraged. Foreign trade became freer than it had been before the war; some import and foreign exchange permits were granted for investments in private factories. The Government began to talk of limiting its sphere of economic activity. In May 1947 a decree was adopted whereby earnings of foreign corporations in Turkey, previously held in blocked accounts, could be deblocked by export of certain commodities. In March 1950 a law to encourage foreign investment in Turkey was passed which permitted the Ministry of Finance to guarantee the transfer of the profits, interest, and capital of foreign investors. Discussions between the Turkish Government, the International Bank, and local bankers and industrialists were undertaken relative to the establishment of an Industrial Development Bank designed to make medium- and long-term loans to new or expanding private industrial establishments.<sup>2</sup>

One of the basic issues of the 1950 political campaign — the first completely free elections ever held in Turkey — was the question of public versus private enterprise. While this was not the decisive factor in the defeat of the Government, the coming to power of the Democrat Party did mean that more than lip

<sup>1</sup> Thornburg, Max Weston; Spry, Graham; Soule, George, *Turkey: An Economic Appraisal* (New York, 1949).

<sup>2</sup> See William Diamond, "The Industrial Development Bank of Turkey," *Middle East Journal*, IV (July 1950), 349-52.



service would probably be given to the curtailment of *étatisme* and the encouragement of private industry. To date, few tangible actions have been taken although the Government has declared its intention not to build any more factories. The possibility of sale of existing state plants is being studied and discussed. The new Cabinet reaffirmed Democrat Party platform promises to private enterprise in the program it submitted to the Grand National Assembly on May 29, 1950. The following is a summary translation of this aspect of the program:

The aim and essence of our economic policies is to reduce to the minimum the interference of the State and to restrict the state sector in the economic field, and, by inspiring confidence, to encourage the development of private enterprise to the utmost. Only those enterprises which due to their nature and operation cannot in any way be undertaken by private enterprise will be left for the State to operate. Such activities will consist only of those that have the character of a public utility or which can be considered basic industries. We intend to transfer all other existing state enterprises to private enterprise. We have decided to abolish those enterprises which seem unnecessary and to link to more certain principles the administration and control of the state economic enterprises and organizations in order to lighten their burden on the economy of the country.

#### *PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AN UNKNOWN QUANTITY*

One of the strange aspects of this recent trend in Turkish economic policy is that little is known of the nature of private enterprise in the country. Studies of industry outside the government sphere are practically nonexistent. Few books on the Turkish economy even mention privately-owned factories. No statistics of any value have been collected on the capacity, output, or growth of private industry, except for certain data required until 1942 of plants subject to the Law for Encouragement of Industry. The element to which everyone is now turning for future economic development is in effect an unknown quantity.

Of course, agricultural enterprise, which supports about 80% of the Turkish population, is overwhelmingly in private hands and is particularly marked by the existence of a large number of small landholders. However, the controversy about public and private enterprise does not relate to agriculture to any great extent. It is primarily in the industrial and mining spheres that the alternatives of state and private enterprise as means of economic development exist.

Private industry is one of the least developed segments of the Turkish economy. This is owing to several factors, some resulting from the emphasis placed on industrialization by the State and others due to more fundamental obstacles to industrial development. Before analyzing these inhibiting factors, it is necessary to survey briefly the present physical development of Turkish private industry.

Some of Turkey's textile plants have been in existence since the turn of the century, but most of the privately-owned factories of any size which exist today date from the period 1923-42, when certain fields of industry were encouraged and protected by governmental or semi-official measures. The principal fields of private industry are cotton textiles, woolen textiles, cement, tanned leather and shoes, bricks and tiles, vegetable oils and soap, silk, rubber goods, plywood, veneers and furniture, a few agricultural implements, some metal products of cast iron and forged and machine steel, flour,\* and to a limited extent other processed foods.

Some of these industries are barely out of the handicraft stage, but in others considerable development has taken place even with state production in the same field and despite the existence of great obstacles to industrial development. Space limitations preclude survey here of each field, but a brief review of some of the most important industries, to illustrate their development and relationship to state enterprise, follows.

Manufacture of cotton goods is by far the most important industry in Turkey. Up to the present time, this field has been about equally divided between state and private factories. A recent estimate gives private enterprise 175,000 spindles out of a country-wide total of 325,000. Ministry of Commerce figures show that private factories have some 2,500 looms out of a total of 5,700 (not counting 40,000 domestic hand-looms). Since the war, the Sümerbank, the government-owned holding company in the industrial field, has invested over TL 60 million in the cotton textiles industry, expanding capacity of existing state plants and constructing three new factories. Private cotton manufacturers have also invested several millions in renewal of ma-

chinery and expansion of capacity, but the heavy current investment by the State gives government enterprise a definite edge.

The private textile factories concentrate largely on production of "grey" goods and hand-printed cloth in bright colors. Both of these items are in great demand by the peasants. The state factories also produce unbleached, bleached, dyed, and printed fabrics, but in addition they devote some of their capacity to production of more costly woven and printed patterns for urban consumption. State plants are undoubtedly superior to private factories in equipment and in technical skills, but heavy administrative and social welfare charges as well as inefficiency in marketing makes the cost of production of government-owned plants relatively high.

There has been little real competition between private and state textile enterprises. The sales price of products of government factories has been the market price, and since private plants generally operate at a lower cost than do government enterprises, private concerns enjoy a high margin of profit. The state textile industry has maintained high prices on its goods both because of its high costs and in order to accumulate profits which have been needed by the Sümerbank to cover its investments and losses in other industries.

In the woolen textiles field, the balance between state and private factories is also about 50-50. Figures on over-all capacity of the industry are not available, but a rough idea of its development can be gained by doubling the state factories' total of 29,629 spindles and 449 looms. This capacity of state plants is currently being expanded by about 50 percent.

The woolen goods industry in Turkey is devoted primarily to the processing of imported raw materials. In view of the relatively low productivity of Turkish factories, their existence can largely be attributed to the protection they receive. Domestic wool is coarse and more suitable for carpet-weaving or very rough fabrics than for better quality cloth. It is significant that in the woolen textiles industry, production in both state and private plants is largely directed toward the urban market. Relatively high quality cloth is manufactured; little attempt is made to meet the demand of peasants for inexpensive and practical clothing. With the exception of production in state factories

of blankets and uniforms for the Army, practically no effort is made to use domestic wool in the industrial production of cloth.

The importation of tanned leather and shoes is virtually prohibited in Turkey. A number of privately-owned tanneries have developed under this protection. They are largely found in the Istanbul area. The State also operates a tannery as well as Turkey's only shoe factory. In the leather industry, imported hides are preferred to domestic hides, which are poor in quality and are used only for military footwear and rough leather goods. Here again the industry is largely a processor of imported raw materials.

The Sümerbank shoe factory at Beykoz produces about 800,000 of the estimated 10 million pairs of shoes consumed annually in Turkey. The remainder are manufactured by hand. Yet the state plant has difficulty in competing with small craftsmen because of tax differentials and consumer preference for the hand-made product. Failure of the state shoe factory to produce cheap shoes for the peasant is compensated by hand production of a "moccasin" type footwear and the manufacture of relatively inexpensive tennis shoes by two rubber processing plants. The entire rubber goods industry is privately-owned; it is completely dependent on imported raw materials.

The capacity of the Turkish cement industry is about 400,000 tons annually. Three private factories in the Istanbul area represent 72% of the nation's capacity, while the remainder consists of a 100,000-ton Sümerbank plant at Sivas and a smaller factory at Ankara (15,000 tons) owned jointly by the Sümerbank and the Ankara Municipality. The two largest private plants date from 1931 when foreign capital (French and Belgian) joined with local interests to enter the industry. This is one of the few instances of the participation of foreign capital in economic development under the Republic. Cement factories enjoyed considerable protection at that time.

#### *SOME INFLUENCES OF ÉTATIST POLICY ON DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE INDUSTRY*

Turkish private industry has been greatly influenced by the fact that it has existed in a partially regulated economy and in many fields in which the State also participates.



Competition between state and private enterprise in the industrial field has not in fact been much of an issue to date. We have already noted the lack of competition in the textiles industry. What private manufacturers have feared is not competition from the State but the expansionist nature of state enterprise and the possibility of government expropriation of private plants. Thus, private industry has been wary of possible arbitrary acts of the State.

Actual competition of the Government in business has been felt by private firms more often in the commercial field than in the industrial. The state-sponsored and -financed agricultural "cooperatives," for example, have invaded commerce. They have helped to push up prices in purchasing cotton and other commodities. In many cases the "cooperatives" have cornered export licenses. In domestic petroleum distribution, the state-owned Petrol Ofis has entered into competition with foreign oil companies operating in Turkey, ostensibly to break up cartel operations but probably also with an eye to lucrative commercial profits.

Private Turkish industry has come to distrust the Government to a considerable extent. Manufacturers eye the rapid expansion of state enterprise with some alarm. The point has been reached in the textiles industry, for example, where competition between state and private factories could be very cutthroat. In 1949, failure of the Turkish wheat crop caused a severe decline in peasant purchasing power which was felt very much in the textile trade. The already high inventories carried by manufacturers and merchants mounted even higher. The stocks of the Sümerbank were especially large. At one point the state factories cut prices on unbleached cloth to a point which private producers claim, in view of the price of raw cotton, was below cost. The Sümerbank maintained that this was not so, but that it paid less for the cotton used in the manufacture of grey goods than it did for that used for dyed and printed goods. The private manufacturers in turn claimed that the Sümerbank's accounts had merely been juggled to reduce the cost of grey goods by adding the difference to the cost of printed cloth. The Sümerbank owns the only factory in the country (at Nazilli) where

cotton goods are printed by machinery rather than by hand. This gives state enterprise a great cost advantage over private factories in the manufacture of printed fabrics. If the Sümerbank took advantage of its horizontal integration by using its profits on printed goods to absorb any losses on grey goods, many of the private plants which produce only unbleached cloth would be forced to operate at a loss.

Another source of increasing distrust of the State on the part of private textile factories was the latter's experience with wartime marketing controls. The entire output of Turkish textile factories was requisitioned by the Government at a price prescribed for each plant. All goods were marketed for the State by the Sümerbank at a price much higher than that paid the factories. Private manufacturers estimate that the Government in this way earned a total of some TL 80 million. These profits were placed in a coordination fund designed to meet losses on basic consumer products, particularly to bridge the gap between the cost of production and the selling price of state-produced coal. The Government also intervened in the cement industry during the war. In this case it actually took over private plants for some two and a half years.

These wartime experiences worried private industry for two reasons. In the first place, it feared that the taste for high profits gained through the monopolization of textiles distribution and cement production might influence the State to make the wartime situation permanent by expropriation of private plants. In addition, private textile manufacturers claim they are now in a tight financial position because, in the prices set for their products, insufficient allowance was made for abnormal depreciation and for increases in raw material and labor costs. They maintain that as a result they realized little of the profits ( $12\frac{1}{2}$ – $17\frac{1}{2}\%$ ) legally permitted them in the controlled price and were left with no margin for renewal of machinery and accumulation of operating capital. Similarly, cement producers maintain that their present financial difficulty stems from the failure of the government to take abnormal depreciation into account in fixing the rents paid for their plants during the war. In view of the expansion of state textiles factories in the postwar period, the

private producers claim that their antiquated and worn-out plants will place them at a serious disadvantage unless they can find means for financing new investment. Though their resources may be sufficient to finance renewals of equipment, they are using this argument to seek loans from the State or foreign aid in order to make their position more secure. The same is true with regard to proposals for the expansion of private cement capacity with ECA assistance.

Turkish private industrial firms have often overvalued their fixed assets on their balance sheets and have set aside inadequate funds for depreciation. They say that this practice was followed because, fearing expropriation by the Turkish Government, they wanted to have a legal basis for claiming as high remuneration as possible if the plants were taken over by the State. In effect, the private manufacturers have taken out as "profits" funds which should have been allocated to depreciation. The practical result is that in many of the private plants the funds that are left are represented by fixed assets, and they are short of cash for operating capital. For financial accounts to accord with realities, however, the firms would have to have faith in the future.

There is a marked difference between the industrial fields in which the State operates and those which private enterprise first entered. While private factories exist in several of the same fields as state factories, they usually predate the latter and have continued to thrive in the protected climate assured by the fact that the Government was in the same business. On the other hand, private enterprise has been wary of entering fields in which the state has been the pioneer.

Differences between state and private fields of industry have also been due to the nature of the operations of each. The Government has sometimes invested in the production of goods for which extensive demand has not yet developed. Since they are often regulated by political considerations, demand does not always concern state enterprises. Private factories, on the other hand, are forced to pay attention to demand because they operate in a market economy.

*Étatism* has given government-owned industries two great

advantages over private enterprise: access to capital, and access to foreign exchange for equipment and raw materials. As we shall see later, scarcity of capital is a basic obstacle to industrial development in Turkey. In fact, this was given as one of the main justifications for the State's entry into industry. Through taxation and the maintenance of high prices to consumers, the Government has diverted potential consumption and even potential private investment funds into forced savings for its own investments in industry.

There has been a distinct difference between the relations of the Central Bank of Turkey with the Government and its relations with private enterprise. Since 1938 the Central Bank has rediscounted Treasury-guaranteed bills of state enterprises at an effective rate of one per cent. These bills normally run nine months but are practically always renewed. They have become in effect a permanent floating debt of the Government at the Central Bank. This practice has also contributed greatly to inflation since it is in effect printing paper money to finance investment. As contrasted with such assistance given to the State's investment in industry, the Central Bank has followed a system of rediscounting for the banking system only nonrenewable 90-day commercial bills of private enterprise. If and when such loans can be arranged by private industries at commercial banks the effective interest rate is 10-12%.

The advantage of state enterprise over private factories in securing foreign exchange for machinery or raw materials imports in a country where trade and exchange restrictions have long been the rule and where favoritism reigns in the allotment of exchange is too obvious for explanation. There has been no effective program for rationing of exchange in Turkey, and a state organization has been able to get pretty much what it wants in the way of foreign exchange.

The mere fact that relations with the government are so important in nearly all aspects of economic operations often puts private enterprise on a political rather than an economic basis. The securing of a license is frequently more important to the industrialist than the price of the goods he imports or exports or the efficiency of his operations. Nepotism is often present in



government purchasing. This is particularly important since the State is the greatest buyer in the country, and since state institutions often get preferential treatment in the purchase of the products of state factories. "Influence" has become an even more valuable asset in Turkey than it has in the West, though this is not a new development in the Levant.

Also significant is the fact that the government is involved in myriad day-by-day operations of private enterprise. It controls labor conditions, unions, and social welfare services. The last are particularly costly to Turkish industry. Bureaucracy causes much loss of time and money. Even the tax system affects the form of industry in Turkey. Income taxes lead to the distribution of extra-heavy dividends, since in personal income taxes dividends previously taxed are exempted only if the dividends are distributed in the same year as the profits are made. The exemption of small firms from the production transaction tax (18% on all manufactured goods) leads to dispersal of operations and prevents integration of production facilities.

Price controls have also been instituted by the Government, even in peacetime. The outstanding case is the cement industry. In 1935, with the coming of *étatisme*, the State intervened in this field. Prices were fixed on cement and plans were drawn up for construction of state factories. In 1938 an attempt was made to buy out the private plants but agreement could not be reached as to their value. The Government still controls cement prices, but this benefits only state purchasers and middlemen since black market sales flourish at more than double the official price. Private consumers find cement a scarce item. The foreign shareholders in Turkish cement factories have received little return on their investment, especially since dividends are based on the original amount of capital without regard to great depreciation in value of the Turkish lira.

Turkish private industry has leaned heavily on government protection. The rope and twine factory near Istanbul illustrates the general situation. This plant was established in 1932 under the favorable conditions of the Law for Encouragement of Industry. It has an annual capacity of about 525 tons of twine and 350 tons of rope. Domestic hemp is used in the manufacture

of twine, while sisal and manila fibres are imported for rope making. The Turkish rope factory enjoyed prosperity until after the war, when easing of import restrictions and devaluation of European currencies placed the local product in a poor competitive position *vis-à-vis* imported rope. Moreover, the principal user of rope, the State Shipping Administration, which had previously purchased the local product on a preferential basis, began to import all of its needs. The factory is now in financial difficulty.

Looking back over the polemics concerning the relations between private enterprise and the Government, it is apparent that private industry complains of state interference while at the same time it often seeks state aid. This is, of course, a characteristic which Turkish enterprise shares with enterprise everywhere and which has been general in economic history. Private industry looks to the Government to take the lead in economic development. It frequently expects state assistance in the maintenance of assured and high-price markets. In its protected position, it often knows little competition. Its most valid objections to the role of the State in industry are based on the fact that activities of the Government have resulted in a feeling of insecurity on the part of private industry and necessity for coping with bureaucratic interference, as well as inequities in treatment of state and private industry.

#### *MORE FUNDAMENTAL OBSTACLES TO INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT*

Aside from hindrances to development of private enterprise which have grown out of the strong, active role of the State in economic affairs, there are basic aspects of the economic situation in Turkey which are impediments to industrialization, whether carried out by public or private means.

Some mention has already been made of the scarcity of capital in Turkey and of the difficulties of enticing capital into industry. The fact is that there is not enough capital to satisfy the demands for it since a large segment of the population amasses no appreciable savings.

Such investment funds as are accumulated are more often

invested in trade, particularly imports, which has generally brought high returns over short periods of time. Bank credit has gone into 90-day commercial loans, except for the inflationary rediscount credit provided to state enterprise by the Central Bank. There has been no development of investment banking. Even the people who have invested in industry are generally traders who build factories as a sideline; most of the private industrial establishments are owned by families which have gained their original wealth in commerce. This too, of course, has been a common development in the economic history of other countries.

The trading nature of Turkish industry is a characteristic of its present stage of development and inhibits effective industrialization. Because of the high rate of profit on commercial investments, capital that does enter industry demands abnormal returns and rapid amortization. The concept of low markup on mass-produced articles does not exist. It is not unusual to find Turkish traders expecting as a normal course as high as 80% profit on their capital and complete amortization of their investment in two to three years. This naturally results in investment taking place only in fields where profits are very high, usually where markets are protected. This is an essential difference between private enterprise in Turkey and in the United States.

Turkish industry is also characterized by a tendency to sink a large portion of its funds in inventory, often for purposes of speculation. Normal stocks are high and in bad years the factories tend to "sit on" their inventory rather than to move it by price cuts. Thus, when crop failures in 1949 resulted in a serious drop in textile sales, the manufacturers allowed inventories to accumulate until all plants were short of operating capital. This was less serious in state industry because the factories' output is immediately "sold" to a central marketing organization maintained by the Sümerbank, where the accumulation of stocks takes place. Despite the severity of the crisis, only one Turkish factory reduced production, the others gambling on a boom crop in 1950.

Industry also has to compete with more stable investment fields, especially real estate, as well as with the traditional tendency to "hide" wealth in gold or precious stones or by sending

it abroad. This tendency has been aggravated by the fluctuations in the value of the Turkish currency.

All of these characteristics of Turkey's stage of development could prove a real obstacle to further growth in view of the shortage of capital in Turkey. Without substantial investment of private savings in industry, the economy may not progress beyond its present stage of development. The new Industrial Development Bank is intended to alleviate the problem of capital accumulation and investment in industry, but the solution of the problem is still a long way ahead.

Other fundamental obstacles to industrial development are the lack of such subsidiary facilities as transportation and power, the nonexistence of marketing services, and the absence of an educational and training system which is integrated with the needs of economic development. These are basic problems of all underdeveloped countries; Turkey has actually made considerable strides in accessory fields so essential to both agricultural and industrial development.

The thing that most characterizes Turkish industrial development to date is the lack of balance between know-how in managerial and financial fields and technological know-how. As early as 1923, in formulating programs of industrialization, it was realized that a great shortage of skilled engineers and technicians existed in the country. Thus, in the last 25 years a large number of people have been given technical training both in Turkey and abroad, particularly since the adoption of the policy of *étatisme* in 1933. Real progress has been made in the technological aspects of state-owned industry; in fact, technological advances have greatly overshadowed and in some respects hindered development of managerial and business skills in public enterprise. This has been partly due to the fact that the directors of state factories are often technicians rather than business men. The balance in private enterprise is the other way. Managerial and financial skills are better developed thanks to the partial existence of a market economy, whereas technological skill is inferior to that in state enterprise. Even in private industry, however, great progress can be made in developing managerial



competence. Because most of the manufacturers are basically traders, true industrial management has been slow to develop.

Managerial and financial know-how are generally the product of long experience. It is natural, therefore, that progress in these fields would be slow in the short period of time devoted to industrialization in Turkey. The over-all lack of these skills, however, is one of the greatest impediments to further economic development; training in management is greatly needed.

#### THE FUTURE OF TURKISH PRIVATE INDUSTRY

The controversy between public and private enterprise has to some extent obscured the more fundamental problems of industrial development in Turkey. The development of private industry will depend on the success attained in resolving such problems, some of which have been noted above.

The Turkish Government can do a great deal to ameliorate the influence of those situations which have arisen from the existence of the policy of *étatisme* by ending the special privileges of state industry, by relieving fears of arbitrary action, and by reducing state investment to a minimum so as to leave in private hands a reasonable amount of the still inadequate capital available in Turkey. The specific actions required for such purposes are too detailed for consideration here. It should be noted, however, that the much-heralded transfer of state enterprises to private ownership is not the most important issue, for in the final analysis the development and growth of private enterprise will be measured by the emergence of new, economic factories rather than by a change in the ownership of existing ones. That transfer does, of course, involve knotty problems, such as proper estimation of the value of the State's plants, decisions as to what to do with existing personnel, and most important of all the source of the private capital needed to purchase the Government factories. These and other considerations make it essential that a thorough and sound policy be worked out for disposal of state plants.

The more serious responsibility of the Turkish Government is the elusive and complicated one of taking the steps required to create an environment in which private capital can with safety

be accumulated and invested and in which private enterprise can develop the skills it needs for effective investment. Though the growth of private investment and the development of such skills depend on the growing maturity of private enterprise, the Government can take a leading role in their encouragement. Possible steps are again too detailed for consideration here, but the broad questions of providing accessory services in transportation and power, the qualitative direction of savings and credit into productive fields through taxation and banking policies, as well as the more ordinary measures of reasonable protection against imports and the provision of public marketing and training services might all be involved in a program of government encouragement of Turkish private industry.

We may say that Turkish private enterprise today is a far cry from what we are used to in the United States. But the important fact is that the Turkish people, of their own choice, have swung toward a free-enterprise economy. There is no doubt that in the present stage of economic development in Turkey, few people understand what the existence of a competitive market economy means. But without knowing exactly why, they feel that private enterprise is more efficient than the statism that they have known. This alone is a significant attainment in the quarter-century efforts toward the industrialization of modern Turkey.

# LAND AND POPULATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

## Trends and Prospects

*Alfred Bonn *

**O**BSERVERS throughout the world have tended to view with growing apprehension the increase in the earth's population as against the limited potentialities of its natural resources. Popular and scientific writers alike warn of the grave implications of this increase unaccompanied by any adequate expansion of food production.

The figures certainly indicate a disquieting situation. During the first half of the century the average rate of increase of world population rose from 0.75 per cent to 1.0 per cent per annum, i.e., to over 20 million persons yearly. World War II cost 31 million lives (not including China); yet the losses from this terrible visitation, which only a few years ago seemed to be irreparable, were made good in less than a two-year period of natural increase.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, it is argued that the rate of increase is bound to show a progressive acceleration; for urbanized conditions of life and scientific approach to the prevention of epidemics and the cure of diseases will result in a steady lowering of mortality rates, while conditions of reproduction will not be essentially affected. World population today is already very much larger than in 1939; if the present rates of increase continue it will amount in 40 years to 3,500 million as against an estimated 2,265 million at the present time.

But in the eyes of those who take a pessimistic view of the

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<sup>1</sup> Colin Clark, "The World's Capacity to Feed and Clothe Itself," *The Way Ahead* (1949), pp. 78ff.

position it is not only this unparalleled increase in human consumption which will mean such a burden on available food supply throughout the world. The gap is widened by conclusions derived from the indication of dwindling land resources. Wherever one turns, whether to Asia, Europe, or Africa, a gradual exhaustion of land resources and soil substance is reported. The productiveness of the land, according to these reports, is steadily decreasing. Fertility has been consumed and soil destroyed at a rate far in excess of the capacity of either man or nature to replace. "The glorious achievements of civilization have been builded on borrowed capital to a scale undreamed by the most extravagant of monarchs. And unlike the bonds which statesmen so blithely issue to — and against — their own people, an obligation has been piled up which cannot be repudiated by the stroke of any man's pen." Thus writes Professor Paul Sears in *Deserts on the March*, a book devoted to the dangers of the expanding deserts and sterile lands throughout the world.<sup>2</sup> Another writer of repute, though not a soil expert, bluntly says that all possible conservation methods are futile unless human breeding is checked. According to him it is obvious that 50 years hence the world will not be able to support 3 billion people at any but coolie standards for most of them.<sup>3</sup>

It is indeed a grim picture which such statements depict. And the disquieting impression is further strengthened by the consideration that the heaviest pressure for additional food derives precisely from those regions where, owing to the absence of any check, the prospects of a substantial increase of population are still very favorable. Regions which show such a disproportion between the growing population and the food supply are largely identical with those nowadays described as "underdeveloped" areas, comprising some three fourths of the present world population. They embrace larger tracts in the Old World than in the New; but in the Old and the New World alike the main problems arising from the increase of population, and from the many obstacles in the way of land utilization and agricultural development, present many similar features. Nevertheless, a close exami-

<sup>2</sup> Paul B. Sears, *Deserts on the March* (London, 1949), p. 9.

<sup>3</sup> William Vogt, *Road to Survival* (London, 1949), p. 279.



nation of the picture in the Middle East leads one to the conclusion that this pessimistic outlook is not justified.

## II

The countries of the Middle East are well suited to demonstrate important aspects of the general problem. They have large potential resources of land and water; they possess tremendous oil resources highly coveted in the present world. Yet the standards of living and the levels of economic, social, and political organization in nearly all parts of the Middle East are low. In some countries of the Middle East the effect of a high rate of population increase is intensely felt. There is even one country — Egypt — which shows indications of acute overpopulation.

But as against excessive density in Egypt, i.e., a growth of the rural population which has outstripped the extension of available land resources, there are other countries of the Middle East which show the reverse picture; their present population is unable to make good use of the uncultivated land reserves.<sup>4</sup> These countries are notably Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Turkey, each of which possesses vast territories with a wide range of agricultural potentialities, primarily in the field of irrigated crops, but including also dry farming, animal husbandry, plantations, and afforestation.

Political considerations have in recent years injected a controversial aspect into the discussion of the agricultural potentialities of the Middle East. Nevertheless, the present writer has arrived over a number of years at a very positive appraisal of its potentialities, an appraisal supported by impressions of many journeys in the area and studies on the spot. He was led to his conclusions by the startling differences in density of population, and in degree of utilization and yield on land of potentially similar fertility. It is unfortunate that an issue which should be handled by

<sup>4</sup> The term "cultivable" is used here not as an absolute measurement but to denote a property which is itself determined by the interaction of the physical properties of the land and the economic factors of production which are applied to it and modify it. The estimates which follow refer to economic factors of production which operate today or can be operated without applying an entirely new technology. They will require, however, certain institutional adjustments. See also Section IV, p. 45.

sober investigation and clarification has been dealt with by some authors, consciously or subconsciously, with considerable bias. The arguments against such a positive appraisal fail to take into account recent experience in the area, as well as the changes in evaluation of natural resources going on in the world.

It is thus the thesis of the present writer, today as before, that millions of people in the Middle East who are at present underemployed, underfed, and illiterate can attain a better standard of living. In his *The Economic Development of the Middle East*, which appeared first in 1943 and which is mainly devoted to this issue, an effort was made to depict the potentialities of the region and their utilization against the background of this population increase. It was thus, in the nature of things, an analysis based on certain given assumptions. But he believes today, just as firmly as then, that a positive answer to these burning problems of the Middle East's future is both feasible and imperative. This belief is based on the ingenuity and skill of modern man as applied to such tasks, and is justified by the mass of evidence both in the Middle East and outside of it.

Since 1943 many more data have become available following the numerous investigations carried out by research teams, agricultural missions, engineering enterprises, etc.; and though there are still many unknown data, the picture which emerges today has become much clearer and in many respects more reliable. The outcome of these investigations widely confirms the views which the writer expressed at the time in regard to the large agricultural potentialities of the area.

Table I (p. 54) is an attempt to summarize the results of these investigations. It contains the findings and estimates of cultivable and irrigable land, the source being indicated in every case. Since there are still a number of gaps in our knowledge the estimates vary in some cases. But even if we omit the extreme estimates and use moderate figures only, we obtain impressive data: the cultivable area of the eight countries totals 118 million hectares (1 hectare=2.47 acres). Of this area only 32 million hectares are cultivated. Thus 86 million hectares can be regarded as land reserve for future cultivation.

Now this total does not consider the specific potentialities of

irrigation. Unlike countries in the temperate zone, the agricultural potentialities of the Middle East countries are largely dominated by the fact that they include substantial territories which require the use of artificial irrigation for cultivation and for the achievement of their maximum yields. Irrigated agriculture means considerable additional application of capital and labor. But in return there is a very considerable increase in productivity, a substantial expansion of yields per unit of area even compared to those zones where irrigated cultivation has been occasionally practiced but has not yet reached its optimum. The peculiarities of irrigated agriculture lead to a relationship between labor applied and the unit of area basically different from that which is characteristic of dry farming. The latter employs no human labor to supply its water needs; whereas the outstanding feature of irrigated agriculture is the high coefficient of manpower required, resulting in the higher density of population in irrigated territories. Irrigated land has thus a much higher potential in respect of labor input, yield, and earning power than unirrigated land.

The right-hand columns of Table I show that the potentialities for irrigated agriculture are very considerable. Of the total irrigable area of 15.8 million hectares in the countries under review, only 7.0 million hectares are at present utilized. This would mean that nearly 9 million hectares are still open for the expansion of irrigated cultivation.

### III

It is thus no matter of surprise to find in recent surveys published or compiled by official or semi-official bodies an increasingly positive appraisal of the available land resources of Middle East regions. The most recent study of this subject is the *Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East*, published on December 28, 1949. It is the production of a group of recognized experts working together in two teams: one in the field of agricultural development and one in engineering. The report contains a series of proposals which, in its opinion, if translated into action can lead the way to a

fuller development of the resources of the countries of the Middle East.

Chapter I of the Report summarizes thus the general views of the Mission on the natural resources of the region in relation to its population:

If the water be once more saved and spread upon the land, crops will grow again. Men, now unemployed for lack of soil to till, living on the verge of starvation, gathering elsewhere one precarious catchcrop of poor cereals a year, could once more find a modest acreage which, if irrigated and properly cultivated, would redeem them from penury and give them a chance to achieve that measure of prosperity which makes for stability and peace. . . The land and water of the Middle East, properly developed and used, can support greatly increased populations and at a higher standard of living than now prevails.<sup>5</sup>

The Director General of FAO made the following statement in his Report to the Council on the FAO Regional Conference for the Near East, dated April 5, 1948:

It is believed that, owing to the unique natural resources of this region, a climate which makes possible two or three crops per annum, abundance of oil as a source of power, and the willingness of all countries to join forces and cooperate in developing these countries, increased production of food to relieve the world shortage can take place more quickly in this region than in any other.<sup>6</sup>

There is also no lack of statements referring to the potentialities of individual regions. In his paper submitted to the United Nations Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources, Mr. Vahé J. Sevian, Head of the Hydraulic Section of the Irrigation Directorate in Baghdad, has surveyed the conditions in the areas belonging to the basins of the Euphrates and the Tigris, including parts of Syria and Iran. He arrives at a total cultivable area of 14 million hectares, containing more than 90% of irrigable land. He attempts thus to describe the effect of a successful control of the rivers in concrete agricultural terms:

What do the controlled water supplies of the two rivers represent in agricultural products? How many men could obtain sustenance if the water

<sup>5</sup> United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (Lake Success, New York), *Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East*, 28 December 1949, p. 2.

<sup>6</sup> Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (Washington), *Report of the Director General to the Council on the FAO Regional Conference for the Near East, 5 April 1948*, p. 3.



were available? Succinct replies can be given to these questions. Over 8 million tons of wheat and barley could be obtained annually in the basin, in addition to some 1.5 million tons of varied summer crops. These rough and tentative figures are based on the present low yields (i.e., 1.2 tons per hectare). Improvements in agriculture and irrigation, thanks to perfected and scientific methods, will undoubtedly increase, perhaps even double, the figures given above. A population of over 40 million would find sustenance in a healthy environment of improvement and progress. Moreover, development in many other fields, as for instance in farming, vegetable and fruit growing, livestock breeding, etc., would increase the wealth of the basin. Industrial crops and by-products would afford new opportunities for light and other industries, based on power obtained from the controlled water. Activities would also be added in the fields of transportation, electrification and general welfare.<sup>7</sup>

As to the cultivability of certain regions, there are, as already mentioned, divergent views. Thus Dr. D. Warriner, writing in 1948 in her *Land and Poverty in the Middle East*, says that there is in Lebanon no uncultivated land which can be brought into cultivation.<sup>8</sup> On the other hand we read in the *Report of the United States-Lebanon Agricultural Mission*, likewise published in 1948, that the present irrigated area of less than 100,000 acres could be increased to half a million acres of more.<sup>9</sup> According to the *FAO 1949 Review of Food and Agricultural Programs and Outlook in the Near East*, there are now in Lebanon irrigation projects under way which would by 1951 add 40,000 hectares to — and thus double — the present irrigated area of the country.<sup>10</sup>

#### IV

But even if this survey of potentialities leads to a very positive conclusion as to the available unused resources, we have still to examine whether their cultivation could keep pace with the

<sup>7</sup> United Nations Economic and Social Council, United Nations Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources (Lake Success, New York): *Economic Utilization and Development of the Water Resources of the Euphrates and Tigris*, by Vahé J. Sevian, Head of the Hydraulic Section, Directorate General of Irrigation, Baghdad. Experience paper prepared for Section Meeting: Water 3 on Comprehensive River Basin Development.

<sup>8</sup> Doreen Warriner, *Land and Poverty in the Middle East* (London, 1948), p. 81.

<sup>9</sup> Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, U.S.A. (Washington), *Report of the United States-Lebanon Agricultural Mission*. (September, 1948).

<sup>10</sup> Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (Washington), *1949 Review of Food and Agricultural Programs and Outlook in the Near East*. A Working Paper for the Regional FAO Meetings at Beirut, Lebanon, 12-17 September 1949, p. 33.

increase in population to be expected in the course of the next two decades. Such a comparison is important since the phenomenon of a falling death rate appears frequently to coincide with a steady birth rate, resulting in a very considerable increase of the population.

The present writer, however, believes that there is no reason to assume that such a demographic trend is certain; it is in any case too early to predict it as an inevitable development. The impact of Western civilization on Oriental societies undoubtedly causes a decline of mortality; but it affects fertility also. Countries undergoing "Westernization" and particularly a process of industrial growth are experiencing a decline in their natural increase. Mr. Colin Clark, who has given much thought to these trends, writes on the rapid decline of fertility in such countries as follow:

It is surprising to find that in Russia and India, in spite of their very different circumstances, the decline in reproductivity began at about the same date and proceeded at about the same rate as in Japan. For Latin America it appears that the decline in reproductivity began in the 1930's. It will perhaps begin in Africa and Southeast Asia about 1960 and will come last in China.<sup>11</sup>

Unfortunately, reliable demographic data for the countries of the Middle East are very scarce. Egypt, Israel, and to a limited extent Turkey publish figures on census results, and, at intervals, on the natural increase also. The other countries give estimates of the total population only. Yet incomplete and scanty though our data may be, we have to use them if we want to obtain a general idea of the prevailing trends. When a more advanced state of statistical technique and knowledge has been achieved the result will be improved.

Table II (p. 56) of birth and death rates in Egypt is computed from the United Nations *Demographic Yearbook 1948*.<sup>12</sup> If we fit a regression line nearest to the crude rates, we obtain a

<sup>11</sup> Proceedings of the United Nations Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources (Lake Success, New York, 1950), vol. 1, p. 17: *World Resources and World Population*, by Colin Clark.

<sup>12</sup> United Nations, Statistical Office in Collaboration with the Department of Social Affairs (Lake Success, New York, 1949), *Demographic Yearbook 1948*, pp. 260-261, 312-313, 404, and *Annual Reports on Vital Statistics*, Statistical Department (Cairo, 1939), p. 117.

decline in respect of the birth rate of 0.33 per 1,000 yearly, the death rate remaining nearly constant. Correspondingly, the yearly rate of natural increase — excess of births over deaths — shows a decrease by approximately 0.33 per 1,000. The data for the birth rate for the years 1943-1945 show, in contradiction to the general trend, a sharp rise which might be explained in various ways: either as an effect of war prosperity or just by statistical irregularities. We have, therefore, to regard the results of these calculations more as indications than as well-established trends.

An attempt to observe trends for a more extended period leads to similar conclusions. The data presented in Table III (p. 56) and derived from official census records point again to a marked decrease in the decennial averages of increase. Although the data of this table, too, are not fully reliable, they tend to strengthen the view of a change of the pace of the growth of the Egyptian population in recent generations. The assumption of such a change seems, on the basis of the figures above, more warranted than the numerous unwarranted prognostications of a persistently increasing birthrate.

Data for Turkey, the other Middle East country with a similar size of population, present demographic trends not too different from those of Egypt. As Table IV (p. 56) shows, there is here, too, a considerable decrease in the decennial averages of natural growth of population.

It is difficult to say to what extent these trends apply to other Middle East countries.<sup>13</sup> Differences in social, cultural, and economic conditions may influence the degree of reproductivity. Nevertheless it appears likely that demographic trends in the respective countries do not show very marked divergencies. This assumption is strengthened by data in the United Nations pamphlet *World Population Trends 1920-1947*, where the estimate given for the Middle East region tallies with the figures used above.<sup>14</sup> It therefore seems justifiable to assume a slightly de-

<sup>13</sup> If we go further East and examine the figures for India, we again find similar features. Using the figures of the United Nations *Demographic Yearbook 1948*, and the correlation method of the least squares, we find a yearly decrease of the birth rate by 0.65 per 1,000 and a stable death rate at 22.5; thus the natural increase also decreases yearly by 0.65. The general trend resembles that of Egypt.

<sup>14</sup> United Nations, Department of Social Affairs (Lake Success, New York), *World Population Trends 1920-1947*. December, 1949.

creasing rate of natural increase for the coming two decades. On the basis of our preceding data we put the average decennial rate of increase for Egypt as follows:

10.5% for the decade 1937-1947

9.5% for the decade 1947-1957

9.0% for the decade 1957-1967

For Turkey we take as the upper limit the following decennial rate of increase:

10% for the decade 1947-1957

8% for the decade 1957-1967

Assuming a similar trend for the other Middle East countries, we may now attempt a computation as per Table V (p. 56).

Data for the population in 1937 and 1947 are official and semi-official figures. The average annual rate of increase for the period 1947-1967 has been assumed to be about 11 per 1,000. The estimate of 5-15 per 1,000 according to *World Population Trends 1920-1947* for the rate of population increase in the Near East tallies fairly with these figures.

No allowance has been made in Table V for the populations of the Kingdom of Jordan and of Israel. At present the Israel population amounts to approximately 1,200,000, the Jordanian to 750,000; i.e., together to somewhat less than 2,000,000. Taking into account the immigration into Israel it seems reasonable to assume a minimum figure of 3,000,000 for Israel and Trans-jordan in 1957 and 3,500,000 — 3,700,000 in 1967. We should thus arrive at a total of about 80,000,000 for the Middle East in 1967.

In the light of this population projection for 1967 we should now consider our data on the cultivable and irrigable area. Assuming no change in the occupational structure (a rather hypothetical assumption since the process of urbanization will lead to a decline in the proportion of agricultural earners) we arrive at the following table:

Cultivable Land (in millions of hectares)	Total Population 1967	Cultivable Land per Capita (Hectares)
Non-irrigable land ..... 102.5		
• Irrigable land (15.8) =		
non-irrigable land ..... 31.6		
Total ..... 134.1	80,000,000	1.67



A per capita area of 1.67 hectares (or 4 acres) compares favorably with figures for the main regions of East and South Eastern Asia, which were 1.1 acres for China, 1.5 for India, and 2.5 for the Philippines before World War II.<sup>15</sup>

According to recent calculations the amount of land per capita required in the United States to produce adequate diets is from 1.8 to 3.1 acres per capita. Assuming an inferior grade of productivity for part of the Middle East lands as compared with areas of the temperate zone, we are still entitled to say that for the region as a whole there is no need to be concerned over the relationship between land and population for a considerable time to come. The only exception is Egypt.

There is a tendency among certain observers of Middle East conditions to belittle or limit the significance of recognized data on land and natural resources. If they contend that data on land alone are not sufficient to reach a judgment on the over-all requirements needed for large-scale development, no one will disagree with them. No serious student would regard the mere computation of figures of cultivable land as an adequate approach to the problem; it is the elaboration of practical schemes, taking into account all the aspects concerned, which must give flesh and blood to the figures; the study of problems of implementation is vital to the effective preparation of any scheme. At the same time, no practical plan can be devised without having as its starting point a set of data and figures which determine the magnitudes of land and other natural resources.

In the discussions on the issues of implementation emphasis is frequently laid on the effect of backward political and social conditions on the prospects of such a development policy. But here again, the validity of a judgment as to whether or not certain lands are cultivable is not affected by the obstacles and difficulties which stand, frequently only temporarily, in the way of the implementation of development plans. Regional agreements between neighboring countries on the use of common water resources are certainly a precondition for their utilization. Political and social backwardness impedes and even prevents agri-

<sup>15</sup> As computed on the basis of data given in *Report IV to the Preparatory Asiatic Regional Conference of the ILO* (New Delhi, 1947), p. 22.

cultural progress, in the Middle East not less than elsewhere. The necessity for agrarian reforms on the basis of careful and systematic investigation of conditions of land tenure, for a progressive marketing policy for the enlarged production according to the specific requirements of each region, and for numerous other measures of far-reaching nature is one of the cardinal points of reconstruction programs in Middle East countries. Indeed no serious treatise on the subject has ignored these problems when outlining the potentialities and difficulties of large-scale development.

Nor would it be permissible to ignore the time factor, which plays such an important role in the conception and execution of every development policy. Large-scale schemes are, in the nature of things, long-term affairs, a fact not seldom overlooked. A policy designed to bring about fundamental changes in the existing conditions of production, income, scope of trade, etc., must of necessity be based on a protracted time-span for the working out of the schemes and to allow for changes.

## V

The positive appraisal of Middle Eastern potentialities in recent reports is not incidental. It reflects the change in our basic approach to the utilization of natural resources made possible by the revolutionary advances in agricultural technique in the last two or three generations. But it is only now that the results of these efforts have become applicable on a large scale in the Middle Eastern region. There are already records of individual successes in many widely divergent fields. Experiments with the introduction of seed varieties which are more heat-resistant and bear higher yields have been eminently successful in Egypt and Palestine. Annual crops have been increased in considerable proportions and there are prospects of conspicuous expansion in other fields. The fight against malaria and worm diseases, and against sicknesses attacking draft animals, cattle, and poultry, have yielded good results in many places. There is an increasing consciousness of the importance of measures against soil erosion, salination, and similar troubles. Systematic methods are devised

to combat insect pests, fungus, virus, and other diseases and to limit the damage done by them.

However, the prospects for improved and expanded food production arise not only from the elimination of disease and damages, though the effects of this should not be under-rated; they lie also in the discovery and use of new or untapped resources. This viewpoint was underlined by Sir Herbert Broadley at the August 1949 UN Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources. He dwelt in particular on the encouraging experience in the increase of grain yields throughout the world, the successes in the combat of erosion, etc., and added:

Nor must we be satisfied only with the restoration of lost fields to production: we can convert into productive fields land which has hitherto never contributed to our food supplies. It is reasonable to assume that about half the world's land surface is unsuitable for cultivation. This includes the mountains, the snow-covered areas of the Arctic and Antarctic and some of the sandy desert regions. But of the half which is potentially cultivable, only about one fifth is now being farmed.<sup>16</sup>

But this is not all. At the same Conference Sir Herbert Broadley dwelt also on the wealth of the sea:

The seas — the origin of life — may contribute much of its preservation — in large quantities of food, in mineral salts invaluable as fertilizers, in power. Man has not yet attempted to till the waters of the earth as he has tilled the land. In fishing we are still at the nomadic hunting stage of obtaining our food supplies.<sup>17</sup>

Now Middle Eastern lands all possess lines of seacoast, and what is said above undoubtedly holds good for the Mediterranean, the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, and other Middle East seaways. The most favorable fisheries on record are, however, not in the ocean but in the Delta lakes of Egypt, which produce over 20,000 metric tons of fish annually. The carp ponds in the Jewish settlements of Israel, an increasingly important item in their production, show astonishing yields per unit of land which compare favorably with fish ponds in the northern countries based on the experience of generations.

"Acre for acre," said Dr. F. N. Woodward, Director of the Scottish Sea-weed Association, "[the sea] is more productive than

<sup>16</sup> Proceedings of the United Nations Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources (Lake Success, New York): *Critical Shortages of Food*, by Sir Herbert Broadley, K.B.E., Deputy Director-General, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Washington, D. C.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, p. 8.

the land, and there is no danger of drought, or violent temperature fluctuations and relatively little fear of disease."<sup>18</sup> The sea, which receives all the soil substance washed down from the land, contains all the minerals required for life and compares favorably with good garden soil in fertility.

Certainly many of these observations reflect less the present state of affairs than the reality of tomorrow. But they show in any case that there is no cause for despair; on the contrary, there is much to hope from a new, resolute, and determined approach to the problems of implementation and broadly conceived exploitation.

X In the light of all that has been said above, we are entitled to conclude that it is wrong to regard the land issue as the primary question for the future fate of Middle East population. Difficult as the conditions are in a country crowded with people like Egypt, the degree of poverty even there is scarcely more appalling than in Iraq or Iran, where land is plentiful and cannot be properly used for lack of working hands. The emphasis usually laid on the dwindling land reserves as against the increase of population is thus misplaced. In most Eastern areas land is available for a considerable time to come. Remedies must be sought in quite different fields: in the attitude and policies of government and the leading classes; in a different distribution of national income and in the modernization of conditions of capital formation, in raising the standard of intelligence and knowledge among the peasant population. There are other problems, too; but the crux of the issue turns on the density of the population in relation to the cultural and material stage it has reached. It cannot be solved along the rules of orthodox economy nor just by using the surveyor's classifications of lands according to their potential productivity.

What is needed, here as in other underdeveloped areas, is a broad-minded approach by men versed in applied social sciences, vested with knowledge of local conditions and traditions, and, in particular, endowed with the gift of envisaging developments for tomorrow which did not appear feasible yesterday. A new

<sup>18</sup> Proceedings of the United Nations Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources (New York 1950), vol. 1, p. 133: *Creatable Resources: The Development of New Resources by Applied Technology*.



discipline, the economics of development, which scarcely exists today, will have to grow up and lay down the rules and principles which can cope with the new requirements.

There has been scarcely any period in the history of the Middle East when this region has been exposed to such far-reaching influences on the mode and scope of goods production as it is today. Many of these changes are not appreciated in their full implication by contemporary observers. One reason for this is to be found in the political conditions which interfere with detached observation, and frequently produce a narrow-minded, prejudiced attitude toward the problems involved. The result is an evaluation based primarily on the viewpoint of a particular country or sphere of interest, and so only too readily developing an exclusive and monopolistic character.

Another difficulty is that many observers, viewing the position at close quarters, fail to grasp the fundamental importance of the new developments: they cannot see the wood for the trees. This lack of perspective prevents them from appreciating the revolutionary significance of the impact of our technical age on the civilization of the Middle East. The fundamental fact is that these regions are endowed with large potentialities — land, water, oil and other mineral resources — and that these resources have been unexploited except to a limited extent. It is only recently that we gained control over many of these resources through new devices in water-flow regulation, in irrigation technique, in the mechanics of lifting water and oil from large depths through motor power, in the prospecting for and production of oil, and in many other directions. Thus an appraisal of opportunities which was adequate some decades ago has to be replaced time and again by new evaluations; as old methods give place to new, so do evaluations, too, become obsolete. It is, in fact, the essence of progress that it grows from the very process of replacing the knowledge of yesterday with that of today. But progress does not come from windfalls. True, the Middle East is at the moment enjoying a windfall of enormous dimensions in its oil resources; but there will hardly be a repetition of such gifts in other fields. What is needed, first and foremost, is the will, on a national and international level, to unite the gifts of nature and the knowledge of men in a fruitful and harmonious marriage.

**Table 1: CULTIVATED, CULTIVABLE, AND IRRIGABLE LAND IN MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES**  
(Estimates in 1,000 hectares, according to various sources)

Country and its total area	Culti- vated	Cultivable but not yet cultivated	Total cultivable	Irri- gated	Additional Irrigable	Total Irrigable
<b>Lebanon: 1,000</b>						
U.S.-Lebanon Agric. Mission, p. 17(a) .....	270	270	540	40	162	202
Warriner, p. 82(b) .....	526	...	526	...	...	...
Bonné, p. 141(c) .....	...	...	560	...	...	...
Clapp Report II, p. 27(d) .....	210	298	508	44	44	88
Mazloum, p. 45(e) .....	225	...	...	30	...	...
<b>Syria: 18,700</b>						
Clapp Report II, p. 22 .....	2,300	3,400	5,700	280	320	600
Warriner, p. 81 .....	1,745	3,398	5,143	...	...	...
Bonné, p. 141 .....	...	...	5,314	...	...	...
Tannous (f) .....	1,616	2,424	4,040	202	1,000-1,800	1,200-2,024
Britain and M.E. Development, p. 22(g) .....	2,330	900-1,700	3,240-4,050	...	...	...
Mazloum, pp. 36, 65 .....	1,415	3,095	4,500	250	1,000	1,250 <sup>1</sup>
<b>Jordan: 9,600</b>						
Warriner, pp. 75-76 .....	445	...	445	26	6	32
Clapp Report II, p. 10 .....	600	...	...	...	...	...
Konikoff, pp. 29-30(h) .....	460	360	820	26	...	...
<b>Turkey: 76,712</b>						
Stephanides, p. 196(i) .....	11,000	45,000	56,000	...	...	...
Small Statistical Abstract of Turkey, 1942-46, p. 165(j) ..	14,300	39,200	53,500 <sup>3</sup>	...	...	...
Bonné, p. 63 .....	...	...	...	40(?)	260(?)	300(?)
<b>Iraq: 45,300</b>						
Britain and M.E. Development, p. 22 .....	...	...	...	2,835	3,645	6,480
Dowson's Inquiry, p. 11(k) .....	...	...	9,220	...	...	4,500
FAO 1949 Review, p. 4(l) .....	3,650	...	...	2,440	...	...
Warriner, p. 101 .....	2,325	...	12,110	1,725	6,282	8,007
Tannous, p. 102 .....	2,400	5,600	8,094	...	...	8,000
Clapp Report II, p. 31 .....	...	...	...	1,300 <sup>4</sup>	1,300 <sup>4</sup>	2,600 <sup>4</sup>
Vahé I. Seviran(m) .....	...	...	10,700 <sup>5</sup>	2,500	6,700	9,200
<b>Iran: 164,400</b>						
Hadary, p. 210(n) .....	16,900	33,100 <sup>6</sup>	50,000	...	...	...
FAO 1949 Review .....	16,600	...	...	6,600 <sup>7</sup>	...	6,600
Lotz, p. 103(o) .....	4,600 <sup>8</sup>	...	50,000	...	...	...
<b>Egypt: 100,000<sup>9</sup></b>						
Hurst, Black and Simaika, pp. 9 ff.(p) .....	2,200	...	...	2,200	1,000	3,200
<b>Israel: 2,100</b>						
Ministry of Agriculture Four Years Plan, 1949-1953(q) ..	190 <sup>10</sup>	approx. 700	890	20	200	220

## RECAPITULATION BASED ON CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATES

(in 1,000 hectares)

Country	Cultivated	Total Cultivable	Irrigated	Total Irrigable
Lebanon .....	350	500	40	200
Syria .....	2,000	4,000	240	1,300
Jordan .....	450	600	26	32
Turkey .....	14,300	50,000	40	300
Iraq .....	2,700	9,100	2,500	4,500
Iran .....	10,000	50,000	2,000	6,000
Egypt .....	2,200	3,200	2,200	3,200
Israel .....	190	890	20	220
Total .....	32,190	118,290	7,066	15,752

## SOURCES

- (a) *Report of the United States—Lebanon Agricultural Mission* (Washington, 1948).  
 (b) Doreen Warriner, *Land and Poverty in the Middle East* (London, 1948).  
 (c) Alfred Bonné, *Economic Development of the Middle East* (London, 1945).  
 (d) *Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, Part II* (Lake Success, 1949).  
 (e) Soubhi Mazloum, *Le Problème de l'Eau au Liban et en Syrie* (Beirut, 1942).  
 (f) Afif Tannous, in *Foreign Agriculture* (Washington), May 1948, pp. 101-5.  
 (g) *Britain and Middle East Development* (C.O.I., July 1949).  
 (h) A. Konikoff, *Transjordan: An Economic Survey* (Jerusalem, 1946).  
 (i) C. S. Stephanides, in *Foreign Agriculture* (Washington), September 1949, pp. 196-201.  
 (j) *Small Statistical Abstract of Turkey, 1942-1946* (Ankara, 1947).  
 (k) Sir Ernest Dowson, *An Inquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions* (Government of Iraq, 1932).  
 (l) Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *1949 Review of Food and Agricultural Programs in the Near East* (Washington, 1949).  
 (m) Vahé I. Sevan, "Water Resources of the Euphrates and Tigris," *Proceedings of the United Nations Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources, 17 August—6 September 1949* (Lake Success, 1951). Volume IV. (in press)  
 (n) Gideon Hadary, in *Foreign Agriculture* (Washington), September 1949, pp. 210-215.  
 (o) J. D. Lotz, in *Middle East Journal* (Washington), January 1950, pp. 102-5.  
 (p) Hurst, Black, and Simaika, *The Nile Basin* (Cairo, 1946).  
 (q) Israel Ministry of Agriculture, *Four Years Plan, 1949-1953*.

## NOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Irrigable area includes Lebanon.  
<sup>2</sup> Area east of the Jordan River only.  
<sup>3</sup> Exclusive of forests but inclusive of meadows.  
<sup>4</sup> Refers to the southern zone only.  
<sup>5</sup> All of Sevan's figures refer to the Euphrates and Tigris basin.  
<sup>6</sup> Inclusive of uncropped fallow land.  
<sup>7</sup> Largely under extensive irrigation.  
<sup>8</sup> Exclusive of fallow land.  
<sup>9</sup> Inhabited and cultivated area: 3,800.  
<sup>10</sup> In 1949.

Table II: BIRTH AND DEATH RATES  
IN EGYPT

(per 1,000)				
Year	Crude Birth Rate	Crude Death Rate	Natural Increase	Infant Mortality
1930	45.4	24.9	20.5	
1931	44.5	26.6	17.9	
1932	42.5	28.5	14.0	173.5
1933	43.8	27.5	16.3	162.5
1934	42.2	27.8	14.4	166.0
1935	41.3	26.4	14.9	160.6
1936	44.2	28.8	15.4	163.8
1937	43.4	27.1	16.3	165.5
1938	43.2	26.3	16.9	163.4
1939	42.0	25.8	16.2	161.2
1940	41.3	26.3	15.0	161.8
1941	40.4	25.6	14.8	150.2
1942	37.6	28.2	9.4	168.4
1943	38.7	27.6	11.1	160.2
1944	39.8	26.0	13.8	152.3
1945	42.6	27.7	14.9	152.8

Table III: POPULATION TREND IN EGYPT

Year of Census	Population	Decennial Rate (c) of Increase (%)
1882	6,800,000 (a)	
1897	9,635,000	23.5
1907	11,190,000	15.1
1917	12,718,000	12.9
1927	14,178,000	10.9
1937	15,921,000	11.7 (d)
1947	19,040,000 (b)	10.5

(a) Estimated.

(b) The figure of 19,040,000 is regarded as considerably exaggerated. It is believed that in many cases the number of persons was wrongly stated in order to obtain extra ration cards. See Charles Issawi, "Population and Wealth in Egypt," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, XXVII (Jan. 1949), p. 100, footnote 5.

(c) The decennial average rate of increase given in this column is smaller than the average rate of *natural increase* during the same period. The explanation could be found either in the occurrence of a certain emigration—there are indications to this effect—or in a deficient registration. Probably both factors operate together.

(d) According to UN *Demographic Yearbook* 1948, p. 86, the figure is 11.3%.

Table IV: POPULATION TREND IN TURKEY

Year of Census	Population (a)	Decennial Rate of Increase (%)
1927 .....	13,648,000	
1935 .....	16,158,000	21.4
1940 .....	17,821,000	17.4
1945 .....	18,790,000	10.6

(a) UN *Demographic Yearbook* 1948, p. 92.

Table V: POPULATION PROJECTION FOR SIX MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES

	Midyear Estimates (in thousands)				Annual Rate of Increase (in %)		
	1937 (a)	1947 (a)	1957	1967	1937- 1947	1947- 1957	1957- 1967
Turkey .....	16,823	19,250	21,250	23,000	13.6	10	8
Iran .....	16,200 (b)	17,000 (b)	17,900	18,800	4.8	5	5
Iraq .....	...	4,800	5,300	5,750	...	10	8
Syria .....	...	3,740 (c)	4,340	4,900	...	15	12
Lebanon .....	925	1,179	1,450	1,730	24.5	21	18
Egypt .....	16,009	17,772 (d)	19,500	21,400	10.5	9.5	9
		63,741	69,740	76,380			

(a) United Nations *Demographic Yearbook* 1948, pp. 75-80.

(b) "Some people who know Persia will consider that its population is nearer 8 millions than the official figure of 16 millions." E. B. Worthington, *Middle East Science* (London, 1946), p. 182.

(c) In UN *Demographic Yearbook* 1948 only the 1946 estimate of 3,662,000 is given.

(d) Computed, as the census data for 1947 are unreliable. (See note to Table III above.)



# BROADCASTING TO THE ARAB WORLD

## Arabic Transmissions from the B.B.C. and Other Non-Arab Stations

*Nevill Barbour*

AT THE END of 1950, the Arabic transmissions of the B.B.C. consisted of four news bulletins daily, two in the early morning, one in the evening, and one at night, supported by three hours of program material. This elaborate service, reflecting the extent of British interest in the Arab world, was the product of a long process of experiment which had begun rather more than twelve years earlier. Arabic, in fact, as well as being the first was for a short time the only language other than English in which the B.B.C. broadcast regular transmissions.

The task originally set the Corporation was to broadcast an objective service of world news for the benefit of Arab listeners; and until today news bulletins are the basis of the foreign language services of the B.B.C., which now amount to over forty. The creation, however, of the simplest service of this nature at once posed a large number of problems, some of which were warmly debated at the time while others were realised only later.

The most urgent was the question of the type of Arabic to be used. Even excluding the linguistically very different Arab world in North Africa, there was a great diversity of spoken language in the Arab world of the Middle East for which the broadcasts were intended. Should some form of standard Arabic

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be used, universally intelligible to the relatively small educated class but to them only, or the particular dialect which could directly reach the hearts and understanding of the masses in a given country?

Then, should the content of the bulletins be the same as that of Home or Overseas English B.B.C. bulletins; and if so, should the items be given in the same order also or should the Arabic bulletin give precedence to news of greater local interest over that of more importance to British listeners or to the world in general? If, on the other hand, the news reports received were independently handled with a view to the background and interests of the audience for whom the bulletin was intended, how could it be ensured that the same events would be presented in the same light to the different audience, and that adaptation would not lay the B.B.C. open to the charge of distortion? Then again, if the transmission were introduced or ended by a signature tune, should this tune be Western, suggesting the origin from London, or be Arab to create a sympathetic reaction in the prospective audience? These were some of the problems which faced the B.B.C. in the absence of any previous experience of broadcasting to foreign audiences.

#### *PREWAR EXPERIENCE*

The first non-Arab station to transmit in Arabic was the Italian. In 1935 the Abyssinian War was beginning to the south of Egypt, while on its western frontier the brilliant, though from the Arab point of view brutal, Italian colonization of Libya no doubt suggested to Fascist leaders the possibility of a further extension of Italian influence in the Arab world. It was before this background that in September of that year news bulletins in Arabic were first given from the Bari transmitters. The original announcers were apparently Tunisians and their presentations was not very acceptable in Egypt. However, broadcasts in Arabic, especially from abroad, were still a novelty, and though Arabs had little desire to substitute Italian for British or French rule, there could be no doubt that listeners derived

a certain satisfaction from hearing propaganda against the powers in possession.

Meanwhile, in 1936, the Palestine Arab rising began and continued in varying degrees of intensity until the outbreak of World War II. By 1937, the Axis threat had become so pronounced that the British Government asked the B.B.C. to initiate Arabic broadcasts from London to counter the often tendentious and inaccurate news broadcasts in Arabic from Rome.

The inaugural B.B.C. transmission, on January 3, 1938, included messages from H.R.H. Prince Sayf al-Islam al-Husayn, son of the Imam Yahya of the Yemen, who was visiting England at the time, the heads of the Arab diplomatic missions then in London (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq), the Director-General of the B.B.C., and Sir Bernard Reilly, Governor of Aden.

The B.B.C. was setting out to give honest and factual news, without flattery or favor. In pursuance of this policy, the editor included in the inaugural bulletin an item announcing that, by order of a British military court, "another Arab" had been hanged, his crime being that he had been found, in the neighborhood of Hebron in Palestine, in possession of a rifle and some cartridges. The prominence given to this piece of news was embarrassing to those Englishmen living in the Arab world who, like myself, had invited parties of distinguished Arabs to their homes in order to listen to the first transmission from London.

Death sentences on Arabs for taking arms against the British policy of establishing a National Home for the Jews in Palestine were not infrequent at that time; but the inclusion of this item as a lead-in to the news from Arab Palestine in the inaugural bulletin, and the way in which it was worded, were criticized by many English residents in the Middle East as well as by Arabs. In another respect, also, the opening transmission was unfortunate. In order to prepare listeners for the Arabic news bulletin it was thought necessary to insert Arabic announcements from time to time during the preceding recital of light music. This gave the listeners the impression that the records played were part of the Arabic Service and thus led to criticism of the pseudo-Oriental character of the music presented. The first three items on the opening day, for instance, were a tango by Al-

beniz, Cesar Cui's "Orientale," and Rimsky-Korsakov's "Chant Hindou."

On the other hand, the staff included a first rate announcer from the Egyptian Broadcasting station — Ahmad Kamal Surur, whose "golden voice" was a tremendous asset. Another original member from Egypt was Muhammad Rif'at, who was with the B.B.C. throughout the war and was recently appointed an adviser to Egyptian State Broadcasting. These two were soon joined by Sheikh Muhammad Mahmud Jum'a who had been Lecturer in Arabic at the School of Oriental Studies. His scholarship, knowledge of Islamic affairs, and vigorous presentation of the Allied view in a weekly "London Letter" were of great value. Other well-known wartime members of the staff included Muhammad al-Ghazzawi, who first produced and popularized drama and dramatic features in Arabic from London, and the Palestinian, 'Isa Khalil Sabbagh, now working for the "Voice of America," who made a reputation by his cultural talks, his productions, and his reports of the sessions of the United Nations. Arabic transmissions are in fact no exception to the rule of the importance of the individual in broadcasting. While steady work by staff who do not get into the limelight is of course essential to success, it is also difficult to over-estimate the value, in building up a service, of broadcasters whose voices, diction, and other qualities make a strong and favorable impression on the listener. When travelling in the Arab countries in 1946 I found that one of the commonest reactions to my connection to the B.B.C. would be a reference to a well-known broadcaster; even today, Ahmad Kamal Surur is still often mentioned, though he left the service of the Corporation in 1945.

The original B.B.C. Arabic staff were all Egyptian; this was due to the fact that Egypt, which already possessed a broadcasting system of its own, was the easiest source from which to recruit experienced staff with an adequate knowledge of both Arabic and English.

Apart from the unsuitable music and the unfortunate news item, the opening transmission was favorably commented on for clearness of reception, good Arabic diction, and meticulous



presentation. In the succeeding weeks, a supporting program of cultural talks and Arab music took the place of Western music and scripts were sought from English orientalists and other Britishers who had had long experience of the Arab world.

In 1939, about a year after the inauguration of the transmission, I happened to be in the Middle East and made inquiries about listener reaction. While the fact that there were Arabic broadcasts from London was appreciated and the diction of the speakers admired, the bulletins were held to be inadequately adapted to the audience and the contents of the programs to be dull. It cannot in fact be said that at that time the London news bulletins had had any appreciable impact on the Arab listener or that there was any response to the programs in the social or cultural fields; by those who had heard them, they were compared very unfavorably with the broadcasts from Italy which had by now, possibly as the result of British competition in this field, been greatly improved. A more competent staff of announcers had been collected; prominent Arabs were regularly invited as guest speakers and Rome Radio, having the advantage of proximity, had been able to assemble and maintain an orchestra of Arab musicians and singers. My conclusion was that the principal effect on Arabs of the B.B.C. broadcasts had until then been to increase their self-esteem and convince them that the importance of their countries was increasing, since the great powers were now openly competing for their favor.

The outbreak of war in September 1939 brought a new sense of urgency. The London transmissions were by degrees enlarged and staff was engaged from other Arab countries as well as from Egypt. The interest of the news bulletins to listeners was, of course, greatly enhanced by the war. Much time passed, however, before it was realized what an attraction news of one part of the Arab world was to Arab listeners in another part. News of this nature was not in any case supplied by the regular news agencies, and it took further time to make special arrangements for securing it.

Quite early it was agreed that in broadcasting to Arabs the Corporation would not seek to rival local stations, but to com-

plement them by concentrating on those items for which the B.B.C. enjoyed special advantages. The process of trial and error showed that such items included dramatic features and plays, in which advantage could be taken of the B.B.C.'s store of experience and technical facilities, and talks on science, social development, and other aspects of modern life, in which young Easterners are very interested and for which qualified script writers were readily available in London. At the same time, there was an insistent demand for talks on Arab culture and literature; this could only in part be met by British contributors. The program thus came to be divided between the presentation of British life on the one hand and material of purely Arab interest, whether literary, historical, or musical, on the other.

The inclusion of Arab music was, of course, an exception to the rule that London should limit itself to those things for which better facilities existed there than in the Arab countries. Music, however, plays such a part in the life of the Arab peoples that it appeared impossible that they would appreciate as long a transmission as that from the B.B.C. unless music formed a part of it. Similar considerations apply also to Quran readings, and experience has disproved the view held by some authorities that such readings would not be welcome from a country in which Islam was not the prevailing religion. Since it was impracticable to maintain Quran readers or Arab orchestras or singers in London, these items had to be imported in recorded form. The perfection of modern recording apparatus is shown by the fact that listeners have sometimes expressed gratified surprise that so many excellent Quran readers should be available in London!

In the beginning, the Corporation was entirely dependent upon commercial recordings in both these fields. Early in the war, however, a B.B.C. office was set up in Cairo to meet various wartime needs. This office soon began to undertake work for the Arabic Service and was able to arrange for special recordings of Quran readings and of Arab music to be made by courtesy of the Egyptian State Broadcasting on behalf of the B.B.C. Later, the office acquired its own static and mobile recording apparatus and was able to make arrangements direct with artists

and to record in its own studios. At the end of the war, this became the primary duty of the Middle East office of the B.B.C. in Cairo.

#### *OTHER STATIONS BROADCASTING IN ARABIC*

Berlin began to transmit in Arabic in the middle of 1938, after Italian anti-British propaganda in Arabic had been suspended in accordance with the Anglo-Italian agreement of that year. The broadcasts had no cultural content but concentrated upon news and news talks which from the beginning were highly tendentious and became inflammatory and abusive with the outbreak of war. They were interspersed with good commercial recordings. The Nazis had the skill or luck to find and employ an Iraqi, Yunus al-Bahri, who had a remarkable talent for the sensational type of broadcasting which they favored. Berlin Radio was bound by no scruples, and cared nothing for factual accuracy.

So long as victory followed victory and unscrupulous action brought sensational success, these faults were overlooked by listeners disposed to mistrust the Allies, and the broadcasts no doubt helped to strengthen the impression of German power and success; but the exaggeration and the bad taste were noted and disapproved by educated Arabs and it is doubtful whether the audience ever looked to Berlin for factual information as opposed to propaganda.

It was curious to notice how the Arabic transmissions from Rome gradually abandoned their own more courteous and educated tradition and finally followed the German example, without, however, achieving the brilliance or the savage ruthlessness which made the German wireless, for a time, a powerful instrument.

Besides Germany and Italy, a number of other nations, including Turkey, Iran, Spain, France, the United States, India, Japan, China, and the USSR sooner or later instituted Arabic services. Difficulties of reception in the case of the U.S., India, Japan, Iran, France, and Spain, and lack of interest, caused these transmissions to be little heard, and they exerted virtually no influence in the Middle East.

Turkish bulletins in Arabic from Ankara, on the other hand, were well received. Coming from a country of Islamic tradition, not directly engaged in the fighting, they were appreciated as presenting a more neutral and objective point of view than those of the combatant nations.

The USSR did not broadcast in Arabic until August 1943. The Russian announcers were passable, but little or no attempt was made to adapt the material to the listener. Home Soviet bulletins appeared to be translated word for word, as they still are today, even when much of the material (such as the mention of awards to officers or the achievements in production of factories) could not be of any interest to the Arab listener. Apart from the bulletins, the standard propaganda lines of Communism which they repeated over and over again were no doubt useful to convince supporters of Communism, but had no appeal to the general public.

In the last two years, broadcasts in Arabic have been originated also from Holland and Pakistan; the latter, coming from a powerful Muslim country, are arousing considerable interest.

#### *THE LANGUAGE PROBLEM*

With the single exception of a brief transmission in Algerian dialect from Paris for the benefit of Algerians in France, every foreign station employs the standard modern Arabic as used in the Arab press and radio stations.

The B.B.C. from time to time experimented with colloquial talks and features in Syrian, Egyptian, or other dialects. These had a mixed reception, one difficulty being that as the dialects have no definitely accepted grammar and are not the official speech of clearly defined areas, it is difficult to speak to any considerable number of listeners in a dialect which they really regard as their own. At present, dialect is used only in plays dealing with modern life or for some other special reason.

The universal use of the standard Arabic is a remarkable tribute to its vitality; its use throughout the Arab world must itself have been greatly promoted by the broadcasts. Reports have been received that Bedouin, visiting a center where a radio set is available, will rapidly learn to understand the standard



language, even if not to speak it. There can, in fact, be no doubt that foreign broadcasting, addressed as it is to the Arab world as a whole, is a prime factor in promoting a sense of unity amongst the Arab nations by spreading a knowledge of standard Arabic, by informing the various countries about one another, and by giving them a common stock of information and views on events of the day.

#### *WARTIME POLITICAL PROBLEMS*

There was no very great difficulty in vigorously presenting the Allied and democratic point of view on the main war issues in a form of digestible by Arab listeners. Many, probably the majority, of leaders of thought in the Arab countries, though not enthusiastic, were more disposed to the British than to the Axis point of view and they were responsive to exposures of the Italian record in Libya and of Nazi atrocities. The task was to convince them that the democracies had the strength to win. In the field of Anglo-Arab relations, on the other hand, the transmissions were faced with two major difficulties: the presentation of the British (and American) attitude toward Zionism, and the British attitude toward Arab unity.

British policy in both these respects was a matter of profound suspicion to Arabs; and Berlin Radio took good care to foment this suspicion. It therefore used every device to inflame Arab resentment against Britain for favoring Zionism, to exploit every conceivable suspicion regarding British actions, and to sneer at Arabs who publicly declared their support of the British connection. The Berlin Radio announcer, for instance, used regularly to refer to the Amir Abdallah as "Rabbi Abdallah."

In 1939, the British Government had, it is true, issued a statement of policy, commonly known as the Macdonald White Paper, which had been violently attacked by Zionists as "appeasement" of Arabs. This document, however, had not gone far enough to win Arab acceptance and it had, moreover, been attacked so strongly in the British Parliament that its reversal seemed a possibility. It was therefore not easy to counter Nazi propaganda on the subject of the Jewish National Home in Palestine.

With regard to the second issue — Arab unity — the position was easier after the statement made by Mr. Eden, as Foreign Minister, on May 29, 1941, declaring British support, in general, of closer cultural, economic, and political unity among the Arab peoples. The sting was thereby taken out of Axis propaganda concerning alleged British hostility to Arab unity. The tone of the Arabic transmissions naturally reflected the changed circumstances and when the Arab League was formed in 1945 the five Arab Ambassadors and Ministers in London participated in a broadcast program in Arabic in honor of the occasion.

French policy toward the Arabs in North Africa was another delicate point; it was, however, not such a burning issue as Palestine with the Eastern Arabs, and owing to the Nazi desire to conciliate Vichy French sentiment, Berlin Radio, and still more the Nazi-controlled Arabic broadcasts from Paris, were themselves somewhat embarrassed by the subject.

Generally speaking, in broadcasting to a group such as the Arabs, who stand between the various world powers without being fully and whole-heartedly committed to the policies of any of them, caution is particularly necessary in political matters, and experience has shown more than once that one bad error is liable to undo the patient work of many months. An ill-advised talk in honor of a statesman of one of the Levant States, who was regarded by the listeners in a very different light from that in which the broadcasts from London presented him, was reported by a reliable observer in Syria to be still seriously prejudicing the Arabic Service from London more than a year later.

In approaching an Eastern audience, moreover, it is not possible to appeal to the same common background of history, culture, and religion as with Christian Europe and the New World. The problem of translation is itself more difficult. It is not sufficient to translate phrases correctly; the ideas have to be translated as well. For this reason it has been found desirable to make the maximum use of foreign staff in presenting the English way of life. The most talented and informed English script-writer may get less across to the listener than a compatriot, who, with less understanding of the subject, has more understanding of the audience which he is addressing.

*POSTWAR POLICY*

The principles governing B.B.C. post-war broadcasting overseas were laid down in the White Paper on "Broadcasting Policy" issued by His Majesty's Stationery Office in July 1946.<sup>1</sup>

After referring to the part played by the Corporation's Overseas broadcasts in creating and maintaining goodwill toward the United Kingdom during the war and specifically mentioning the direct war services of B.B.C. transmissions to European countries, the White Paper states that Overseas broadcasting should continue "in view of the understanding of British life and customs which they can promote." It then lays down that the news bulletins, which are described as the "kernel" of the Overseas broadcasts, shall be composed with the greatest possible objectivity, that the B.B.C.'s reputation for telling the truth must be maintained, and that the treatment of an item in bulletins for overseas must not differ in any material respect from its treatment in current news bulletins for domestic listeners.

In view of the fact that Overseas broadcasts are regarded as a national service, the expenses are covered by a grant-in-aid from public funds and not from the proceeds of the license fees on listening sets by which domestic broadcasting is supported. Nevertheless, the Corporation, while bound to keep in touch with Government Departments concerned "in order to obtain such information about conditions in the various countries and the policies of His Majesty's Government toward them as will permit it to plan its programmes in the national interest," retains complete independence in the choice and preparation of the material.

In short, the transmissions are designed, by giving as full and objective service of news as is possible, to explain British life and British policy, to clear up misunderstandings and deliberate distortion of facts, and to remedy ignorance which is sometimes the result of censorship. In order to attract an audience (without which, of course, no results at all can be achieved) it may be necessary to include also material of purely local, cultural, or entertainment value.

<sup>1</sup> *Broadcasting Policy* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, July 1946). Command 6852.

In view of the special relationship of the Arab world to Great Britain, the problem is in many respects different from that of speaking to European allies or to such countries as Australia or Canada. In wartime there is also, of course, a fundamental distinction between broadcasting to a neutral audience and to audiences which are either enemies whose morale it is sought to impair, or allies for whom the broadcasts (as in the case of many European countries during the late war) are a direct inspiration and the main source of consolation and hope.

Except possibly in the case of the Sanusi of Cyrenaica, London has not, with regard to the Arab nations, ever been in the position of giving guidance to a people vitally engaged in a struggle against an aggressor. Arab public opinion is inclined to regard Britain partly as a guardian whose assistance is not as whole-hearted as they would like or as a master from whose control they are anxious to escape. During the war this was further complicated by British support of Zionism against which all Arabs were united in varying degrees of opposition. It would in any case have been quite out of keeping with the spirit of the British people as well as impracticable to employ in B.B.C. transmissions to Arabs the mixture of crude threats and equally crude promises which were the stock currency of Berlin. In the early days of the war, before these principles had been thought out, such a policy was indeed often urged on the B.B.C. by people who were impressed by the apparent success of propaganda from Berlin but had not fully considered the background. They had not taken into consideration that in the case of Berlin the success of the method, in the early days of the war, depended on the phenomenal military victories of Germany rather than on its broadcasting techniques.

An official correspondent once actually wrote to say that B.B.C. propaganda was no good because it contained insufficient news of victories on land, on sea, and in the air. The absence of such encouraging news was certainly a drawback, but the complaint should have been addressed to the War Office, the Admiralty, or the Air Ministry, rather than to the Corporation. Evidence that the B.B.C.'s transmissions are appreciated is found both in the large number of letters received from listeners (6,000



annually) and in the flow of Arab visitors who make a point of calling on the Arabic Service while they are in London. It was noteworthy, too, that during the fighting in Palestine the volume of correspondence, nearly all friendly in tone, continued to increase even though the transmissions were announcing events and propounding British policies which must have often been highly distasteful to Arab listeners.

Foreign language broadcasts are the handmaids of policy. They cannot, of course, replace diplomacy in time of peace and still less the armed forces in time of war. Nor at any time can they be effective unless they command an audience. With this proviso, however, they can render many useful services. In time of war they can impair the morale of the enemy and strengthen the resolution of allies. Where necessity exists they can inform those who have been misled as the result of ignorance or through the wilful distortion or suppression of the truth. In the case of Arab listeners, they can maintain and increase interest in the achievement of the West in science, in the art of government, and in social welfare; and they can lessen their suspicions in matters of policy. In these respects it can be claimed with some confidence that the Arabic Service of the B.B.C. performs a valuable function.

## DEVELOPMENTS OF THE QUARTER: COMMENT AND CHRONOLOGY

**B**ENEATH THE fevers and chills of recent crises in the Middle East lies a malaise which is endemic: an uneasiness caused by the pressure of constantly facing the problems of relations with the Great Powers, of corrupt and inefficient administrations, of a depressed peasantry bound to an iniquitous system of land tenure, and of the urgent need for education, training, and tools for higher economic standards. It was the struggle against these chronic ills which now caught the attention of the Middle East, while the issues peculiar to this period (as for example, Palestine and Kashmir, both the aftermath of post-war political solutions) tended to mark their time. Of the latter, only those of Libya and Eritrea advanced toward solution.

Problems of particular relations with the one or the other of the Great Powers came to the surface in Egypt, Iraq, Iran, and Morocco. Egypt, refusing to drop its fight for complete freedom from British influence, declared the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 to be no longer legal, and requested therefore that all British troops be removed from the Suez Canal Zone. But Great Britain, in the light of the world tension, of the uncertainty of Egyptian cooperation in time of crisis, and of the strategic importance of the Canal area, evidenced no desire to cut short the privileges granted it by the Treaty, which still had six years to run. Britain was up against a parallel sentiment in Iraq, where Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa'id declared on November 27 that Iraq's treaty of alliance with Britain had become obsolete.

As for Iran, the problem of its relations with the United States on the one hand and with the Soviet Union on the other placed it squarely between the opposing world camps. Unlike Turkey, which geographically was similarly placed but had thrown in its lot wholeheartedly with the West, Iran continued its traditional attempt to balance forces.

Having come a long way since the Azerbaijan crisis of 1946 toward closer dependence upon the West, seeking finally American guidance in its Seven Year Plan for economic development, Iran now indicated that it did not want to progress in this direction so far that all paths of retreat toward the Soviet Union would be blocked. When the USSR showed a willingness to be conciliatory, Iran readily fell in. Early in September it was announced that the two countries would discuss the numerous border disputes that had served as an irritant for years. Early in November several weeks' negotiations culminated in an Iranian-Soviet trade agreement involving \$20 million, and there was even prospect that the long-standing dispute regarding an Iranian gold and hard currency credit of about \$20 million held in Moscow since World War II might now be settled.

While relations with the Soviet Union thus appeared to be easing, American efforts to bolster the Iranian economy were slow to get underway. High hopes of the previous year for the effectiveness of Iran's Seven Year Development Plan, formulated under American technical guidance, were dashed by the Government's inability to gather the necessary finances: oil royalties, calculated to cover the majority of the cost of the undertakings, had already been borrowed a year in advance. There began to be harsh criticism, on the part of the Iranians, of the high cost of the American technical advice as provided by Overseas Consultants, Inc. Another source of Iran's dissatisfaction was what it considered the slowness of American governmental aid. Early in October the Export-Import Bank finally came through with a \$25 million loan for the purchase of American agricultural, pumping, and road-building equipment; and on October 20 Iran became the first country to receive a grant under the Point Four program when \$500,000 was allotted it for projects in health, agricul-

ture, and education. Grateful as the Iranians may have been for support even on this modest scale, they did not conceal their relief at the concurrent prospect of a Soviet "peace offensive." What the cost of all this to U.S. prestige might be was not yet apparent, the only concrete evidence so far of a withdrawal from close cooperation with the West being a refusal to continue the rebroadcasting of Voice of America and BBC programs over the Tehran radio.

In Morocco the chronic problem of relations with France again hit the news upon the occasion of the Sultan's visit to Paris early in October. Begun with the expectation that relations between the protecting power and the protectorate would be smoothed, the visit ended with a surprise demand by the Sultan for a revision of treaty relations. This the French Government refused to concede, for a reason previously made clear: the protectorate was insufficiently advanced toward political maturity to justify greater independence. France also advanced the legalism that a change in the status of Morocco would involve all the signatories to the Algeiras Treaty of 1906.

Upon the scene of domestic politics, two countries — Egypt and Iran — embarked upon investigations of administrative irregularities. In Egypt the inquiry involved corruption in the Army relative to the purchase and supply of arms for the Palestine campaign in 1948, and resulted in the resignation among others of the Commander in Chief, and in the retirement of the Chief of Staff and of many of the officers of the General Staff. In Iran the investigation took the wider range of a survey of some 900 higher government officials, of whom 400, including the speaker of the House of Deputies, several cabinet members, and former Prime Minister Ahmed Qavam, were declared to be unfit for office. In Syria, a new constitution voted early in September signalled a fresh departure. It was hoped that this act would stabilize the country after almost two years of violent overthrow and government by constituent assembly. However, continued assassinations, near-assassinations, and arrests of persons highly placed indicated that it would be some time before lines of authority would be clearly drawn.

Also on the credit side of the ledger was

the session of the Social Welfare Seminar for the Arab States, which met in Cairo late in November under the auspices of the United Nations. A direct attack was launched on land tenure systems of the Arab countries as the basis of the area's poverty, and on the governments' tendencies to expend their energies on political problems rather than on social and economic reform. The opinions expressed indicated a ripeness for the type of assistance to be offered by the Point Four program, already agreed to in principle by a number of the Arab states.

Israel, even more drastically, faced up to its own economic problems. Deeply committed to the principle of unlimited immigration, it began to prepare for the colossal task of absorbing an anticipated 600,000 immigrants in the next three years. The estimated cost of this undertaking was set at \$1,500 million; of this the Israel Government agreed to provide the equivalent of \$500 million while \$1,000 million was to be garnered in the United States through voluntary donations, private investments, sale of Israel Government bonds, inter-governmental loans, and direct U.S. Government grants-in-aid. The enormous problems faced were reflected by a brief cabinet crisis in October and the slight setback suffered by the Mapai (Government majority) party in the municipal elections of November. The upshot indicated a domestic economic policy somewhat more inclined to private enterprise; and politically, that the necessities of the three-year program were forcing Israel to increase its reliance on the West and to that degree deviate from its neutral position in the East-West conflict.

As for the problem of Israel's relations with its neighbors, there continued to be the irritant of numerous incidents with Jordan, and to a lesser extent with Syria and Egypt. The refugees from Palestine remained an unabsorbed group subsisting on relief and minor works projects administered by the United Nations Relief and Work Administration. Late in November the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the General Assembly approved a plan for continued support to the extent of \$50 million; of this amount, \$30 million was to be spent on a projected program of "reintegration" rather than on the works projects envisaged by

the Clapp Mission of the year before. It was hoped by this formula to by-pass Arab refusal to discuss any scheme for the permanent resettlement of the refugees. Only in Jordan proper and in Jordan-administered Arab Palestine was there progress in this direction, both through the attitude of the Government and through cooperative rehabilitation efforts among the refugees themselves. The question of Jerusalem remained outstanding. All that the Ad Hoc Political Committee was able to approve was a resolution, passed on December 13, to set up a four-man committee to restudy the problem and report the next year. Even this resolution was dismissed when it failed to receive the necessary two-thirds majority in the General Assembly on December 15. Both Israel and Jordan held fast to the current status of a split administration of Jerusalem, admitting in principle only partial jurisdiction by an international body over a selected number of Holy Places.

The whole of the Middle East, as did the rest of the world, brooded over the prospect of a spread of the Korean conflict. India continued to take the lead in the attempt to effect a truce, swinging behind it a group of twelve countries comprising all the Arab members of the United Nations, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and three South-East Asian states (Ceylon, Burma, and the Philippines). The thirteen Arab-Asian nations finally came up with a resolution for the appointment of a three-man committee to investigate the basis for a possible cease-fire; it was passed on December 13, with only the Soviet Union and four East European nations remaining in opposition. Whether or not this specific resolution would exert any influence on the Korean and Chinese questions, the very fact of a concert of six Arab States, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India with states of South-East Asia had significance for future alignments of power.

## Eritrean-Ethiopian Federation<sup>1</sup>

Action taken by the United Nations General Assembly on December 2, 1950, paved the way for the emergence of a new federated state in East Africa in the form of a federal union between Eritrea and Ethiopia

under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown. Eritrea is to constitute an autonomous unit within the federation in which a single nationality will prevail. Rejected by the Assembly were proposals to grant Eritrea independence either immediately or at the end of three years. Because of the unique authority granted to the General Assembly by the Italian Peace Treaty of 1946 in the disposition of the Italian Colonies, this recommendation, unlike others by the Assembly which have no obligatory character, is a final and binding decision.<sup>2</sup> On December 14 the General Assembly appointed Eduardo Anze Matienzo, chief Bolivian Delegate to the UN, as United Nations Commissioner in Eritrea. It will be his function to advise and assist in the organization and establishment of the new federation.

The federation of Eritrea and Ethiopia is to be accomplished during a transition period which is to extend not later than September 15, 1952. During this period, Great Britain, the present Administering Authority of Eritrea, will continue to conduct the affairs of the territory. However, it is charged by the Assembly's decision to work with the UN Commissioner in helping the people of Eritrea to draft a constitution, establish a government, and assume greater responsibilities on all levels of administration. The first step in this direction is to be the convocation of an Eritrean representative Assembly chosen by the people.

Serving as the fundamental law of the projected federation is a Federal Act, which is to consist of the first seven articles of the General Assembly's resolution. Article 3 provides for a division of power between the Eritrean and Federal Governments that is in many ways reminiscent of the division that exists between the State and Federal Governments under the United States Constitution. The Federal Act also includes a Bill of Rights that ensures to all residents of Eritrea without distinction of nationality, race, sex, language, or religion the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental liberties.

The General Assembly's decision comes as a culmination to more than five years of pro-

<sup>1</sup> Based on an analysis by Benjamin Rivlin.

<sup>2</sup> For complete text of the General Assembly resolution, see p. 89.



tracted negotiation and indecisive effort to determine the future of Eritrea. For the first three years of this period, when the question of Eritrea was the responsibility of the Council of Foreign Ministers and their Deputies, efforts to reach an agreement on the future of Eritrea as well as on the future of the two other former Italian Colonies — Libya and Italian Somaliland — were stymied as the question of the Italian Colonies became a pawn in the East-West "cold war." When the General Assembly assumed responsibility for deciding the fate of the Italian Colonies in September 1948, reaching an agreement on Eritrea's future involved arriving at a solution for all three colonies in which the various conflicting interests in the Assembly — primarily the pro-Italian Latin-American Bloc and the Muslim-Arab Bloc — were delicately balanced.

At the second part of its third session in the spring of 1949, the General Assembly in committee actually did agree to the partition of Eritrea between Ethiopia and the Sudan. The acceptance of this formula, however, hinged upon the acceptance of the other sections of the resolution dealing with the future of Libya and Italian Somaliland. As the latter failed to receive the required two-thirds majority, the Eritrean solution, too, fell by the wayside. At the next session of the General Assembly in the fall of 1949, when agreement was finally reached on the disposition of Libya and Italian Somaliland, it proved impossible to work out an acceptable solution for Eritrea that could still maintain the balance required to steer the proposals for the other two colonies through the Assembly. Accordingly, the Assembly decided to postpone a decision on Eritrea for a year, during which time it decided to dispatch a five-member Commission of Investigation, consisting of representatives of Burma, Guatemala, Norway, Pakistan, and the Union of South Africa, to visit Eritrea in order to ascertain more fully the wishes and the best means of promoting the welfare of its inhabitants, and to prepare a report with proposals for its disposition.

The UN Commission of investigation was the second to visit Eritrea within a period of two years. Previously a Four Power Commission acting under the authority of the Coun-

cil of Foreign Ministers had visited the territory. While both commissions foundered on the preconceived preferences of their governmental representatives, their reports demonstrated the inherent complexity of the problem of deciding the future of Eritrea. Even under conditions far less turbulent than those under which the question of the future of the Italian Colonies was considered, the question of the future of Eritrea would have proved to be a most difficult and thorny problem.

In addition to Ethiopia's claim to Eritrea and to an outlet to the sea through Massawa, Eritrea poses a complex problem because of a most confused internal picture. Within its area of some 45,000 square miles are sharp ethnic, religious, linguistic, and geographic cleavages. Despite all the hearings and investigations, it has been almost impossible to ascertain the attitudes and wishes of the Eritrean population accurately and democratically. Nevertheless, two main political trends, substantially reflecting the geographical distribution and religious cleavage of the approximately one million illiterate and politically immature inhabitants of Eritrea, have been discerned. The first is the feeling prevalent among the Coptic Christians inhabiting the highland areas adjacent to Ethiopia, who favor the outright union of all or most of Eritrea to that country. The second main trend, prevalent primarily among the Muslim elements and the small Italian minority, has been in favor of maintaining the unity of the territory and of granting it independence either immediately or after a short period of international trusteeship.

The complexity of the issues and almost insurmountable difficulties involved made it appear during the summer and early fall of 1950 that the General Assembly would again be unable to find an acceptable solution to the problem of Eritrea's future. The report of the UN Commission of Investigation offered no path as the five members of the Commission, unable to reach any agreement among themselves, submitted three different solutions to the problem. Burma and South Africa recommended the federation of Eritrea and Ethiopia; Norway preferred the "complete and immediate reunion" of Eritrea and Ethiopia except possibly for the Western Province;

while Pakistan and Guatemala, each for different reasons, advocated a United Nations trusteeship for the territory leading to eventual independence. Neither was the Interim Committee (Little Assembly), which was to consider the Commission's report and prepare recommendations for the General Assembly, able to make any headway.

When the General Assembly met in September it had before it the record of the Commission's disagreement but no concrete proposals that seemed capable of commanding the required two-thirds majority. However, throughout this period negotiations were going on behind the scenes in an effort to attain a formula that would satisfy the various interested parties and their spokesmen in the General Assembly. Finally on November 17, after months of consultations among delegations, the plan that was eventually adopted was submitted jointly by fourteen nations.

Before the federation scheme was finally

adopted various alternatives had been considered, including outright independence, independence after trusteeship, independence after a specified period, and partition of the territory. Even when the federation proposal was being accepted by the General Assembly's Ad Hoc Political Committee, some of the Arab-Muslim states objected to it for fear that it would contravene the right of self-determination and self-government appertaining to the Muslim population of Eritrea. However, at the final plenary session of the General Assembly this opposition abated when the Ethiopian Foreign Minister gave assurances that the rights and privileges of the Eritrean Muslims would be respected. While the federation formula is far from a perfect solution, it seems hardly possible to have been able to achieve, under the circumstances, a better compromise among most of the divergent issues that have for so long stood in the way of a speedy solution of the problem.

## Chronology<sup>1</sup>

SEPTEMBER 1—NOVEMBER 30, 1950

### Afghanistan

(See also Pakistan.)

1950

Oct. 6: Sardar Najib Allah Khan, Minister to India, denied that his country's troops had participated in the invasion of Pakistan.

### Arab League

1950

Sept. 3: The Cultural Conference of the Arab League sent to the various Arab states a resolution calling for the substitution of classical Arabic for colloquial speech in the everyday life of all Arab nations.

Oct. 5: The Legal Committee of the UN General Assembly voted to extend a permanent invitation to the Secretary General of the Arab League to attend Assembly sessions as an observer.

Nov. 1: Six members of the Arab bloc in the UN General Assembly (Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen) abstained from voting when the Assembly extended the term of

Trygve Lie as Secretary General for another three years. Immediately after the vote Dr. Fadil al-Jamali of Iraq explained that he had not been able to vote for the extension because he felt that Mr. Lie had not been "entirely impartial" on the Palestine question.

Nov. 26: An assembly of economists and experts from throughout the Arab world met in Cairo under the auspices of the United Nations to devote three weeks to the study of the condition of the peasantry. In press interviews, members of this Social Welfare Seminar for the Arab States described the situation of the Arab population that works the land as "desperate."

### Egypt

(See also Israel, Palestine Problem.)

1950

Sept. 3: Foreign Minister Muhammad Salah al-Din told a Cairo news conference that Egypt had no intention of bringing the British-Egyptian question before the UN.

Sheikh Muhammad Ma'mun al-Shinnawi, rector of al-Azhar University and a leader of the Muslim world, died at Ismailia at the age of 74.

<sup>1</sup> In general, items in the Chronology are drawn from the *New York Times* or the *New York Herald Tribune* unless otherwise indicated.

*Sept. 10:* Announcement was made of a new Anglo-Egyptian financial agreement, and it was decided that talks on a permanent settlement of the blocked sterling account amounting to \$840 million owed Egypt by Great Britain would be held in November.

*Sept. 13:* Queen Nazli, mother of King Faruq, was deprived of her title and her affairs were placed in official hands, after the Queen's refusal to return to Egypt from California.

*Sept. 27:* Britain authorized payment of £400,000 to improve rural water supplies in Egypt. The money was part of the £1 million received in the early years of World War II as Britain's share of the profits of the Anglo-Egyptian Cotton Buying Commission in Egypt. (*London Times*, Sept. 27.)

*Oct. 2:* The Egyptian Cabinet approved allocation of £E3 million (\$8,610,000) for arms purchases.

*Oct. 17:* Opposition party leaders made public a statement which they addressed to King Faruq, hinting at a munitions scandal among his Palace intimates and high army officers, charging misuse of the Wafdist party, urging the King to uproot "corruption" in the Government, and warning of possible revolution.

*Oct. 20:* Prime Minister Mustafa al-Nahhas Pasha stated that King Faruq desired investigation of an alleged munitions scandal to proceed, regardless of whether members of the Army or of his court were involved.

*Nov. 11:* In the reshuffled Egyptian Government, announced in Cairo, Zaki 'Abd al-Muta'al Bey was removed from his post as Finance Minister and the portfolio was taken over by Fu'ad Sirag al-Din Pasha, who would continue as Minister of Interior. Muhammad Mursi Farhat, Supply Minister, and Yasin Ahmad Pasha, Waqfs Minister, also left the administration. The new Cabinet was made up as follows:

Mustafa al-Nahhas Pasha — Prime Minister  
'Uthman Muharram Pasha — Public Works  
'Abd al-Fattah al-Tawil Pasha — Justice  
Fu'ad Sirag al-Din Pasha — Finance and Interior

Mustafa Nusrat Bey — War and Marine  
Mahmud Sulayman Ghannam Bey — Commerce and Industry

Ahmad Hamzah Bey — Supply

Taha Husayn Bey — Education

Hamid Zaki Bey — National Economy

Ibrahim Farag Masihah — Municipal and Rural Affairs

'Abd al-Latif Mahmud Bey — Agriculture  
Muhammad Salah al-Din Bey — Foreign Affairs

Ahmad Husayn Bey — Social Affairs

Dr. 'Abd al-Gawad Husayn Bey — Public Health

Isma'il Ramzi Pasha — Waqfs

Muhammad al-Wakil Bey — Communications. (*Arab News Agency*, Nov. 11)

The Cabinet accepted an invitation to take part in President Truman's Point Four plan for underdeveloped countries.

*Nov. 12:* King Faruq accepted the resignation of Army Commander-in-Chief Gen. Muhammad Haydar Pasha, and a few hours later the Cabinet ordered the retirement of the army chief of staff, Gen. 'Uthman al-Mahdi Pasha. At the same time most of the members of the army general staff also retired. Cairo newspapers said the shake-up developed from an investigation of alleged graft and fraud in the purchase of defective guns and munitions during the 1948 Palestine campaign. A Government statement said an impartial investigation and punishment of guilty persons regardless of their positions had been ordered.

*Nov. 16:* Prime Minister Mustafa al-Nahhas Pasha, reading the traditional "speech from the throne" before a wildly cheering Parliament with King Faruq observing, demanded that Britain evacuate the Suez Canal Zone and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan immediately. Nahhas Pasha threatened to cancel forthwith the treaty that permits Britain to keep troops in the Canal Zone until 1956, and also to cancel agreements for joint administration of the Sudan. The Prime Minister said that Egypt's armed forces were to be reorganized on a modern basis and that the Government would do its utmost to lower the cost of living. As he spoke thousands of rioting anti-British students surged through Cairo streets; at least 41 persons, including 33 policemen, were reported injured.

*Nov. 20:* Acting Egyptian Foreign Minister Ibrahim Farag Bey declared that "Egypt will not join the Atlantic pact if this means joint defense or the stationing of foreign troops on Egyptian soil."

*Nov. 21:* British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin told the House of Commons that British troops would not leave the Suez Canal Zone and that the British Government would "rest on the [1936] treaty until it is changed by mutual consent." He assured other countries of the Middle East that Britain "has no intention of taking steps or agreeing to any measures which would leave the Middle East defenseless." He also declared that the British Government had not changed its attitude toward the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, which was that the Sudanese should in due course decide freely their own future. He added that Britain would continue to meet its obligations to supply Egypt with arms.

Several thousand university students demonstrated in Cairo against Bevin's statement to the House of Commons. A strong police guard was placed around the British Embassy.

*Nov. 22:* Shipment of 16 of Britain's latest tanks to Egypt was postponed after members of Parliament on both sides protested that these might be used in an attempt to drive British troops out of the Suez Canal Zone or for an attack on Israel.

Assurance was given by Foreign Under Secretary Ernest Davies that the tanks would not leave the country until Foreign Secretary Bevin could report to the Commons on negotiations for revision of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty.

Egypt was placed in a state of alert because of the number of demonstrations, and Port Said was made out-of-bounds for British troops.

**Nov. 23:** The discovery that seditious elements had been using the mass student demonstrations for British evacuation of the Canal Zone and unity of the Nile Valley to serve other purposes prompted the Ministry of Interior to order the students to disperse, expressing its regret that the situation required such a measure.

**Nov. 28:** Foreign Minister Muhammad Salah al-Din, arriving in London from New York, said that Egypt, given sufficient armor, could defend itself against a major power without British troops in the Suez Canal Zone. He made it clear that his country's aim was to get rid of foreign troops and at the same time to get delivery of British tanks. Just before his arrival in London, Hugh Gaitskell, Chancellor of the Exchequer, disclosed in the House of Commons that Egypt's sterling balances had dropped by October 1, 1950 to £272,200,000 from £387,000,000 at the close of 1945.

**Nov. 29:** Police fired shots in the air to disperse 300 students staging an anti-British demonstration in suburban Zamalek. No one was injured.

A *Life* magazine article quoting statements by Queen Frederika of Greece about King Faruk created diplomatic tension which resulted in Egypt's recalling its Ambassador to Greece in protest.

## Ethiopia

(See also Italian Colonies.)

1950

**Sept. 13:** The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development made two loans totalling \$7 million to the Government. The first loan of \$5 million was for the rehabilitation and maintenance of highways, toward which the Government also agreed to contribute immediately 5 million Ethiopian dollars (about \$2 million U.S. currency); 6 million Ethiopian dollars for each of the next three years; and 5 million annually for the remainder of the 25-year life of the loan. The second loan of \$2 million would provide foreign exchange for projects to be financed by a new Ethiopian Development Bank, to be financed in turn by Ethiopian capital.

**Oct. 22:** Amba Cyril, Coptic Christian Archbishop of Ethiopia, died in Cairo.

**Nov. 11:** In a cablegram to UN Secretary General Trygve Lie, Zaoudie Garre Heywot, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, offered to send a contingent of 1,069 Ethiopian officers and men to take part in the UN war effort.

## India

(See also Kashmir Problem.)

1950

**Sept. 2:** Congress Party headquarters announced that Purshottamdas Tandon, strong critic of Prime Minister Nehru's foreign and domestic policy, had been elected president of the Congress Party.

**Sept. 5:** The first official casualty figures of the recent earthquake in Assam Province stated that 400 persons were killed in two small areas.

**Sept. 11:** Dr. Balrishna Vishwanath Keskar, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, left India for Lake Success to join India's delegation to the UN General Assembly.

It was announced that during the next two months 6,000 Muslim refugees who came to West Pakistan between February and May 1950 would be allowed by the Indian Government to return to their homes. (*London Times*, Sept. 12.)

**Sept. 12:** Prime Minister Nehru issued a statement outlining what were believed to be the minimum terms he would accept from the opposition group now in control of the Congress Party and continue as Prime Minister. He demanded endorsement of the broad lines of his foreign policy, his domestic economic program, and his ideal of a secular state.

**Sept. 17:** The Working Committee of the Congress Party endorsed the Government's foreign policy and reaffirmed its confidence in Prime Minister Nehru.

**Sept. 19:** Prime Minister Nehru's moderate policy toward Pakistan and his determination to fight Hindu extremists within the country received unqualified support from the All-India Congress Committee, which also ratified the India-Pakistan pact on minorities.

**Sept. 20:** Purshottamdas Tandon, newly elected president of the Congress Party, making his presidential address to the party convention, came out unequivocally in support of Prime Minister Nehru on the communal policy of the Indian Government.

**Sept. 21:** When Prime Minister Nehru threatened to resign unless his All-India Congress Party voted full endorsement of his policies, the party promptly gave him that endorsement by an overwhelming vote.

The Congress Party voted for an economic program aimed at establishing a "welfare state" in the country.

**Sept. 26:** Recent floods submerged several hundred square miles in the Kashmir Valley.

**Oct. 1:** Congress Party President Purshottamdas Tandon, addressing a Muslim crowd in a Calcutta park, said that Indian Hindus would be tested by the way they behaved toward Muslims, adding that in spite of what happened in Pakistan, Hindus must regard Muslims as their equals. (*London Times*, Oct. 2.)



Oct. 3: Indian Delegate Sir Benegal N. Rau appealed in the UN for a Russian-Western conference to seek "the greatest measure of common agreement" on a plan for the political future of Korea.

Oct. 7: The Government declined to accept a seat on the new 7-member Korean Commission appointed under a UN resolution.

Oct. 11: Land reforms passed by the Lower House of the Legislature of Uttar Pradesh, India's largest state, "go much farther than the Chinese Communists, although we are not Communists," Charan Singh, parliamentary secretary to the State Prime Minister, said in an interview.

Oct. 12: A Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that India "fully subscribes" to the UN objectives for the establishment of a united and independent Korea under a government chosen by the people.

Oct. 15: Prime Minister Nehru agreed to join the Congress Party Working Committee.

Oct. 16: Prime Minister Nehru, in a major statement on India's policy, disapproved Communist expansion and disavowed an appeasement policy, but opposed proposals now before the UN General Assembly for a UN police force and for by-passing the veto clause. He also advanced arguments for admitting Communist China to the UN.

Oct. 25: A technical assistance agreement concerning forestry development was signed between India and the FAO in New Delhi. (*India News Bulletin*, Oct. 31.)

Nov. 14: Opening the Indian Parliament, President Rajendra Prasad announced that the date of the first general elections would be postponed from April-May 1951 to November-December 1951. He also announced that the target date for India's objective of attaining self-sufficiency in food supplies was postponed to March 1952. He spoke of the "unparalleled calamities," including a great earthquake and subsequent floods in Assam and a drought in Bihar, which had gravely affected the national economy. (*London Times*, Nov. 15.)

Nov. 15: Prime Minister Nehru told the Indian Parliament that participation of Chinese Communist forces in the Korean war would have no effect on India's decision not to join the UN Korean Commission.

A technical assistance agreement was signed between India and the UN Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization in New Delhi. (*India News Bulletin*, Nov. 30.)

Nov. 18: Prime Minister Nehru intervened during the usual question-and-answer exchange in Parliament to announce that he had directed the Ministry of Defense to reduce the size of the army and slash defense appropriations. Mr. Nehru said, "We want a highly efficient and highly mobile army, but that does not depend on numbers."

Nov. 20: The Special Political Committee of the UN General Assembly recommended by a vote

of 26 to 6, with 24 abstentions, that India, Pakistan, and South Africa hold a round-table conference on the subject of accusations by India and Pakistan that certain practices in South Africa constituted race discrimination.

Nov. 21: Food and Agriculture Minister K. M. Munshi told Parliament that India had lost 6 million tons of food in 1950 as a result of natural calamities, and that wheat had had to be bought in the U.S. and Canada at a considerable dollar expenditure.

Nov. 28: The Government's 6-year 18,396 million rupee economic development program—part of the Colombo Plan—was presented to the Parliament.

Nov. 29: The Kuljian Corporation of Philadelphia announced that India had awarded it a contract to design and construct the \$35 million Bokara power plant, part of a project to provide the Damodar Valley with irrigation, flood control, and power.

Nov. 30: India-U.S. talks on Point Four aid were initiated in New Delhi between officials of the U.S. Embassy and the Indian Government. (*India News Bulletin*, Nov. 30.)

The Indian Embassy in Washington announced that gasoline rationing had been abolished in India except in Uttar Pradesh.

## Iran

1950

Sept. 3: It was reported from Tehran that Kurdish tribesmen near the Iraq border had revolted and that the Army High Command had announced a battle in progress. It started when the Javanrudi tribe of about 4,000 families refused to surrender arms and ammunition under an ultimatum issued by the Government.

Sept. 7: Prime Minister Gen. Ali Razmara announced in the Majlis that 400 high officials listed as unfit for or unnecessary in public service, according to the Shah's anti-corruption commission, had been dropped from the Government payroll.

Sept. 19: Nasrollah Entezam, newly-appointed Ambassador to the U.S., was elected president of the Fifth UN General Assembly.

Sept. 22: A report by the Imperial Anti-Corruption Commission, listing 500 or more prominent Iranian political men or high officials as incompetent or unfit for public office, caused a dramatic uproar in Parliament.

Sept. 23: Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi expressed in a press interview his conviction that the proposed Export-Import Bank loan to Iran was only the beginning of U.S. aid to his country.

Sept. 24: A friendship treaty between Iran and Italy was signed in Tehran.

Sept. 28: The leader of the parliamentary majority, Jamal Imani, formerly demanded that the Government take a stand on three principal current

issues including the explosive Anglo-Iranian oil agreement question.

*Sept. 30:* The Tehran radio began broadcasting the names of tax delinquents and of those whose property was being confiscated.

*Oct. 3:* The "semi-official press" announced that Dr. Taqi Nasr, Finance Minister, had offered his resignation from London and that it had been accepted.

The Government announced that it was setting up a joint commission with the USSR to settle 8 border disputes of long standing. The USSR also agreed to negotiate for the release of 11.5 tons of gold blocked since World War II.

*Oct. 4:* Deputy Abdol Saffai formally requested the Government to explain to Parliament why Iran should "bother" any more with the U.S., how much money was paid to Overseas Consultants, and whether the U.S. had paid for using the railways and other Iranian facilities during World War II.

*Oct. 7:* The Shah requested the Majlis to pass a law creating a system of self-government in local matters for the various regions of Iran.

*Oct. 8:* Prime Minister Razmara demanded and received a vote of confidence from the Majlis (97 votes from the 106 Deputies present).

*Oct. 10:* Prime Minister Razmara announced to the Majlis that a loan of \$25 million had been made to the Government by the Export-Import Bank of the U.S. "to implement the first part of the development plans of Iranian and American experts with a view to improving the economic situation of Iran."

*Oct. 11:* In a traditional Muslim betrothal ceremony, the Shah placed a diamond engagement ring on the finger of Saroya Isfandiari, a princess of the Bakhtiari tribe.

*Oct. 15:* The Governor of the National Bank of Iran, Ibrahim Zand, said in a declaration published in Tehran that Iran did not need further credits and would not expand its circulation of currency.

*Oct. 18:* Prime Minister Ali Razmara for the first time made a positive statement in the Senate in support of the new oil royalties agreement with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

*Oct. 19:* The U. S. Department of State and the Government of Iran announced that Iran would receive \$500,000 under the Point Four program to improve health, agriculture, and education standards in rural areas. The combined group administering the program would be called the Iranian-United States Joint Commission for Rural Improvement, and would be composed of 4 representatives from Iran and 3 from the United States.

*Oct. 20:* The Government issued orders setting up near Isfahan the first Point Four project in the world. Ambassador Henry F. Grady announced the appointment of Dr. Franklin S. Harris and Hoyt Turner as director and technical field

director respectively. The Isfahan center was planned as the first of 10 such projects to demonstrate modern agricultural methods, sanitation, and public health control.

*Oct. 24:* Prime Minister Ali Razmara presented several Cabinet changes to the Shah. Dr. Abdollah Daferi, former assistant manager of the Iran National Bank, succeeded Dr. Morteza Asmudah as Minister of National Economy. Gholam Hosein Forouhar, Minister of Labor, became Minister of Finance, succeeding Dr. Taqi Nasr.

*Nov. 4:* Iran and the Soviet Union signed a \$20 million trade agreement implementing the formal Trade Treaty of 1940 between the two countries. It was described at a palace ceremony as marking the opening of a new era of friendship between two neighbors.

*Nov. 15:* The Iranian Government ceased relaying Voice of America (VOA) programs over the state radio station. Relay of BBC news programs also was stopped by a blanket order canceling re-broadcasts of all foreign radio programs.

*Nov. 16:* The Department of State in Washington said that if the VOA had been silenced in Iran it could not be because of any criticism of the Soviet Ambassador to that country, as reported from Tehran. The Department denied that its overseas radio had made any "derogatory mention" of the Soviet envoy in a Nov. 13 broadcast as alleged.

*Nov. 22:* Iranian press and propaganda director Bahram Shahrokh told a news conference that the Iranian Government decided to stop rebroadcasting VOA programs because the U.S. had not kept its promise to deliver 5 radio transmitters to Iran. He said that the cancellation was not the result of foreign pressure, as Tehran newspapers had charged, emphasizing that Iran would not tolerate any foreign pressure from whatever source.

*Nov. 24:* The International Monetary Fund agreed to the proposal made by the Government of Iran to modify its foreign exchange system as a step toward exchange stabilization and establishment of a unitary rate in the future. (*International Financial News Survey*, Nov. 24.)

*Nov. 25:* The State Department announced that U.S. Ambassador Henry F. Grady was returning to Washington for discussions looking toward speeding the carrying out of economic assistance programs for Iran.

*Nov. 29:* U.S. Ambassador Grady, arriving in New York from Tehran, said he had not returned "because of so-called anti-American feeling in Iran," but had come home to urge prompt economic and military aid to that country to bolster American prestige. He said that reports of declining American prestige and increasing pro-Russian sentiment were "true to a degree," but on the whole "out of perspective," adding that "the situation is not too disturbing."

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## Iraq

1950

*Sept. 14:* The Cabinet resigned.*Sept. 16:* Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa'id announced a new Cabinet as follows:

Nuri al-Sa'id — Prime Minister and Acting Minister of Interior  
 Shakir al-Wadi — Minister of Defense and Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs  
 'Abd al-Wahhab Mirjan — Communications and Acting Minister of Finance  
 Diya' Ja'far — Economics  
 Hasan Sami Tatar — Justice  
 Khalil Kannah — Education  
 Hamid Mustafa — Social Affairs

*Oct. 10:* Formation of a new national development board of 8 men was announced in Baghdad. The board was charged with carrying out the first of a series of 5-year plans to which the whole of Iraqi oil income had been assigned by law. The primary objective of the program was to rebuild the Tigris-Euphrates irrigation system. Negotiations were under way for Sir Eddington Miller, former Finance Director of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, to become the British member of the board; the Iraqi Government was also seeking a top-ranking American irrigation expert to serve on it.

*Nov. 20:* The Iraqi Government issued an official communiqué defining certain points made in a public lecture by Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa'id on November 14. The communiqué said he had intended to emphasize (1) the importance of completely overhauling Iraq's defense plans; (2) the necessity of adapting the country's defense policy for war or peace conditions; and (3) the necessity for moves for conciliation among the country's varying political parties in order to achieve a unified defense policy. (*Arab News Agency*, Nov. 25.)

*Nov. 28:* Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa'id, in an address to his Constitutional Union Party, said that Britain's treaty of alliance with Iraq had become obsolete. He added that no foreign power should have peacetime bases in Iraq, saying that "necessity and national interest dictate that we should . . . cooperate with our Egyptian brethren to settle this vital mutual problem."

## Israel

(See also Palestine Problem.)

1950

*Sept. 3:* A conference of 50 American business and Jewish community leaders and British and South African Jews concerning the economic problems confronting the country opened in Jerusalem with Government and financial leaders. Prime

Minister Ben Gurion presented his \$1,500 million plan designed to bring in 600,000 immigrants, create full employment, and narrow the deficit in trade balance by the end of 1953.

*Sept. 4:* Finance Minister Eliezer Kaplan announced that plans had been drawn up for a £1200 million (\$560 million) 20-year irrigation program.

*Sept. 6:* The conference of American business and communal leaders was concluded with a pledge that the Jews in the U.S. would provide \$1 billion toward Israel's 3-year development and immigration plan.

*Sept. 17:* The Government of India recognized the state of Israel.

*Sept. 23:* Text of an air service agreement between England and Israel was initialled in London by representatives of both countries. (*London Times*, Sept. 23.)

*Sept. 30:* The Israel Cabinet announced economic and financial reforms relaxing some Government controls on business and making other concessions to free enterprise.

*Oct. 12:* Prime Minister David Ben Gurion informed Government leaders that he proposed to make Jack Gering, a non-party man, Minister for Industry and Commerce in a Cabinet reshuffle.

*Oct. 15:* Prime Minister Ben Gurion submitted his resignation to President Chaim Weizmann, after the 3-member Orthodox bloc withdrew from the Cabinet upon the announcement of his decision to reorganize the Ministry of Trade and Industry. After consultation with leaders of all parties in the Knesset (Parliament), the President asked Mr. Ben Gurion to form a new Government.

*Oct. 16:* Prime Minister Ben Gurion stated in the Knesset that he had failed to establish a new Government with a stable majority to replace the 4-party coalition that had fallen. He proposed a "caretaker" government composed of the 7 Mapai members of the former Cabinet.

*Oct. 18:* The Knesset voted 57 to 43 against Prime Minister Ben Gurion's proposed all-Mapai Party Government. It was decided to have the outgoing 4-party coalition Government remain in office until a new Cabinet was approved. The House adopted a motion for the dissolution of the Knesset and asked the Legal Committee to submit a new election bill within two months.

*Oct. 19:* President Chaim Weizmann asked Justice Minister Pinhas Rosen, head of the Progressive Party, to replace David Ben Gurion's 4-party coalition government, but Dr. Rosen asked for several days in which to consider the proposal.

*Oct. 25:* Justice Minister Pinhas Rosen informed President Chaim Weizmann that David Ben Gurion had agreed to form a new cabinet, which would in effect be the same Cabinet except for the addition of Jack Gering (Yaacov Geri), an independent businessman, as Minister of Trade

and Industry. Mr. Ben Gurion informed the Orthodox group that the choice in the present issue was between agreeing to a Cabinet reshuffle or holding new elections. The Orthodox bloc agreed to Mr. Ben Gurion's concessions regarding their demands that meat imports conform to religious dietary laws and that Sabbath observance and restrictions, such as banning interurban transport, be enforced.

Later in the day, however, three members of the Orthodox bloc refused to accept Ben Gurion's proposals for Cabinet shifts, and the Knesset began consideration of a bill providing for new general elections.

**Oct. 28:** Finance Minister Eliezer Kaplan reported to the 280-man steering committee of the National Planning Conference for Israel and Jewish Rehabilitation in Washington that Israel would achieve economic stabilization by 1956 but stressed that the nation would require \$1,500 million to execute a 3-year program of development.

**Oct. 29:** Twelve-hundred representatives of 44 national Jewish organizations in the U.S. unanimously adopted a 4-point program to provide Israel with \$1 billion in the next three years to help solve economic problems and to provide rehabilitation and resettlement for 600,000 Jews who were expected to enter that country within that period.

**Oct. 30:** Prime Minister David Ben Gurion announced formation of a new 13-member Cabinet based on a coalition of the same four parties as in the outgoing Government. The Prime Minister said that the Cabinet would operate on the basis of the 4-year program announced by the Knesset in March 1949, together with recently introduced economic reforms making concessions to the business interests. The new Cabinet was as follows.

David Ben Gurion (Mapai) — Prime Minister and Defense

Moshe Sharett (Mapai) — Foreign Affairs

Eliezer Kaplan (Mapai) — Finance

David Remez (Mapai) — Education

Mrs. Golda Myerson (Mapai) — Labor and Social Insurance

Dr. Bernard Joseph (Mapai) — Communications

Pinhas Lubianker (Mapai) — Agriculture

Moshe Shapiro (Orthodox) — Interior, Health and Immigration

Rabbi Juda Maimon (Orthodox) — Religious Affairs and War Sufferers

Rabbi Itzhak Meir Levin (Orthodox) — Social Welfare

Pinhas Rosen (Progressive) — Justice

Behor Shitrit (Sephardim) — Police Affairs

Yaacov Geri (Independent) — Trade and Industry.

**Nov. 15:** Israel's first country-wide municipal and rural elections produced a marked swing to the right. Although the Mapai had a slight lead throughout the country, it lost considerable ground compared with the January 1949 general election, especially in Tel Aviv. The General Zionist center party gained most ground, winning in Tel Aviv, running second in Haifa and Jerusalem, and taking a majority of seats on several town and village councils. The Orthodox bloc, the Left-wing Mapam, and the Progressives all lost ground, while the extremist Right-wing Herut and the Communists showed slight gains but remained inconsequential as political parties. The General Zionist representatives in the Knesset interpreted the results as a sign of public dissatisfaction with the economic and fiscal policy of the Coalition Government and called for immediate new national elections.

**Nov. 18:** The Jewish Agency Executive in New York reported that Israel's system of immigrant reception camps would be ended early in the spring of 1951. Under the new procedure, newcomers, with the exception of the aged, infirm, and other unemployables, would go directly to workers' villages newly established throughout Israel.

**Nov. 19:** Bedouins from the Sinai desert were reported to have shot a child and stolen three horses in a foray across the border, when they attacked Israel Arab tribes southeast of Beer-sheba. Local Arabs reported to Israel military authorities that the raiders were of the 'Azazimah tribe expelled from Israel three months before.

**Nov. 23:** Uri Winter, 23-year-old Communist, was sentenced to 6 years imprisonment at the first Communist spy trial in Israel. Found in 1949 with copies of secret military documents on the strength and organization of the Israel Army, he was arrested during a recent Communist demonstration against Henry Morgenthau, who made a statement in Jerusalem that Israel should join a Middle East pact similar to the Atlantic Pact.

**Nov. 29:** It was announced that about 500,000 immigrants had entered Israel since the state was formed, bringing the Jewish population to 1,184,000 and total population, including Arabs, to 1,354,000.

## Italian Colonies Problem

1950

**Sept. 7:** The Italian Government decided to accept the principle of federation of its former East African colony of Eritrea with Ethiopia.

**Sept. 29:** UN Commissioner in Libya Adrian Pelt reported to Secretary General Lie that a single independent Muslim political unit for Libya now had the support of the entire area.



*Oct. 6:* Italian Foreign Under Secretary Signor Brusasca told the Senate that public order was so secure in Somaliland, of which Italy assumed the UN trusteeship at the beginning of 1950, that 2,300 of the 5,300 Italian troops sent there would return to Italy. (*London Times*, Oct. 7.)

*Oct. 9:* Sir Gladwyn Jebb, chief British representative on the UN Special Political Committee, submitted a resolution to create an arbitral tribunal to solve Libyan economic and financial problems — chiefly the disposition of former Italian property in Libya.

*Oct. 10:* Soviet Union spokesman Amazasp A. Arutunian, in the Special Political Committee of the UN, urged that the UN call upon the U.S., Britain, and France to withdraw all of their troops from Libya within 90 days and liquidate military bases in that region.

*Oct. 17:* A joint 13-power resolution regarding the implementation of independence for Libya was submitted to the Special Political Committee of the UN. The three main recommendations were as follows: (1) a duly representative national assembly would be convened as early as possible, and not later than Jan. 1, 1951; (2) this Assembly would establish a provisional government "bearing in mind April 1, 1951, as the target date"; (3) authority now held by Britain and France as administering powers under the peace treaty would be transferred progressively until their authority had been relinquished by Jan. 1, 1952.

*Oct. 19:* The UN General Assembly's Special Political Committee rejected by a vote of 38-13 the Soviet Union resolution calling for withdrawal of U.S., British, and French troops from Libya.

*Oct. 26:* Adrian Pelt, UN Commissioner in Libya, reported to the General Assembly that according to a decision made by the Preparatory Committee of Twenty-One charged with formulating a plan for convoking the Libyan national assembly, non-national minorities would not be allowed to participate or be represented.

*Nov. 9:* The Soviet Delegation to the UN formally requested that the UN grant "independence immediately" to Eritrea, order Britain's "occupation forces" out of the Red Sea territory within 90 days, and cede Ethiopia "that part of the territory of Eritrea which is necessary to secure access to the sea through the Port of Assab."

*Nov. 11:* Iraq presented to the UN a proposal calling for a decision by the people of Eritrea on the disposition of the former Italian colony not later than Jan. 1, 1953. The resolution provided for establishment of a national assembly by the end of 1951 and the determination by that body of the people's choice for "some form of federation with Ethiopia" or for "an independent sovereign state granting Ethiopia suitable access to the sea."

Claiming veto rights for itself and 19 other

signatories of the Italian peace treaty, Ethiopia filed a formal resolution at Lake Success questioning the legality of a UN trusteeship agreement by which Italy had assumed provisional administration of its former Somaliland colony since April 1.

*Nov. 13:* The U.S. delegation assumed the leadership of a group of countries searching in the UN for a "practical compromise solution" to the problem of Eritrea. Ethiopian Foreign Minister Ato Abte-Wold Akilou condemned the Iraqi resolution of Nov. 11, declaring that such a proposition "should not be taken seriously."

*Nov. 16:* Dr. Adrian Pelt, UN Commissioner for Libya, laid before the General Assembly a plan for establishing a democratic government for Libya. His idea, on which he proposed to seek the advice of the UN Council for Libya, provided that the National Assembly be considered solely a drafting body, and final adoption of the proposed constitution be left to a democratically elected Parliament; that the Parliament consist of two chambers — a territorial chamber, chosen by the people in each of the three territories, and a popular chamber, elected by the people of Libya as a whole; and that the government be responsible to the popular chamber, which would have sole competence in certain fields, particularly that of the state budget.

*Nov. 17:* UN technical assistance for Libya was voted by the General Assembly.

The joint 13-power resolution regarding the implementation of independence for Libya was adopted by the UN General Assembly's Special Political Committee.

*Nov. 18:* The U.S., supported by 13 other countries, circulated a resolution in the Special Political Committee proposing that Eritrea be made an autonomous unity federated with Ethiopia under the Ethiopian crown. The Eritreans would possess legislative, executive, and judicial powers in their own domestic affairs. The federation was to be brought into effect no later than Sept. 15, 1952. A UN Commissioner would assist in the administration of the area during the transition period. A single nationality would prevail throughout the region except for persons holding foreign passports. The Federal Government would be responsible for defense, foreign affairs, currency and finance, foreign and interstate commerce, and communications. Eritreans would be vested with authority to maintain an internal police force, levy taxes to meet domestic needs, adopt a budget, and all powers not vested in the Federal Government. (For text, see p. 89.)

*Nov. 22:* Ethiopian Foreign Minister Ato Abte-Wold Akilou told the Special Political Committee of the UN General Assembly that his country was prepared to accept the U.S.-sponsored 14-nation proposal for federation with Eritrea, calling the plan "the best solution we can get and the one thing likely to get a majority vote."

**Nov. 24:** A Soviet proposal for immediate independence for Eritrea and a Polish resolution for independence after 3 years were rejected by the Special Political Committee. Still before the committee were resolutions by Pakistan for independence not later than Jan. 1, 1953, and by Iraq recommending self-determination.

The U.S. Government announced it would give Point Four help to Libya, sending technical experts in agriculture, water resources, public health, and education.

**Nov. 25:** The Libyan National Constituent Assembly convened in Tripoli in inaugural session. Almost the first act of the new Assembly was to send its greetings to the "expected King of Libya," Amir Sayyid Idris al-Sanusi of Cyrenaica. The Mufti of Tripoli, Abu al-Asad al-'Alim, acted temporarily as Speaker.

The UN General Assembly's Special Political Committee approved the 14-nation plan for federation between Eritrea and Ethiopia by a vote of 38 to 14 with 8 abstention. The Iraqi and Pakistani proposals were rejected. Mahmud Fawzi Bey of Egypt said the plan was not a perfect one, but it was, he believed, "the most appropriate to the situation." Sheikh Ahmad 'Abd al-Jabbar of Saudi Arabia attacked the plan as the disguised annexation of Eritrea to Ethiopia in contravention of the principle of self-determination.

**Nov. 30:** A 5-member committee to nominate a UN Commissioner who would lead Eritrea along a planned road to federation with Ethiopia was proposed by the Assembly Special Political Committee.

## Jordan

(See also Palestine Problem.)

1950

**Sept. 30:** The Cabinet approved drafts of friendship treaties with Afghanistan and Spain, to be formally signed the next week.

**Oct. 5:** Dr. Yusuf Haykal, Jordanian Minister in the U.S., was named Jordan representative in the UN Assembly.

**Oct. 12:** King Abdallah approved the resignation of the Cabinet and requested Prime Minister Sa'id Pasha al-Mufti to form a new Government.

**Oct. 14:** The Prime Minister announced formation of a new Cabinet as follows:

Sa'id Pasha al-Mufti — Prime Minister  
 Ruhi Pasha 'Abd al-Hadi — Foreign Minister  
 'Abd al-Rahman Pasha Khalifah — Interior  
 Sheikh Abdallah Ghoshah — Chief Muslim Justice  
 Ahmad Bey Tarawni — Trade and Agriculture  
 Hashim Bey Jayyusi — Transport  
 Muhammad al-Shurayqi Pasha — Justice

Ahmad Bey Tuqan — Education  
 Anastas Bey Hananiya — Reconstruction  
 Fawzi Pasha al-Mulqi — Defense

**Oct. 15:** Prime Minister Sa'id Pasha al-Mufti, in a ceremony at Parliament House announcing the new cabinet, outlined the aims of his foreign policy as follows: cooperation with, and remaining in, the Arab League group; and striving to establish exchange of diplomatic representation with Syria. (*London Times*, Oct. 16.)

**Oct. 17:** It was announced in Amman that all roads between Jordan and Syria were closed, probably because of the suspicion in Syria that recent attempts against Syria's security had emanated from Jordan.

**Oct. 25:** King Abdallah said in a press interview in Baghdad that Palestine should be returned to its "rightful people," adding that villages and settlements were being established in Jordan for Arab refugees and that a special Ministry was dealing with this important matter. (*Arab News Agency*, Oct. 28.)

**Nov. 1:** King Abdallah, in his speech from the throne to the Jordan Parliament, declared that Jordan foreign policy would always aim at the strengthening of cordial relations and brotherly ties between Jordan and the other Arab states. In reference to internal affairs the throne speech said that the Government aimed at thorough reform which would cover all aspects of life in the country, adding that "the Government has approved big estimates to deal with construction and industrial schemes. In approving this expenditure the Government has sought the advice of experts and has appointed a special committee to study a scheme for the construction of a port at Aqaba in which the Government will participate to the extent of 25% of the cost." (*Arab News Agency*, Nov. 11.)

Minister of Justice and Acting Minister of Education, Muhammad al-Shurayqi, resigned his posts. 'Abd al-Rahman Pasha Khalifah, Minister of Interior, took over the post of Acting Minister of Justice in addition to continuing his present post, and Sheikh Abdallah Ghoshah, Supreme Judge, was appointed Acting Minister of Education while also continuing in his existing appointment. (*Arab News Agency*, Nov. 11.)

Jordan's population was announced as 1,367,180 according to latest official statistics. Native Jordanians totalled 464,680; refugees 102,500; and inhabitants of West Jordan, together with refugees living in that region, 800,000. (*Arab News Agency*, Nov. 11.)

**Nov. 25:** The government decided to transfer all major government departments from Jerusalem to Amman for easier ministerial control, expecting to accomplish the move by April 1. (*Arab News Agency*, Nov. 25.)

**Nov. 28:** Anti-British demonstrations in the Jordan Parliament were reported. The dominant British position in that country, the military arrange-

ments under which the Arab Legion was virtually a British force, and the existence in Jordan of British bases were reportedly assailed.

## Kashmir Problem

1950

Sept. 5: Nawab Sir Shah Jahan, of Dir State, whose men formed the bulk of the tribal lashkar (armed band) which fought the Indian Army in Kashmir in 1947 and 1948, telegraphed the Governor of North-West Frontier Province that the people and forces of his state were impatient to resume the jihad. The Governor replied asking patience, explaining that the Government of Pakistan was exploring all peaceful means of settling the dispute. (*London Times*, Sept. 6.)

Sept. 20: UN Mediator Sir Owen Dixon forwarded to the Security Council his report that he had been unable to bring India and Pakistan together on the future of Kashmir and asked to be relieved of his post. He indicated that partition of Kashmir seemed to be the only way out, and advised the Security Council to instruct India and Pakistan to settle the dispute themselves.

Sept. 30: Prime Minister Nehru told a press conference that the Indian Government was unable to accept any of Sir Owen Dixon's proposals, primarily because his country's "basic position was not appreciated." He indicated he was still prepared to consider the Mediator's partition plan on terms that would not violate the basic stand taken by India.

Oct. 2: Promising a full debate on the Kashmir question, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan told the Pakistan Assembly that "the Government is fully aware of the deep feelings which have been aroused throughout the length and breadth of Pakistan on account of the failure of Sir Owen Dixon's mission and his report to the Security Council." (*London Times*, Oct. 3.)

Oct. 5: Debate in the Pakistan Assembly on Kashmir was marked by general moderation. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan said that the goal of Pakistan's policy was to secure the right of self determination and "we shall not allow India to dominate Kashmir by force." He emphasized that India must be made to implement the agreement that the fate of Kashmir should be decided by a free and impartial plebiscite. (*London Times*, Oct. 6.)

Oct. 22: The Landed Estates Abolition Act in Jammu and Kashmir state was passed with a view to transferring all land holdings in excess of 23 acres to the actual tiller. (*India News Bulletin*, Oct. 31.)

Oct. 27: The All-Jammu and Kashmir National Conference passed a resolution proposing to set up a constituent assembly on the basis of adult franchise for determining "the future shape and

affiliations of the state." Prime Minister Nehru in a press interview said the resolution was not in conflict with UN efforts to settle the state's future. (*India News Bulletin*, Nov. 14.)

Oct. 28: Prime Minister Nehru supported the proposal made by Sheikh Abdullah's Government to prepare for the eventual conduct of state-wide elections to convene a constituent assembly in Kashmir, presumably as a substitute for the plebiscite previously advocated.

Nov. 28: In a letter to Pakistan Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister Nehru repeated his suggestion of a year before to Pakistan to join India in a formal declaration that neither country would go to war with the other over Kashmir. Pakistan Foreign Minister Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, in releasing in New York the texts of lengthy correspondence between Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan, charged that India was responsible for blocking the peaceful settlement of three long-standing disputes between the two countries. In New Delhi Nehru told Parliament that he had been invited by the Pakistan Prime Minister to continue talks aimed at settling differences between the two countries. He said he would go to Karachi as soon as circumstances permitted.

## Lebanon

1950

Oct. 10: A Communist demonstration was staged before the American Legation in Beirut. Police fired shots over the heads of the demonstrators. No persons were injured, but two were arrested.

Oct. 27: Prime Minister Riyad al-Sulh was in Cairo to discuss the question of instability in Syria and the Syro-Lebanese economic dispute.

Nov. 23: Former Prime Minister 'Abd al-Hamid Karamah died in Beirut. (*Arab News Agency*, Nov. 25.)

## North Africa

1950

Sept. 13: A protest against French authority in North Africa was addressed in a letter to Secretary of State Dean Acheson by El Abed Bouhafa, Secretary of the Committee for Freedom for North Africa, on behalf of 'Abd el-Krim, (president of the committee), the Sultan of Morocco, and the Bey of Tunis.

Oct. 11: The Sultan of Morocco, visiting France, in conversation with President Auriol asked for more personal power in the government of his people. His basic demands were: "(1) that he receive full authority over the Makhzen or Moroccan Central Government with the power to appoint all pasha and kaid (tribal chieftans) and kadis (magistrates); (2) that his personal cabinet receive powers hitherto invested in the Makhzen."



*Oct. 27:* France asked the World Court to determine the legality and extent of United States treaty rights in French Morocco, which stem from treaties with the Sultan of Morocco as far back as 1836.

*Oct. 31:* The French Government, in a memorandum handed to the Sultan of Morocco, agreed to some minor reforms in line with the Sultan's request but rejected any basic modification of the French protectorate in Morocco. Although the text of the memorandum was withheld, it was understood that the French had agreed to abolish censorship in Morocco and immediately to seek the Sultan's consent for a separation of the judicial and administrative powers of the pashas.

*Nov. 2:* The exchange of notes between the French Government and the Sultan ended with each side handing the other a last-minute rebuttal before the Sultan left Paris. The Sultan and his entourage insisted on a new treaty between France and Morocco to replace the Protectorate Treaty of 1912. A French communiqué asserted that the present regime in Morocco offered ample scope for democratic reforms.

## Pakistan

(See also Afghanistan, India.)

1950

*Sept. 6:* Maj. Gen. Muhammed Ayyub Khan was appointed the first Pakistani Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

*Sept. 14:* Ambassador M. A. H. Ispahani announced in New York that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development would send a mission to Pakistan within a month to survey development projects involved in a loan of \$250 million asked for by Pakistan.

*Oct. 4:* Pakistan announced that its northern borders had been invaded from Afghanistan with ensuing fighting. According to Karachi the attack was repelled.

*Oct. 6:* In a formal protest to the Government of Afghanistan, Pakistan charged that 5,000 Afghan troops had joined Pathan warrior tribesmen who crossed the border into Pakistan on Sept. 30.

The Constituent Assembly unanimously approved a report by its Committee on Human Rights, including a clause for the protection of minorities.

Pakistan and Poland signed a trade agreement providing for the prospective exchange of \$36,400,000 worth of products. Pakistan would receive coal for cotton, jute, and rice.

*Oct. 8:* Jogendranath Mandal, Minister for Law and Labor and the only Hindu in the Pakistan Cabinet, resigned. He stated that his resignation was in protest against the treatment of Hindus in Pakistan, particularly in East Bengal.

Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was elected

President of the Muslim League at a meeting of 460 delegates in Karachi.

The Pakistan Government announced preparation of a 6-year development plan which was estimated to cost 2,600 million rupees. (For details, see pp. 94-100.)

*Oct. 20:* The Pakistan Assembly approved a bill to abolish the old constitutional requirement that the assent of the Governor General of the Dominion or of the Governors of the provinces to a bill approved by the federal or provincial legislatures should be given "in his Majesty's name." The bill also contained a clause making it impossible to sue the Pakistan Government or the governments of the provinces in the courts of Britain. (London Times, Oct. 21.)

*Oct. 23:* The Government ordered large increases in the export duty on raw cotton. (London Times, Oct. 24.)

*Nov. 28:* The Government's 6-year 2,600 million rupee economic development program — part of the Colombo Plan — was presented to the Legislative Assembly.

*Nov. 29:* The Pakistan Ministry of Frontier Regions charged that Afghan regular troops had again invaded northern Pakistan on Nov. 21 and had taken over a hill position in the Quetta-Pishin district.

## Palestine Problem

1950

*Sept. 2:* The UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine closed its current session in Jerusalem and announced that it would reopen at Lake Success on Oct. 2.

*Sept. 4:* Egyptian Minister of War and Marine Mustafa Nusrat Bey stated that Israel armed forces had driven 2,000 Palestinian Arabs across the Israel border into Egyptian territory, and asked the UN to take measures to stop such actions.

*Sept. 12:* Egypt's Minister of War and Marine Mustafa Nusrat Bey made his third announcement in ten days concerning the expulsion of Arabs by gun point from southern Israel, bringing the total of Arabs reportedly expelled to about 6,000.

Jordan officially accused Israel of occupying Jordanian territory and forging a map to justify the act. Jordan Minister for Foreign Affairs Muhammad Shurayqi Pasha in a telegram to UN Secretary General Trygve Lie urged that the Security Council instruct Israel to withdraw to the "line in Palestine territory originally occupied by the forces."

*Sept. 13:* An Israel army spokesman stated that Israel forces had occupied an area of land along the border of Jordan because it was Israel territory under the Rhodes armistice agreement with King Abdallah.

*Sept. 14:* UN Chief Truce Supervisor Maj. Gen.



William E. Riley said in Tel Aviv that from an interpretation of the armistice map Israel undoubtedly was right in its claim to land disputed by Jordan, but that he had legal reservations arising from the fact that the land had belonged to Transjordan before the Palestine fighting.

*Sept. 15:* Egypt filed charges against Israel at the UN Security Council, stating that more than 4,000 Arab Bedouins had been driven out of Israel into Egyptian territory, and that atrocities had been committed on them by Israel troops.

*Sept. 16:* Israel filed four complaints with the UN charging that Egypt and Jordan had "threatened aggressive action" and violated armistice agreements with Israel.

*Sept. 18:* A Jordan Government spokesman stated that his country would press before the UN Security Council a complaint that Israel had invaded Jordan territory in August at the junction of the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers.

*Sept. 20:* In a report to the UN Security Council, Maj. Gen. William E. Riley, UN truce chief in Palestine, stated that on Sept. 2 Israel forces drove 4,000 Arab Bedouins from Israel into Egypt. He also stated that Israel had driven another 1,000 Arabs into the Gaza coastal strip since March 1950.

*Sept. 26:* The Palestine Conciliation Commission turned in a 70-page report on its attempt to arrange a settlement of outstanding questions still in dispute between Israel and the Arab countries.

*Oct. 6:* The UN Palestine Conciliation Commission held its first formal meeting at the UN in New York since returning from Jerusalem.

*Oct. 7:* Egypt's Minister of War and Marine Mustafa Nusrat Bey said that Israel forces had driven 300 more Arabs from the Negev region within the past few days and that a total of 7,000 Arabs had recently been driven from their homes in southern Palestine.

*Oct. 9:* The Israel Government protested to the Mixed Armistice Commission that 8 Syrian soldiers abducted 3 Israel Arabs and took them to Syria after the Syrians had attempted to steal flocks belonging to an Arab tribe 12 miles north of Tiberias.

*Oct. 16:* The Egyptian Government presented armistice violation charges against Israel before the UN Security Council accusing Israel authorities of having expelled thousands of Arabs into Egyptian territory. The accusations were denied by Abba S. Eban, Israel's representative.

*Oct. 25:* In a report to UN Secretary General Lie, the Palestine Conciliation Commission recommended that the General Assembly urge Israel and the Arab states to begin direct discussions under UN auspices without delay, adding that it "does not doubt" that such talks would succeed.

*Oct. 26:* Representatives of the four nations (Britain, the U.S., France, and Turkey) on the Advisory Committee of the Relief and Works

Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East asked the UN General Assembly for an additional \$50 million to provide help and jobs for Arab refugees.

*Nov. 2:* The question of relief and repatriation for Palestine's refugees was debated in the Special Political Committee of the UN General Assembly. The two speakers who were heard, Tafazzul Ari of Pakistan and Ahmad Bey Tuqan of Jordan, both said that relief, while urgently needed, must not block the return of refugees to their homes.

*Nov. 6:* Jordan's senior representative on the Mixed Armistice Commission, 'Azmi Bey al-Nashashibi, defied UN orders to permit a regularly scheduled Mount Scopus convoy, going to relieve the isolated staff and guards at Hebrew University and Hadassah Hospital, to pass.

*Nov. 7:* Israel representative Abba Eban told the Special Political Committee of the UN General Assembly that Israel would sooner pay compensation for lands abandoned by Arab refugees than have them return to their homes, and that any idea of repatriating this group was "completely unrealistic." The position was heavily attacked by representatives of various Arab states, who insisted that a return of Palestine refugees to their homes was a paramount issue to be settled before there was any possibility of permanent peace in the Middle East. U.S. Delegate John C. Ross warned that the extent of U.S. financial contribution to Palestine refugee relief programs would be measured henceforth against the amount that other nations gave and would be "gravely affected" by the willingness of Israel and the Arab lands to work together on a solution. Discussion closed with submission of a draft resolution by 'Abd al-Mun'im Mustafa Bey of Egypt for the Arab bloc, proposing creation of a new agency to handle repatriation and fix compensation.

*Nov. 8:* A member of the committee created by the Congress of Refugee Delegates in Syria and Lebanon asserted in Damascus that the committee had been empowered by the Congress to issue the following orders if the UN did not repatriate the refugees: to boycott relief and work relief projects; to organize active resistance to UN measures; and to march into Israel-held territory.

*Nov. 13:* Israel delegate to UN, Abba S. Eban, demanded in the Security Council that Egypt abandon its restrictions preventing shipment through the Suez Canal of goods bound for Israel.

*Nov. 15:* A spokesman of the UN Relief and Work Administration in Beirut estimated that putting the Palestine Arab refugees on their feet as self-supporting persons was going to cost some \$200 million. Hence, the work relief program would be halted after an expenditure of about \$10 million—about \$25 million less than had been planned for it—and a new fund of \$30 million would be sought for the year beginning July 1951

for "reintegration of the refugees instead of work relief."

**Nov. 17:** By a vote of 9 to 0, with Egypt and the Soviet Union abstaining, the UN Security Council directed that charges and countercharges between Israel and its Arab neighbors be referred for settlement to the UN Mixed Armistice Commission, which was to report within 90 days. The charges involved armistice and frontier violations, including the Arab charge that Israel was systematically deporting Arabs from Israel territory.

**Nov. 20:** The Vatican, through its daily newspaper *L'Osservatore Romano*, indicated that it still favored the full internationalization of Jerusalem despite contrary proposals by the Government of Israel.

**Nov. 27:** A \$50 million UN program to continue direct relief to Palestine refugees and provide funds for reintegrating displaced Arabs on a permanent basis was approved without opposition in the General Assembly's Special Political Committee. The resolution incorporated a provision for appointment of a negotiating committee of 7 or more members to consult during the present session with member and non-member states to find out how much money might be contributed to the fund on a voluntary basis. In a radio program Israel Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett praised the committee's decision, saying Israel would contribute its share.

**Nov. 29:** Israel authorities called for an emergency meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission, charging that an armored force of Jordan's Arab Legion blocked the main road between Beersheba and Elath in the Israel Negev, cutting communications with the southern tip of the desert area. Jordan had previously filed a complaint that the highway cut through a part of Jordan territory.

**Nov. 30:** Israel Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett told the UN Assembly's Special Political Committee that repatriation of any appreciable number of Palestine Arab refugees was "utterly impracticable." He said Israel was willing to pay compensation for Arab properties into a new UN reintegration fund. Syrian Delegate Farid Zayn al-Din said there was "little possibility" of resettling 1 million Arab refugees in neighboring states. Ahmad Tuqan of Jordan said the property left behind by Arabs was worth \$3 billion.

## Saudi Arabia

(See also Syria.)

1950

**Nov. 24:** The Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington called attention to official denials made by the Saudi Arabian Government of charges that it had financed Arab terrorism in Syria.

## Sudan

(See also Egypt.)

1950

**Nov. 22:** Sir James Robertson, Administrative Secretary, warned the Legislative Assembly that a general strike in the Sudan would be followed by drastic consequences for the strikers. The Sudanese Labor Congress had threatened to call a general strike if a number of students expelled for striking were not permitted to return to their schools. (*Arab News Agency*, Nov. 25.)

**Nov. 25:** Sayyid Siddiq al-Mahdi, leader of the Umma (Independence) Party in Khartoum, called the governments of the United Kingdom and Egypt and the Governor General of the Sudan protesting any attempt to undermine the right of the Sudanese people to full independence. The telegrams were sent following a meeting at Omdurman of the Umma Party, where speeches were made in support of Egypt's stand on the Sudan question. (*Arab News Agency*, Nov. 25.)

## Syria

(See also Jordan, Palestine Problem, Saudi Arabia.)

1950

**Sept. 5:** Hashim al-Atasi was elected President of the Third Republic of Syria by the Parliament, which also approved the nation's new constitution by a vote of 105-6.

**Sept. 8:** Prime Minister Nazim al-Qudsi announced the new members of his Populist Cabinet as follows:

Nazim al-Qudsi — Prime Minister and Foreign Minister  
Hani al-Siba'i — Education  
Col. Fawzi Silu — Defense  
Hasan al-Hakim — Minister of State  
Zaki al-Khatib — Justice  
Shakir al-'As — Finance  
Ahmad Qanbar — Public Works  
Dr. Georges Shalhub — Health  
Farhan al-Jandali — National Economy  
Rashad Barmadah — Interior  
'Ali Buzo — Agriculture

**Sept. 11:** The new Cabinet won a vote of confidence in the Parliament by 63-5.

**Sept. 12:** President Truman nominated Cavendish W. Cannon as Minister to Syria.

**Sept. 15:** The UN Relief and Works Agency offices in Damascus were blown up, killing one man and injuring 2 others.

**Sept. 27:** Deputy Munir al-Ajlani was arrested for alleged complicity with King Abdallah of Jordan to promote the Greater Syria Plan.

**Oct. 11:** Four men attempted to assassinate Col.

Adib Shishakli, Deputy Army Chief of Staff. Col. Shishakli was unhurt.

Oct. 17: Ahmad al-Sharabati, a former National Defense Minister, and 20 other persons were arrested in an alleged plot against Syria's security.

Oct. 30: Gen. Sami al-Hinnawi, who led the second of two army coups in 1949, was shot and killed at a streetcar stop in Beirut. The killer, who was arrested by police as he tried to run away, was Ahmad al-Barazi, cousin of former Prime Minister Muhsin Bey al-Barazi, who was executed on Gen. Hinnawi's order after his coup.

Nov. 5: Prime Minister Nazim al-Qudsi and Defense Minister Col. Fawzi Silu left Damascus for Saudi Arabia, Amman, Beirut, and Cairo to discuss mutual problems with officials there.

After endorsing Syria's construction projects and expressing readiness to recommend a loan at 0.5% interest, a mission from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development left Damascus for Baghdad to examine similar projects in Iraq. (*Arab News Agency*, Nov. 11.)

Nov. 11: Dr. Farhan al-Jandali, Minister of Economy, announced that Syria would establish a permanent Economic Council to be composed of 7 members who were authorities on economic affairs. (*Arab News Agency*, Nov. 11.)

Nov. 12: Military investigation authorities charged 21 persons affiliated with the Arab Suicide Redemption Falange with 7 bombings, 15 killings, and other assassinations. Nash'at Shaykh al-Ard was formally accused of receiving money from the Saudi Arabian Government and of delivering it to a Nationalist, Amin al-Ruwayhah, to obtain the support of the terrorist society in an attempt to assassinate King Abdullah of Jordan. Husayn Tawfiq, an Egyptian, and his associates were charged with having attempted to assassinate Col. Adib Shishakli, deputy chief of staff of the Syrian Army. Ahmad al-Sharabati, former Minister of Defense, was charged with financially supporting the terrorist group in full awareness of its criminal activities. Among the acts charged to the society were the bombing of the U.S. Legation; the bombing of a Jewish synagogue in which 13 were killed and 21 injured; the injuring of Col. W. F. Stirling, Damascus correspondent of the *London Times*; and the bombing of the UN Works and Relief headquarters in Damascus.

## Turkey

1950

Sept. 2: The Ministry of Public Works appointed Frederic R. Harris, Inc., consulting engineers, to prepare a hydraulic power development program for Turkey.

Sept. 10: Turkey temporarily closed its Bulgarian frontier in order to prevent the influx of emigrants from Bulgaria who sought to enter Turkey without Turkish visas.

Sept. 19: Turkey was asked to associate itself with appropriate phases of defense planning of the North Atlantic treaty organization with respect to the Mediterranean area.

Sept. 21: Minister of Public Health, Dr. Nihat Rasat Belger, resigned, and was replaced by Dr. Ekrem Hayri Ustundağ.

Agreement was reached between the Turkish Government and ECA concerning construction of a power station of 80,000 kilowatts at Sariyer on the Sakarya River at a total cost of \$128 million.

Sept. 26: Mme. Mufide Ilhan was elected Mayor of Mersin, the first woman elected to such a post in Turkey. According to unofficial returns, the municipal elections confirmed the results of the General Election of May 14. Out of 643 municipalities, the People's Party won a clear majority in 258, the National Party in 2, while 383 were won by the Democratic Party. (*London Times*, Sept. 26.)

Sept. 27: Herr von Kamphövener was appointed German Consul-General in Turkey and was expected to arrive soon with his staff. (*London Times*, Sept. 28.)

Sept. 28: The official Ankara radio announced that the Turkish Army brigade promised to the UN had left for Korea.

Oct. 5: A 4-man Turkish military mission prepared to fly to Tokyo for talks with General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and then to Washington for military talks.

Oct. 7: Turkey was elected to the UN Security Council by a vote of 53 to 4, with 3 abstentions.

Oct. 8: The semi-official Ankara newspaper *Zafer* stated that the Turkish-Bulgarian frontier would remain closed until the Bulgarian Government took back 97 persons lacking visas, mostly gypsies who turned up among Bulgarians of Turkish origin recently entering Turkey.

Oct. 19: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development announced a loan of \$9 million to the Industrial Development Bank of Turkey to stimulate private investment in Turkish industry. Mr. Norman M. Tucker, director of marketing of the I.B.R.D. was named the general manager of the Turkish bank.

Oct. 29: Public Works Minister Fahri Belen resigned. Labor Minister Hasan Polatkan temporarily assumed the duties of the office.

Ambassador to the U. S. Feridun C. Erkin said that unless there was a prompt solution of the problem created by the threatened expulsion by Bulgaria of 250,000 Turks, Turkey would formally charge Bulgaria in the UN with a flagrant violation of human rights, and appeal either for direct UN action or a ruling by the International Court.

Nov. 1: President Celal Bayar, in his opening address to the National Assembly, urged the inclusion of the Eastern Mediterranean in the Atlantic Pact system on a *de jure* basis.

*Nov. 16:* Two U.S. submarines were transferred to the Turkish Navy in ceremonies at New London, Conn.

*Nov. 24:* In a note handed to the Turkish legation in Budapest, the Hungarian Government protested the closing of the Turkish-Bulgarian border by the Turkish Government.

*Nov. 30:* It was officially announced that the Turkish-Bulgarian frontier would remain closed until the Bulgarian Government agreed to regulate its mass deportation of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria in accordance with the practical and humane provisions of the emigration-immigration agreement signed previously between the two countries. (*News from Turkey*, Nov. 30.)

## Yemen

1950

*Sept. 10:* Edward M. M. Warburg, chairman of the Joint Distribution Committee, announced that it was expected that by Sept. 19 virtually all of Yemen's 50,000 Jews would have emigrated to Israel.

*Oct. 13:* The 6-weeks negotiations between Yemen and British delegations in London ended with a statement that the two delegations would submit certain proposals to their Governments. The subjects discussed included the settlement of incidents and disputes since the Treaty of San'a in 1934, the establishment of diplomatic relations, and technical cooperation. (*London Times*, Oct. 13.)

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## DOCUMENTS

### The Ethiopian-Eritrean Federation

(Text)

*Plan for Federation Between Ethiopia and the Former Italian Colony of Eritrea. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its 316th Plenary Meeting on 2 December 1950.<sup>1</sup>*

*Whereas* by paragraph 3 of Annex XI to the Treaty of Peace with Italy, 1947, the Powers concerned have agreed to accept the recommendation of the General Assembly on the disposal of the former Italian Colonies in Africa and to take appropriate measures for giving effect to it; and

*Whereas* by paragraph 2 of the aforesaid Annex XI such disposal is to be made in the light of the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants and the interests of peace and security, taking into consideration the views of interested Governments:

*Now therefore*

*The General Assembly*, in the light of the reports of the United Nations Commission for Eritrea and of the Interim Committee, and

*Taking into consideration*

(a) the wishes and welfare of the inhabitants of Eritrea, including the views of the various racial, religious and political groups of the provinces of the territory and the capacity of the people for self-government;

(b) the interests of peace and security in East Africa;

(c) the rights and claims of Ethiopia based on geographical, historical, ethnic or economic reasons, including in particular Ethiopia's legitimate need for adequate access to the sea;

*Taking into account* the importance of assuring the continuing collaboration of the foreign communities in the economic development of Eritrea;

*Recognizing that the disposal of Eritrea*

should be based on its close political and economic association with Ethiopia; and

*Desiring that* this association assure to the inhabitants of Eritrea the fullest respect and safeguards for their institutions, traditions, religions and languages, as well as the widest possible measure of self-government, while at the same time respecting the constitution, institutions, traditions, and the international status and identity of the Empire of Ethiopia;

*A. Recommends that:*

1. Eritrea shall constitute an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown.

2. The Eritrean government shall possess legislative, executive and judicial powers in the field of domestic affairs.

3. The jurisdiction of the federal government shall extend to the following matters: defense, foreign affairs, currency and finance, foreign and interstate commerce and external and interstate communications including ports. The federal government shall have the power to maintain the integrity of the federation, and shall have the right to impose uniform taxes throughout the federation to meet the expenses of federal functions and services, it being understood that the assessment and the collection of such taxes in Eritrea are to be delegated to the Eritrean government, and provided that Eritrea shall bear only its just and equitable share of these expenses. The jurisdiction of the Eritrean government shall extend to all matters not vested in the federal government, including the power to maintain the internal police, to levy taxes to meet the expense of domestic functions and services, and to adopt its own budget.

4. The area of the federation shall constitute a single area for customs purposes, and

<sup>1</sup> UN Document A/1605, 4 Dec. 1950.

there shall be no barriers to the free movement of goods and persons within the area. Customs duties on goods entering or leaving the federation which have their final destination or origin in Eritrea shall be assigned to Eritrea.

5. An Imperial Federal Council composed of equal numbers of Ethiopian and Eritrean representatives shall meet at least once a year and shall advise upon the common affairs of the federation referred to in Article 3. The citizens of Eritrea shall participate in the executive and judicial branches, and shall be represented in the legislative branch, of the Federal Government in accordance with law and in the proportion that the population of Eritrea bears to the population of the federation.

6. A single nationality shall prevail throughout the federation.

(a) All inhabitants of Eritrea, except persons possessing foreign nationality, shall be nationals of the federation;

(b) All inhabitants born in Eritrea and having at least one indigenous parent or grandparent shall also be nationals of the federation. Such persons, if in possession of a foreign nationality, shall within six months of the coming into force of the Eritrean constitution, be free to opt to renounce the nationality of the federation and retain such foreign nationality. In the event they do not so opt, they shall thereupon lose such foreign nationality;

(c) The qualifications of persons acquiring the nationality of the federation under subparagraphs (a) and (b) above for exercising their rights as citizens of Eritrea shall be determined by the constitution and laws of Eritrea;

(d) All persons possessing foreign nationality who have resided in Eritrea for ten years prior to the date of the adoption of this resolution shall have the right, without further requirements of residence, to apply for the nationality of the federation in accordance with federal laws. Such persons who do not thus acquire the nationality of the federation shall be permitted to reside in and engage in peaceful and lawful pursuits in Eritrea.

The rights and interests of foreign nationals resident in Eritrea shall be guaranteed in accordance with the provisions of Article 7.

7. The federal government, as well as Eritrea, shall ensure to residents of Eritrea without distinction of nationality, race, sex, language or religion, the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental liberties, including the following:

(a) The right of equality before the law. No discrimination shall be made against foreign enterprises in existence in Eritrea, engaged in industrial, commercial, agricultural, artisan, educational or charitable activities, nor against banking institutions and insurance companies operating in Eritrea.

(b) The right to life, liberty and security of person.

(c) The right to own and dispose of property. No one shall be deprived of property including contractual rights, without due process of law and without payment of just and effective compensation.

(d) The right to freedom of opinion and expression and of adopting and practicing any creed or religion.

(e) The right of education.

(f) The right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.

(g) The right to inviolability of correspondence and domicile, subject to requirements of the law.

(h) The right to exercise any profession subject to the requirements of the law.

(i) No one shall be subject to arrest or detention without an order of a competent authority, except in case of flagrant and serious violation of the law in force. No one shall be deported except in accordance with the law.

(j) The right to a fair and equitable trial and the rights of petition to the Emperor and appeal to the Emperor for commutation of death sentences.

(k) Retroactivity of penal law shall be excluded.

The respect for the rights and freedoms of others and the requirements of public order and the general welfare alone will justify any limitations to the above rights.

8. Paragraphs 1 through 7 of this resolution shall constitute the Federal Act which shall be submitted to the Emperor of Ethiopia for ratification.

9. There shall be a transition period which shall not extend beyond 15 September 1952, during which the Eritrean Government will be organized and the Eritrean Constitution prepared and put into effect.

10. There shall be a United Nations Commissioner in Eritrea appointed by the General Assembly. The Commissioner will be assisted by experts appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

11. During the transition period, the present Administering Authority shall continue to conduct the affairs of Eritrea. It shall, in consultation with the United Nations Commissioner, prepare as rapidly as possible the organization of an Eritrean Administration, induct Eritreans into all levels of the Administration, and make arrangements for and convoke a representative Assembly of Eritreans chosen by the people. It may, in agreement with the Commissioner, negotiate on behalf of the Eritreans a temporary customs union with Ethiopia to be put into effect as soon as practicable.

12. The United Nations Commissioner shall, in consultation with the Administering Authority, the Government of Ethiopia, and the inhabitants of Eritrea, prepare a draft of the Eritrean Constitution to be submitted to the Eritrean Assembly and shall advise and assist the Eritrean Assembly in its consideration of the Constitution. The Constitution of Eritrea shall be based on the principles of democratic government, shall include the guarantees contained in Article 7 of the Federal Act, shall be consistent with the provisions of the Federal Act and shall contain provisions adopting and ratifying the Federal Act on behalf of the people of Eritrea.

13. The Federal Act and the Constitution of Eritrea shall enter into effect following ratification of the Federal Act by the Emperor of Ethiopia, and following approval by the Commissioner, adoption by the Eritrean Assembly and ratification by the Emperor of Ethiopia of the Eritrean Constitution.

14. Arrangements shall be made by the Government of the United Kingdom as the Administering Authority for the transfer of power to the appropriate authorities. The transfer of power shall take place as soon as the Eritrean Constitution and the Federal Act enter into effect in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 13 above.

15. The Commissioner shall maintain his headquarters in Eritrea until the transfer of power has been completed, and shall make appropriate reports to the General Assembly of the United Nations concerning the discharge of his functions. The Commissioner may consult with the Interim Committee of the General Assembly with respect to the discharge of his functions in the light of developments and within the terms of the present resolution. When the transfer of authority has been completed, he shall so report to the General Assembly and submit to it the text of the Eritrean Constitution.

**B. AUTHORIZES** the Secretary-General, in accordance with established practice:

1. to arrange for the payment of an appropriate remuneration to the United Nations Commissioner;

2. to provide the United Nations Commissioner with such experts, staff, and facilities as the Secretary-General may consider necessary to carry out the terms of the present resolution.

# Documents and Situation Reports

## (A Selected Listing)

### General

*Direction of International Trade, Supplementary Issue, January-August 1950.* Joint publication of Statistical Office of the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 10 December 1950. 45 pages. Statistics on 27 areas, including Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, India, Israel, and Tunisia.

*Report of the Special Committee on the Scale of Contributions and Currency Problems.* Washington: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 22 pages.

### Afghanistan

*Afghanistan—Summary of Basic Economic Information.* International Reference Service, Foreign and Domestic Commerce Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce. July 1950. 4 pages.

*Economic Review of Afghanistan, 1949.* International Reference Service, Foreign and Domestic Commerce Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce. August 1950. 3 pages.

*Reports of the Member States. Afghanistan.* UNESCO Document 5C/4 Afghanistan. Florence, 26 May 1950. 7 pages.

### Arab States

*Permanent Invitation to the Arab League to Attend Sessions of the General Assembly. Note by the Secretary General.* UN Document A/C.6/L.112. 27 September 1950. 10 pages.

*Technical Assistance for Social Progress, No 3. United Nations Social Welfare Seminar for Arab States in the Middle East, Beirut, 15 August to 8 September 1949.* UN Document E/CN.5/175/Rev. 1. 11 July 1950. 68 pages.

### Ethiopia

*Loan Agreement (Highway Project) Between the Empire of Ethiopia and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.* Loan #31 ET. 13 September 1950. 12 pages.

*Loan Agreement (Development Bank Project) Between the Empire of Ethiopia and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.* Loan #32 ET. 13 September 1950. 14 pages.

### India and Pakistan

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## ECONOMIC REVIEW

### The Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development

Jerome B. Cohen

AT THEIR Colombo, Ceylon, meeting, in January 1950, the Foreign Ministers of the British Commonwealth countries agreed upon the vital importance of the economic development of South and South-East Asia to the maintenance of political stability in that area. The Commonwealth Governments took the initiative in considering international action to deal with the problem because three quarters of the people of South and South-East Asia live in countries which are members of the Commonwealth, and the whole area is one with which the Commonwealth Governments have close political and economic ties. Accordingly, after the Colombo Conference a process of Commonwealth consultation was begun with the purpose of making the most effective possible attack upon the problem, and of focusing world attention on the needs and difficulties of the area. The Commonwealth Consultative Committee, which was brought into being at Colombo, met at Sydney in May 1950 and took the process a long step further. The Governments of the Commonwealth countries in the area agreed to draw up a practical and realistic plan of development for a six-year period to run from the middle of 1951 to mid-1957. As a result of such preparatory work by the individual countries, a combined report was prepared at the London meeting of the Commonwealth Consultative Committee in September-October. This report was released to the public at the end of November.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *The Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia*. Report by the Commonwealth Consultative Committee, London, September-October 1950. Issued by the Information Offices in the United States of the

The region with which the report is concerned comprises the countries of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, British Borneo, Burma, Thailand, the Associate States of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, and Indonesia. Its 570 million people make up one quarter of the population of the world. The report presents development programs for only the first five countries mentioned, and of these India, Pakistan, and Ceylon account for more than 90 percent of the proposed expenditure. Accordingly this account will be confined to these three countries.

#### NEED FOR DEVELOPMENT

The Report indicates that throughout South Asia the standard of living is lamentably low and the economies gravely underdeveloped. Poverty and hardship are the rule rather than the exception. National income per capita in 1949 was estimated at \$67 for Ceylon, \$57 for India, and \$51 for Pakistan, in contrast to \$1,453 for the United States, \$870 for Canada, \$856 for New Zealand, \$773 for Great Britain, and \$679 for Australia.

The meager diet of most of the peoples of these countries lacks variety; it is composed mainly of cereals, pulses, and starchy foods, which do not supply the amount of proteins and fats necessary to proper nutrition. The average daily consumption of food per head is below 2,000 calories — about 1,750 calories in India, in contrast to about 3,000 calories in the U.K. and 3,250 calories in the U.S. The absence of adequate medical facilities results

Governments of Australia, Canada, Ceylon, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom.

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in a high mortality rate. In India, for example, nearly 65 percent of the people die before they reach the age of thirty and 45 percent before their tenth year. Illiteracy is very high: 85 percent in India and 90 percent in Pakistan.

By far the largest element of national income in South Asia is derived from agriculture, which provides the livelihood for between 65 and 80 percent of the population. The heart of the problem is the pressure of population on the land, which results in severe underemployment. In Ceylon, for example, there are nearly 1,200 people who depend on agriculture for every 1,000 acres of cultivated land, in contrast to about 60 in Great Britain. What this difference means in terms of output can be illustrated by a comparison between India, with 306 million acres under cultivation, and the United States with 360 million. In India there are 73 million agricultural workers of all kinds, while in the United States only 8 millions are actively occupied on the land. In spite of the much more intense application of manpower, agricultural yields per acre are far below those in the United States; for instance, the yield of wheat is less than 600 lbs. compared with over 1,000 lbs., and the yield of cotton is only 66 lbs. compared with 313 lbs. This disparity cannot be explained simply by natural differences of soil fertility; it is the application of capital which enables the farm worker in the United States to produce so much more than the peasant of South Asia. For example, in the United States there are over 2,400,000 tractors, whereas in India there are only 10,000. Again the U.S. uses, on an area only one-sixth greater, over 13 million tons of fertilizer a year against some 200,000 tons used by India.

The extent of underdevelopment and correspondingly the scope for development may be further seen from some international comparisons. India's steel consumption is but 3.8 tons per 1,000 population, Pakistan's 1.3, and Ceylon's 6.0 in contrast to 364 tons for the U.S. and 194 for the U.K. Similarly coal consumption is but 80 tons per 1,000 population in India, 18 tons in Pakistan, and 28 tons in Ceylon against 3,884 tons in the U.K. and 3,473 in the U.S. Electric power production is only 13 kwh per 1,000 population in India compared to 2,296 kwh in the U.S.;

but 1.9 in Pakistan and 9.6 in Ceylon against 1,033 kwh in the U.K.

The scope and need for development are great, but so also are the potentialities of the region's underdeveloped resources. Vast additional areas can be put under cultivation. Exceedingly low yields on land presently under cultivation can be doubled. The human and material resources of the area are large enough to solve its problems. India, for example, possesses within its borders the resources and potential capacity for modern industrial power. It is richly endowed in iron ore and coal, which lie close together in deposits considered among the richest in Asia. If such resources are not brought into use South Asia's position will become worse. Even the present inadequate standards of nutrition will not be maintained, for the pressure of increasing population will bring them still lower, and this will make it all the more difficult to create the social services which are required to combat disease and to educate the millions who are still unable to read. India's present 350 millions are expected to exceed 400 million by 1960, an absolute increase in numbers greater than the entire present population of Great Britain. Merely to keep abreast of this increase will require a great development effort if political stability in the subcontinent is to be maintained.

#### DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM OF INDIA

In India, however, relatively little industrialization is contemplated; the main effort is directed to food and raw material production, and to the provision of power and transport for the countryside, so that rural industries can develop naturally and along economic lines. The tendency is away from the concept of intensive urban development and toward a more balanced economy in the villages.

The National Planning Commission of India, in preparing its program, investigated a list of projects either in progress or ready for execution involving a total cost of Rs. 32,190 million. From these a careful selection was made of the most urgent projects, estimated to cost Rs. 18,400 million (\$3.8 billion). The Government of India considers that these represent the minimum of develop-

ment necessary to achieve the objectives of the program, and that after six years they can be supported out of the country's own resources. The cost of the program is estimated in Table I.

In agriculture three multi-purpose river valley projects of the TVA type are accorded a very high priority. Work on these is already in progress: the Damodar Valley (Rs. 500 million); the Hirakud (Rs. 300 million) and the Bhakra-Nangal (Rs. 757 million). The Damodar Valley project in Bihar, for which the International Bank has already granted a loan of \$18.5 million, is designed to harness the wayward Damodar River, whose periodic floods cause untold destruction and misery. New dams will contain the flood water for irrigation, power generation, and even navigation. The project will, at the same time, open up to full development the richest mineral basin in India, for India's major coal and iron ore deposits are found within 200 miles of each other in the Damodar Valley area. Further south, the Hirakud Dam will control the floods of the Mahandi, which cause considerable damage and soil erosion. It will provide irrigation for surrounding areas and power for cottage industries. To the north, at Bhakra and at Nangal in the Punjab, dams will be erected across the river Sutlej, one of which will be not much smaller than the Boulder Dam in the United States. The har-

nessing of the Sutlej will open up areas now arid for the resettlement of refugees. Power will be provided for the cities of the north, including New Delhi. These three projects are expected to bring about 6 million acres of new land under irrigation by 1956-57 and to increase electric generating capacity by 708,000 kilowatts.

Another major development project is the Government's Integrated Crop Production Plan. This provides for the extension of cultivation on reclaimed lands, the introduction of improved agricultural techniques, the development of an extension service, the use of better seeds and more fertilizer, and the execution of a large number of local irrigation works. As a result of this campaign and of the multi-purpose projects, it is expected that by the end of 1956-57 there will be an addition to agricultural production of 3 million tons of food-grains, about 195,000 tons of cotton, 375,000 tons of jute, and 1,500,000 tons of oil-seeds. All these commodities are in short supply in the area.

Under transport and communications an expenditure of Rs. 4,800 million is planned on railways. This will provide for the construction and restoration of tracks, bridges, structural works, and rolling stock. These projects, coupled with the extension and improvement of roads, are designed to open up the hinterland, to enlarge the size of the domestic

Table I: INDIAN SIX YEAR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM  
(1951-1957)

	Rs. million	Percentage of Total	Number of Schemes (a)	
			In Hand	New
Agriculture .....	6,080	33	104	27
Transport and Communications:				
Railways .....	4,800			
Roads .....	1,099			
Ports & Harbors.....	110			
Others .....	1,018			
Fuel & Power.....	576	3	27	2
Industry & Mining (b) .....	1,800	10	21	23
Social Capital:				
Education .....	1,144			
Housing .....	183			
Health .....	515			
Others .....	1,071			
Total .....	18,396	100	284	137

(a) Costing more than Rs. 2.5 million.

(b) Excluding coal.



market, and to facilitate the flow of goods to the ports. In the industrial sector the emphasis is on raising production of steel, particularly through the modernization and expansion of existing steel plants and the construction of additional capacity of 500,000 tons annually. In addition plants for the manufacture of heavy electrical equipment, aircraft, machine tools, penicillin, radio equipment and radar, chemicals, paper, cement, aluminum, and wire are scheduled, as is development of rural cottage industries.

The 16 percent allocated to social capital is to be spent on education, medical development, rehabilitation of refugees, water supply, slum clearance, housing, etc.

The Consultative Committee states that it hopes the program will provide a basic standard of living which will include, among other things, an annual cloth consumption of 15 yards per person, and, in the rationed urban areas, cereal consumption of 16 ounces a day. This represents a modest but important improvement over present consumption levels, which on a per head basis are only about 10 yards of cloth per year, and in the rationed areas, 12 ounces of cereals a day. Ten yards of material provides less than two garments a year, without taking into account other uses of cloth. The 12-ounce ration provides only about 1,600 calories.

Of the total Rs. 18,400 million cost of the India six year development plan, it is estimated

Table II: FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE  
INDIA SIX YEAR DEVELOPMENT  
PLAN

(in Rs. million)

Internal Financial Sources	Annual average	Total
Current revenues of Central & State Govts. ....	816	4,900
Surplus of state-owned enterprises (mainly railways) .....	300	1,800
Net borrowings from the public...	400	2,400
Proceeds of Railway Depreciation Fund .....	200	1,200
	1,716	10,300
Annual average cost.....	3,070	
Total Six Year Cost.....		18,400
Deficit to be Covered by Ex- ternal Sources .....	1,354	8,100

that India itself can provide Rs. 10,300 million, leaving Rs. 8,100 million to be obtained externally. The way in which India expects to be able to provide Rs. 10,300 million of internal financing may be seen from Table II.

The Report does not indicate specifically how this external financing gap can be met. It suggests, in general, that possible channels of external finance are:

- (1) use of the countries' own external assets (e.g. sterling balances)
- (2) from private investors overseas to private enterprise in the area
- (3) from private investors overseas to Governments in the area
- (4) from international institutions to Governments in the area
- (5) from Governments overseas to Governments in the area.

While contributions from advanced Commonwealth countries are seemingly anticipated, regular annual sterling releases are apparently earmarked to meet expected deficits in the balance of payments. The Report places major emphasis on the fifth source, though not specifying particular countries, declaring: "It is very unlikely, in view of the magnitudes involved, that the external finance available through the previous four channels will be enough to enable the development programmes to be carried out. It seems certain, therefore, that a substantial element of Government-to-Government finance will be required, particularly in the early stages of the development programmes." The Report indicates that the Commonwealth Governments are considering to what extent the external finance requirements can be provided by their countries, but adds "the task of providing this financial support . . . is manifestly not one which can be tackled by the Commonwealth alone. The need to raise the standard of living in South Asia is a problem of concern to every country in the world, not only as an end in itself, but also because the political stability of the area and its economic progress are of vital concern to the world."

#### DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM OF PAKISTAN

Pakistan is a predominantly agricultural country with approximately 80 percent of its

82 million people dependent upon agriculture. When Pakistan came into being, it found itself with over 80 percent of the world's production of jute, but with no jute manufacturing capacity. Pakistan was producing annually 200,000 tons of cotton, mainly of fine quality, but its textile industry was negligible. There were no tanneries, no woollen mills, and very little other industry. It was thus inevitable that the economy of Pakistan should depend mainly on the export of its agricultural products. In the brief three and a half years since Pakistan achieved independence, the country has been largely preoccupied with problems of an emergency character. The Government has been obliged to spend large sums on the relief and rehabilitation of some 7 million refugees. This burden, in addition to problems of national administration and defense, retarded economic development.

A Development Board was established, however, early in 1948 and has since approved 112 schemes estimated to cost Rs. 1,125 million, of which Rs. 820 million has thus far been raised by development loans. Among the major projects already underway as a result are the irrigation works of the Thal project, the Rasul Hydro-Electric project, the Lower Sind Barrage, development of the port of Chittagong in East Pakistan, and the Malakand Hydro-Electric Extension project.

The first real over-all attempt to develop a national plan for Pakistan is embodied in the program submitted to the Commonwealth Consultative Committee. The plan is based on the assumption that Pakistan must continue to be essentially an agricultural country, but that more modern and effective methods of cultivation can raise presently low yields and that complementary industrial development can introduce a better balance in the economy.

Pakistan's program is estimated to cost Rs. 2,600 million (\$783 million) over the six years, divided as in Table III.

Agriculture constitutes the largest section of the development plan, and by irrigation, anti-waterlogging measures, improved varieties of seeds, subsidization of fertilizer use, mechanization, improved animal husbandry, etc. it is hoped to increase the output of food crops by 34 percent over present levels by the end of 1957. In addition it is expected to increase production of cotton by 27 percent and jute

by 10 percent. The anticipated increase in the output of rice of more than 500,000 tons will be sufficient to meet the needs of East Pakistan. More generally the program should help to bring down the price of essential foodstuffs and should permit some increase in the standard of living.

The restoration of the railway system in Pakistan is an urgent need, particularly for the transport of the agricultural produce of the country. The intense pressure on the railways during and after the war, the inadequacy of repairs, and the almost entire absence of replacement reduced the transport system to an extremely low level of efficiency. There are also several urgent projects for new railway construction, but the plan does not provide for their execution except in one or two vital cases. It concentrates particularly upon the repair and replacement of worn-out locomotives and rolling stock.

In a country with such limited resources of oil and coal as Pakistan, hydroelectric power is of crucial importance. The hydroelectric potential is 5 to 6 million kilowatts against which present installed capacity is only 9,600 kilowatts. Thermal stations provide another 59,500 kilowatts. With a population of 82 million, Pakistan's rate of consumption of electricity per head is one of the lowest in the world. In view of the existing unsatisfied demand and the extra demand which will be

Table III: PAKISTAN SIX YEAR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

	Rs.	Per-	
	million	centage	
Agriculture .....	820	32	
Transport & Communications:			
Railways .....	200	530	20
Roads .....	100		
Ports .....	140		
Telecommunications ..	90		
Fuel and Power .....	470	18	
Industry and Mining(a) .....	490	19	
Social Capital			
Housing .....	40	290	11
Health & Medical ...	40		
Education .....	100		
Technical Training ..	90		
Water Supply .....	20		
Total .....	2,600	100	

(a) Excluding coal.

created by the development program, it is proposed to build new stations capable of generating an additional 200,000 kilowatts of hydroelectric power and about 56,000 kilowatts of thermal power.

The Pakistan program allots a higher proportion of total proposed expenditure to industry, nearly 20 percent, than does any other South Asian country. This is because Pakistan is a country with hardly any industry at all, since the parts of undivided India which subsequently formed Pakistan were almost entirely agricultural areas. The scale of industrialization envisaged in the next six years is the minimum necessary to produce a better balanced economy. There are no jute mills in Pakistan in spite of the country's huge production of raw jute. The development plan contemplates the establishment of six mills which will produce 130,000 tons of jute goods a year. This production will be sufficient to supply Pakistan's own requirements and a margin for export. At present, when the annual consumption of cotton goods is at the very low rate of 9 yards per head, Pakistan can supply only 100 million yards out of the 700 million yards consumed. The development plan provides for 24 new mills. At the end of the six-year period it is anticipated that domestic production, together with annual imports of 150 million yards, will be sufficient to meet the demand created by an average consumption level of 17 yards per head. In the industrial sector there is also provision for a beginning in paper, chemical, sugar, ceramic, glass, and fertilizer plants. The plan also covers the cost of a general geological survey of the country to discover its mineral wealth, if any.

Of the Rs. 2,600 million development program, Pakistan expects to be able to finance Rs. 1,700 million from internal private savings and public loans, leaving the remainder to be financed externally. In contrast to the Indian plan, it is believed that there is very little scope in Pakistan for increases in taxation. Pakistan anticipates a continued balance of payments deficit aggravated by development needs but partially covered by sterling releases.

#### DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM OF CEYLON

The population of Ceylon is at present 7,300,000 and is increasing at the rate of some

200,000 every year. The economic position of the island is dominated by the fact that two thirds of the cultivated land is taken up with the production of three main crops—tea, rubber, and coconuts. Two thirds of the population depends on this production. The specialization is at the expense of food production. Two thirds of even the present restricted consumption of rice, which is the staple diet, has to be satisfied by imports—400,000 tons out of a total of 587,000 tons consumed in 1949–50. Over half of Ceylon's annual expenditure on imports goes to food. Tea, rubber, and coconuts account for 90 percent, by value, of the total exports of the island, which is therefore dangerously dependent on the fluctuations of world prices over a very limited range of commodities. The vulnerability of the position is illustrated by the fact that a reduction of only 10 percent in export income would amount to approximately Rs. 135 million annually and make the difference between a surplus or deficit in the balance of payments on current account.

The main objective of the Ceylon six year development program is to bring about increased economic stability by reducing Ceylon's precarious dependence upon factors outside its control. To achieve this aim, it is proposed to diversify the economy by some increase in food production and by the creation of other forms of employment. The main features and a breakdown of the cost (Rs. 1,359 million) of Ceylon's development program may be seen from Table IV.

The heaviest emphasis is of course on agriculture. Two thirds of the population at pres-

Table IV: CEYLON SIX YEAR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

	Rs. million	Per- centage
Agriculture .....	503	37
Transport & Communications:		
Railways .....	30	
Roads .....	100	
Ports & Harbors.....	167	
Power .....	109	8
Industry .....	75	6
Social Capital		
Housing .....	47	
Health .....	132	
Education .....	196	
	375	27
Total .....	1,359	100

ent live in the zone of heavy rain in the south-west of the Island, crowded into a little less than one third of its area. Pressure on land in the wet zone can best be relieved by migration to the more sparsely inhabited dry zone on the eastern and north central parts from which, as from the rest of the island, malaria has been almost eliminated since World War II. It is in this area that all the major projects for land development are being undertaken by the Government. The total acreage at present cultivated is 3,250,000; it is estimated that another 3,250,000 acres, which in ancient times were under irrigation, are potentially available. Of the area now cultivated, over 2 million acres are devoted to the production of the three primary products — tea, rubber, and coconuts — leaving only about 1 million acres for food production. By 1957 it is planned to have under food crops another 200,000 to 250,000 acres — an increase of about 20 percent on the present food-producing areas, from which it is expected to get 75,000 tons of rice annually. To accomplish this, multipurpose river valley agricultural projects such as Gal Oya, Huruluwewa, and Walawe Ganga, have been and will be undertaken.

The main project under transport and communications is the development of the Port of Colombo, which is now heavily congested. The first stage of the only hydroelectric project in Ceylon is now almost completed. This will provide an installed generating capacity of 25,000 kilowatts. Under the development program it is proposed to complete two further stages providing an additional 50,000 kilowatts. Ceylon has little manufacturing industry, but projects are to be developed for the processing of local agricultural products and raw materials. The 27 percent of the program allotted to social capital is devoted largely to schools and hospitals, and in lesser degree to housing. In Ceylon there is free education up to and including the University, and nearly 70 percent of the population is literate.

Of the estimated cost of the Ceylon program of Rs. 1,359 million (\$285 million), internal government loans and planned budget

surpluses are expected to provide about Rs. 810 million, leaving Rs. 550 million as the external finance gap.

### CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK

In India the near-term problem is one of food and raw material shortage, and the need to overcome inflation; thus the program is directed to the expansion of food and raw material production and the scale of development which can be undertaken is governed by the need to prevent inflation. Pakistan's problem is one of low productivity and of the need to provide some diversification in an almost completely agricultural economy; so its program provides for more industry and a general advance in power, transport, and agricultural efficiency. In Ceylon the economy is at present highly specialized in the production of export crops and it is necessary, therefore, without abandoning such production, to concentrate on opening up new areas for food output in order to give more stability to the economy.

When the programs are completed in South Asia, results anticipated include 13 million additional acres (an increase of 3½ percent) under cultivation; 6 million tons more of food-grains produced (an increase of 10 percent); 13 million more acres under irrigation (an increase of 17 percent); and 1.1 million kilowatts more of electric generating capacity (an increase of 67 percent).

In terms of the standard of living of the people, the growth of productive power is not likely to show spectacular results by 1957. But the danger at present in the subcontinent is that the standard of living will fall as a result of population growth and the inadequacy of savings and capital investment. The Report states that the programs "will do little more than hold the present position" but it will be apparent to everyone in the area that some progress is being made. The strength of the Colombo Plan is that it is designed to lay sound foundations for further development; to provide in a six-year period the indispensable preliminary basic development which will pave the way for improvement in the future.



## BOOK REVIEWS

### Recent Books on Contemporary Egypt

Grant V. McClanahan

ONLY A RASH or a tendentious observer would claim to know the inner meaning of Egyptian affairs. Those who have ripened their understanding of the Nile kingdom through years of patient study and whose interest in the destiny of its people is founded on something deeper than the service of a particular calling, whether that be diplomatic, military, political, religious, or scientific, are apt to be most cautious. They will agree that in Egypt the sediment-bearing flood of Westernism is receding from the face of the social and political scene. But what is to spring from the ancient soil it fructified and how many of the old landmarks have been eroded beyond restoration?

The past decade has been one of enormous activity in Egyptian politics. Egypt felt the direct impact of World War II and sent armies of its own on campaigns into Palestine. Twice it passed in and out of a regime of martial law. Three general elections were held, and although many older politicians held their positions of power, some of the key figures left the scene by assassination. Yet through all these storms a careful observer could see the basic internal political forces in continuous play and the international position of the country progressing in a gradual, evolutionary manner. The Mixed Courts duly passed away at the end of their lengthy scheduled transition period, and the cardinal question in Egyptian foreign affairs, Anglo-Egyptian relations, was always approached in a spirit of negotiation and parley without ever spilling over into a blunt repudiation on the

part of the Egyptians, nor, except on one occasion, into an ultimatum from the British side.

Unfortunately this significant and frequently dramatic process has been treated in Western books only piecemeal and usually without much appreciation of or interest in the larger meaning of the portions of the story which have been related. The only book since 1945 which surveys political and economic conditions with approximately equal emphasis, Anthony Galatoli, *Egypt in Mid Passage* (Cairo, 1950), is limited by its brevity and the fact that it feels called upon to share a portion of its space devoted to politics to a political review going back to Arabi and even Mohammed Ali. But although Galatoli's work is brief and modest, it is, on the whole, a very satisfactory introduction to present-day Egyptian politics. It provides sufficient facts and interpretation concerning economic and social conditions, and adopts the approach of an intelligent and somewhat optimistic protagonist in the discussion of Egypt's political and international problems. For example, the chapter entitled "The Reunion of the Nile Valley" gives a good current statement of the Egyptian approach to the problem of the Sudan, an approach which is almost invariably misunderstood or misstated in books in Western languages. On internal politics Galatoli is generally accurate and quite nonpartisan, but in his exploration of the social problems which underlie and in the long run compel political decisions he paints the picture a shade too rosily. The dreariness and misery of the fellahin is understated while the ruling class is

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treated rather too kindly. The author even expresses the conviction that among them "for every five reactionaries, usually members of the older generation, there is at least one earnest liberal, especially among the younger and better educated."

For further light on Egyptian politics during the past ten years one can only refer to books which include some more or less sketchy treatment of the subject as a part of their main concern. George E. Kirk, *A Short History of the Middle East* (Washington, 1949), goes into internal Egyptian politics mainly as a background to the British position in that strategic area and entirely from a British angle. Jean Lugol, *Egypt and World War II* (Cairo, 1945), actually covers only events of the years 1940-1943, and even for that period its treatment is too superficial to be of much value to the serious student. The section on Egypt in the Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey* (London, 1950), is a useful though brief summary of Egyptian politics.

A much more specialized and minute treatment of Egyptian politics is James Heyworth-Dunne, *Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt* (Washington, 1950). In spite of its title the book actually concentrates on a single religious-political group, the Ikhwan al-Muslimun. The reader may be irritated by the book's obvious lack of editing, and it is open to much more serious criticism in that many of its main conclusions are of questionable accuracy. Nevertheless, in spite of such blemishes this book is exceedingly valuable for two reasons. First is the tremendous interest and significance of its principal subject. The Ikhwan al-Muslimun was a vital Islamic movement which undercut the artificialities of orthodox Egyptian politics and carried with it the hearts and youthful enthusiasm of hundreds of thousands of young Muslims in Egypt. Even though officially suppressed and deprived of its ideologically creative founder and successful leader, Hasan al-Banna, it is still a power in Egypt. Second, is the unique scope of Heyworth-Dunne's knowledge of the movement. He obviously had access to more information than would be available to a private student of such matters, was steeped in

its literature, and was personally acquainted with Hasan al-Banna.

Two knotty, recurrent problems in Egyptian foreign policy are the Suez Canal and the Sudan. The literature on both is extensive, and but a recent book on each can be mentioned here. Abbas Ammar and others, *The Unity of the Nile Valley: Its Geographical Bases and its Manifestations in History* (Cairo, 1947), is a government-sponsored volume of articles on the various natural and historical ties between Egypt and the Sudan. Its authors intended to produce a strong polemic weapon for their country's struggle with Britain, but their work is more than that — a serious elucidation of the reasons for Egyptian interest in the Sudan and a demonstration of some hard facts which any ultimate settlement will have to recognize. *Compagnie Universelle du Canal de Suez* (Paris, 1947) is an anonymous book but so well-informed and so cautious in its avoidance of the thorny political and strategic problems posed by De Lesseps' triumph of engineering, finance, and diplomacy that one suspects that its author had the blessing and encouragement of the Company itself. The text, which is illustrated with beautiful photographs and accompanied by numerous tables, graphs, and two maps, explains the history, organization, and function of the Canal Company and ends with praise for the interest which the Company has displayed in the welfare of its employees and the population of the Canal area.

E. A. Speiser, *The United States and the Near East* (Cambridge, Mass., 1947; 2nd ed., 1950) gives a few summary sections to events in Egypt, but is of little use as a source on Egyptian politics and of practically no use at all on U.S. relations with Egypt. Such hasty flights through the area, notebook in hand, as have been made by George Fielding Eliot, *Hate, Hope, and High Explosives* (Indianapolis, 1948), Maurice Hindus, *In Search of a Future* (New York, 1949), and Kermit Roosevelt, *Arabs, Oil, and History* (New York, 1949) are of some interest because they provide a vigorous argument and scattered face to face observations on their particular topics.

Charles Issawi, *Egypt: An Economic and Social Analysis* (London, 1947), has deliber-

ately avoided the subject of politics in all but one chapter of his book. Nevertheless, that chapter, "Political Structure," is a first-rate ten-page essay on the main phenomena up to 1942. Furthermore, the rest of Issawi's treatment is full of unstated political significance and, in fact, does an enormous amount to explain the dynamics of Egyptian politics.

A bibliographical review of this kind indicates that it is time for a book on Egyptian politics either since independence in 1922 or at least since the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. The desired volume should focus on the struggles and shifts which occur within the country and around Egyptian personalities. The changing role of the foreign communities and the vicissitudes of Egyptian foreign policy would have their place, but necessarily a position subordinate to the main determining factors, such as the growth and decay of major political organizations (the Wafd, the Ikhwan), and the changing role of national government, which continuously extended and improved its services and became an ever more effective machine for the translation of broad popular needs and aspirations into firm, effective, nation-wide action. Such a study would necessarily rely mainly on Arabic sources and would harvest the magnificent efforts of Egyptian writers for the enlightenment of readers in the West.

The Western reader who seeks an acquaintance with social conditions in Egypt is, curiously, considerably better off than the one who directs his inquiries toward politics. This situation is almost entirely the result of the output of the last five or possibly ten years; however, the excellent little volume of Wendell Cleland, *The Population Problem in Egypt* (Lancaster, 1936), has provided a good, though now somewhat historical, starting point.

The major contribution in the field of social description is Henry Habib Ayrout, *The Fellaheen* (Cairo, 1945), which may well prove to be the most permanently valuable work on Egypt published during the past decade. The author, whose intimate knowledge of the peasants was gained during years of living in the villages of Upper Egypt, portrays the fellah at work on the soil whose riches he transmutes into the profits of the

landowner, at home with his family and the domestic animals who share their roof, and as a social unit (one can hardly say citizen) of the mud-village community which is the familiar world of over ten million Egyptians. The wise and sensitive author has not sentimentalized his hero, the fellah, nor spared the system which produced him. However, Ayrout has recognized as a pregnant possibility something which in the years since the book was written has become an established fact; namely, that the national movement for independence which transformed the superstructure of Egyptian life and expressed itself in a flowering of culture and politics has proved in its unfolding to contain strong elements of social conscience and responsibility.

Charles Issawi, *Egypt: An Economic and Social Analysis*, already referred to, devotes a moderate amount of attention to social questions and analyzes, quite constructively, the problem of overpopulation and the economic measures which would prove useful palliatives. He briefly summarizes Egypt's class structure and rather fully indicates the way in which the financial policy of the government up to 1944 had made gradual progress in coping with social problems by means of such devices as taxation, socially motivated loans, and rational control of currency and prices. Doreen Wariner, *Land and Poverty in the Middle East* (London, 1948), devoted attention to some of the special Egyptian social and economic problems, particularly overpopulation, while placing them in the broader context of the area as a whole. A detailed description of one sociological aspect of an Egyptian province is A. M. Ammar, *A Demographic Study of an Egyptian Province* (London, 1942, apparently republished in 1948). Although Ammar is deliberately writing primarily for specialists, his monograph has a somewhat wider interest since he identifies the chief social problems of the people in Sharkiya province and discusses the feasibility of various agricultural solutions to the plight of the peasant.

Egyptian education has been well described as a system in Roderic Matthews and Matta Akrawi, *Education in Arab countries of the Near East* (Washington, 1949). The approach is rather formal and evaluation of the system is only briefly attempted, but the statistics are

full and much of the detailed data is not available elsewhere in Western languages. Unfortunately, the commission which produced the study visited Egypt in 1946 and the information and statistics frequently do not extend beyond 1943. It is to be hoped that this book can be revised to take account of the considerable progress which has been made during the past five years. In 1950 the new cabinet secured Parliament's approval for making secondary education free, and the Ministry of Education is now committed to the creation of at least two new universities, at Assiut and Abbasiya. The subject of culture, usually an interesting index of social conditions, has been delightfully described in M. M. Mosharaffa, *Cultural Survey of Modern Egypt*, Parts I and II (London, 1947 and 1948). These booklets are the best source for the Western reader who wishes to know what is being done in such fields as the theatre, literature, music, and art. Mosharaffa's highly original attempt to explain and reorganize the history of the Middle East on the principle of class formation is not entirely convincing, particularly when he takes up such specific matters as the theology of the Coptic Church and the rapid military-political success of early Islam.

At least two English translations of Egyptian novels of serious social as well as literary interest have been published recently. Tewfik Hakim, *Maze of Justice* (London 1947), is cast in the form of a diary kept by a legal officer stationed in a small Delta town near Tanta. In his official capacity the officer is continually required to apply the terms of Egypt's westernized penal code to the crimes which occur in a peasant community, most of whose members are pathetically confused by the system's exotic concepts of crime, punishment, and procedure. The village personalities whom he encounters are realistically portrayed and his fellow officials—the police chief, judge, and inspectors—are ironically and critically revealed as rather harsh and self-centered individuals. Without giving his own solution to the problem of reconciling a modernized administration with the conservative Egyptian countryside, Tewfik Hakim plainly indicates that much of the judicial and administrative reform which has been introduced

since the 19th century is far from effective in actually improving the welfare of the citizen which it was theoretically intended to serve. The other novel, Albert Cosseri, *The House of Certain Death* (New York, 1950), is set in a slum of old Cairo where the dwellers in the worse than dilapidated tenements are so impoverished that a street cleaner is considered by his neighbors to be a man of considerable affluence. Most of the characters grumble and engage in petty schemes to force the indifferent landlord to save their rickety tenement from fatal collapse. Again the moral of the tale is not clearly stated, but there are hints that only by cooperation and agreement among themselves can these wretches alleviate their miseries.

The life of a poor student at al-Azhar University a generation ago has been sensitively described by Dr. Taha Hussein. His book, translated into English by Hilary Wayment and published in Cairo in 1943, has now been republished as *The Stream of Days* (London, 1948). It is a haunting personal statement of the intellectual and spiritual problems which were faced by Egyptian youth of Taha Hussein's generation and should be particularly treasured because its message was lived by a great Arab writer, a man who rose from a humble village family to become a national figure and an eminent Minister of Education.

In the past the output of Western books on Egypt has generally included a considerable element of memoirs, biographies, and personal reminiscences. The large number of highly-placed foreigners in the administration and the strength of foreign interests in Egypt encouraged both supply and market for the semi-official, picturesque, and often quite well-written fruits of retired leisure. In the past few years four British personalities—Sir Thomas Russell, Dr. Alport, Viscount Wavell, and Pennethorne Hughes—have made their contributions. Sir Thomas Russell, *Egyptian Service, 1902-1946* (London, 1949), has revealed himself as a friendly and extremely well travelled observer of Egypt over a period of 50 years. In his position during much of this time as Commandant of the Cairo police and director of the Central Narcotic Intelligence Bureau, he learned the



inner story of many a national event. Unfortunately for the reader interested in Egyptian politics, Russell says nothing at all about the political aspects of his work and instead confines himself largely to the recounting of a series of interesting crime stories. In addition the book is graced by chapters on his own special, personal interests: hunting desert game and the art of snake charming. On such topics Russell is delightfully enthusiastic and expansive, a considerable contrast to his clipped prosaic treatment of the enthralling and historically crucial case of the assassination of Sir Lee Stack in 1924. This incident was the fuse which touched off a British ultimatum to Egypt involving the payment of an £E 500,000 indemnity and virtually complete withdrawal of Egyptian personnel from the Sudan. Russell says that it was the most interesting case in which he was ever involved but devotes only a completely noncommittal paragraph to it.

Another memoirist, Dr. A. C. Alport, came to Egypt in 1937 to serve as a professor of clinical medicine at Fuad I University. He was intensely dissatisfied with conditions at the University and the great Kasr al-Aini Hospital, and after urging reforms on the dean and the faculty became so impatient with the whole system that he resigned in 1943 and circulated a scathingly critical report on the hospitals of Egypt, *One Hour of Justice: The Black Book of the Egyptian Hospitals and a Fellaheen Charter* (London, 1947). This report he subsequently expanded to book length and published as a means of continuing his campaign to improve the medical care offered to the poor in government hospitals. Unfortunately, Dr. Alport extends his attack into a frequently ignorant belaboring of practically all Egyptian persons and institutions concerned. He is so far out of touch with the realities of politics that he regularly quotes Lord Cromer and even Lord Lloyd as the final authorities on Egyptian problems. Particularly offensive is the spurious moral tone which he injects into his discussion, even when the heart of the problem is entirely to be explained in economic or political terms. In a chapter called "Constructive Suggestions," he states flatly that "the experiment of granting self-government to Egypt has failed com-

pletely . . . today Egypt is hardly fit to live in, particularly for Europeans." His principal solution turns out to be the founding of "a Political University, completely divorced from the present Fouad I University, almost the exact replica of the University at Cambridge . . . and sharing the methods, codes, and traditions" of Cambridge and Oxford. In this school high government officials and "men with Parliamentary ambitions" would be trained and any graduate "who fails to carry out the cultural, and moral ideas, and principles laid down by the University, or who has a lapse from grace, or who does not fit into the scheme of cultured, democratic government would be instantly dismissed." The heavy burden of such false panaceas and the numerous errors of historical fact are most regrettable because Alport can write engagingly of clinical incidents and knows much about his own field.

*Allenby in Egypt* (London, 1943), the second volume of Viscount Wavell's biography of the conqueror of Palestine, has historical interest because of the light which it throws on Allenby's role in events attending the abolition of the British Protectorate on February 28, 1922, and the British ultimatum of November 22, 1924. However, Wavell seems unable to do justice to any of the major figures (Lord Curzon, King Fuad, Saad Zaghlul, etc.) except his hero. The resultant distortion is especially regrettable in the case of Zaghlul, Allenby's great opponent on so many issues. Wavell repeatedly refers reverently to Allenby's courage, strength, and patience while Zaghlul is faintly praised as "a not unworthy representative of the qualities and defects of his race." A fairer judgment of the relative courage and statesmanship of the two doughty champions would have taken into account which of the two was backed on the spot by a modern army and supported by the resources of a Great Power and which, during the period of their duel, stood in danger of prison, actually experienced years of exile, and was backed only by the hastily organized formations of a popular movement in a small and impoverished land. The somewhat inarticulate, strong-willed Allenby, laden with the highest honors of a military career, did his

duty in what appeared to him to be very difficult circumstances. Neither he nor his biographer give the impression of realizing that the occasion called for more, that Zaghlul was a leader with whose cooperation most of the constructive results of the British Occupation could have been consolidated and the accumulated grievances of decades adjusted in two or three sessions of the new Egyptian Parliament. Wavell reflects nothing of this lost opportunity. To him the "quick flowering" of Egyptian national consciousness in 1919 was due mainly to the doctrines of Allied politicians, especially "that class-room idealist, President Woodrow Wilson." This lack of proportion in his estimate of men and movements renders his book an interesting but inadequate account of the political side of Allenby's six years in Egypt.

Pennethorne Hughes, *While Shepherds Watched* (London, 1950), says very little about himself but sketches a full and fairly faithful picture of life in Cairo for the British military and others brought there by World War II. Probably any American who served in Cairo during the war would heartily enjoy this book. Hughes flavors his narrative with entertaining gossip and charming disrespect for many of the puffer wartime authorities. However, he knows a good deal about the real Egypt which most Cairo commandos never even saw, and he manages to make many political and social topics almost as easy reading as his satirical description of Shepherds and its bar.

Charles Breasted's biography of his father, James Henry Breasted, *Pioneer to the Past* (New York, 1945), relates a thrilling account of a trip down the Nubian Nile in the early years of this century and also contains a full story of Breasted's part in the controversy between the Egyptian Government and Lord Carnarvon's estate over the tomb of Tutankhamon, and the complex and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to establish and endow an Egyptian museum with \$10 million of Rockefeller money in 1925.

Claude Dewhurst, *Limelight for Suez* (Cairo, 1946), is another book based on the personal experiences of a British officer serving in Egypt during World War II. It is not

to be taken seriously as an accurate account of the history of the area, ancient or modern, but it is certainly worth the attention of the tourist or even of the east- or west-bound traveler who may be looking forward to the stately processional of a daylight trip through the canal.

By far the best recent survey of Egypt's basic economic problems is Charles Issawi's book mentioned repeatedly above. In spite of its somewhat biting tone, *Egypt: An Economic and Social Analysis* can hardly be sufficiently commended as a succinct statement of the strengths, weaknesses, and potentialities of the country's cotton-centered, under-capitalized, yet gradually progressing, economic machine. Two more surveys may serve as useful supplements but are far from being in a class with Issawi. J. W. Taylor, *Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt* (London, 1948), is a volume in the British Government's series, "Overseas Economic Surveys." It is addressed almost entirely to the interests of the foreign trader or investor, but its list of economic legislation and numerous tables of financial and trade statistics have a wider interest. *Mémento Économique: L'Égypte* (Paris, 1950), a publication of the French Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, compresses a great bulk of practical economic information into 200 pages. Its analyses are often not very profound ("Les Chiffres . . . montrent qu'aucune politique encourageant la natalité n'est nécessaire en Égypte," page 44), and it contains numerous factual inaccuracies, such as calling the new Delta province "Faroukiye" instead of Fuadiyah, but its handiness and up-to-dateness are hard to match.

In the field of economics, too, there will soon be need for a book which will take account of current transformations but view the picture steadily with due attention to the setting and background. The next few years are likely to witness some drastic changes in Egypt's public finance as income taxation becomes a major revenue source and defense and social security claim a much larger share of expenditures. Furthermore, the foundations of the economy are bound to be affected as land reforms are introduced and economic develop-

ment and reclamation accelerated. New sources of power are on the way and a rapid expansion of light industry may follow. It is to be hoped

that a trained and gifted economist will come forward to analyze the Egyptian economy of, say, 1952 as Issawi does the economy of 1942.

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## GENERAL

*Islamic Society and the West. Volume I: Islamic Society in the Eighteenth Century, Part I*, by H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1950. xi + 386 pages. \$4.50.

In this important volume Mr. Gibb and Mr. Bowen present part of the necessary preliminary groundwork for what is designed to become "an organic study of the life of the Muslim societies, and the forces, ideals, and tendencies at work within them" — a study which will undertake to explore the full nature of the impact of the West upon Muslim life and which will concentrate upon tracing "social evolution and the bearing of this process upon present conditions." The more the reader knows about the modern Muslim world, the more will he appreciate the magnitude, the difficulty, and the importance of this undertaking. It is a new departure and a pioneer work in every sense of those terms.

On the one hand, here the student of Islam finds men of established reputations and authority addressing themselves directly to the problem of discovering and interpreting the principal factors which have produced the Muslim societies of the present day — a venture which cannot fail to yield numerous insights both new and stimulating. And on the other hand, the social scientist who (as is frequently the case) would be interested in Islam if materials for study were made available to him will find here a mass of data collected and organized for his use.

The authors of the present study are the first to disclaim completeness of coverage or

definitiveness of results for their work. In this publication and in the book which is to follow — and one greatly regrets that Mr. Bowen's health compels him to drop from the collaboration — the attempt is made to establish a baseline by which the changes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries can be appraised. Many considerations compel the limitation of such a survey to the Ottoman Empire, to the worlds of the Turks and the Arabs. Equally cogent considerations forbid the investigation of a large range of topics which the authors fully realize should ideally be included. Much of the data needed can be collected only on the spot; much else can no longer be found even there, for time has obliterated it.

Working within the bounds of the possible, this first volume discharges its task with distinction. It would be premature to attempt a criticism in detail until a larger portion of the total planned work has appeared. But it is already abundantly clear that *Islamic Society and the West*, whatever its weaknesses may eventually prove to be, will be a basic step in the advance toward new horizons in the study of Muslim life. Forthcoming installments are awaited with keen anticipation.

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*The Second World War. Volume III: The Grand Alliance*, by Winston S. Churchill. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950. xvi + 903 pages. \$6.00.

The memoirs of personages who take active part in public life, if written before the au-



thor's recollections have become vague and distorted, may supply the historian with invaluable source materials. Such memoirs, however, should always be used with certain reservations as they tend, probably inevitably, to emphasize the author's own role in the events at the expense of others as well as to justify his actions and policies. If the memoirs are deliberately written for this purpose, then they degenerate into mere apologiae and lose almost all their value as source materials. Mr. Churchill, with all his desire and earnestness for accuracy, has not escaped such accusations by some of his trenchant critics.

Mr. Churchill's account of World War II, though classified by many reviewers as memoirs, is written with such comprehensiveness and such complete documentation that it becomes something more than memoirs. But it is also less than a history, and World War II still awaits its definitive historians. The writing of history is regarded as both science and art: science in the discovery and interpretation of facts, and art in the presentation of these facts to the reader. If Mr. Churchill lacks something of Thucydides' detachment to the events around him, he must be regarded at the same time as one of the few great masters of historical art.

In his third volume, entitled *The Grand Alliance*, Mr. Churchill devotes 14 of his 37 chapters to the Middle East, aside from certain short sections and casual references. But although the 14 chapters constitute more than one-third of the total, they receive much less than that proportion of space. Mr. Churchill gives a full account of the desert warfare and the operations in Greece and Crete, but is inclined to be very concise in his narrative of the revolt in Iraq and the Allied occupation of Syria, Lebanon, and Iran.

The year 1941 (the period covered in *The Grand Alliance*) was a crucial one for the war in the Middle East. It may be divided into two stages. During the first half of the year the German forces, following the utter failure of Mussolini to occupy Greece and Egypt, offered a challenge to Britain's position which culminated in their penetration into Egypt beyond Halfaya Pass and the complete occupation of Greece and Crete. The German-

Italian Armistice Commission took over the supervision (resulting in virtual control) of Syria and Lebanon. Rashid Ali al-Gaylani instigated a revolt in Iraq during April and May, while the Germans became increasingly popular in the other Arab countries and Iran. It appeared that Turkey, alone in formal alliance and friendship with Britain, was soon to be encircled if the German forces were to descend from Crete upon the Levant States and Iraq to make the feared push into Iran and the Persian Gulf.

To meet this threat, Mr. Churchill, already worried about the fate of the Middle East, warned his Commander-in-Chief in the area to send forces to Iraq (and later to Syria and Iran). But General Wavell, says Mr. Churchill the historian, would not respond and advised his Prime Minister to seek a political settlement with Rashid Ali. Harassed by the Germans in the western desert, General Wavell could supply but meager forces, which were ultimately sent into Iraq (later joined by Transjordan's Arab Legion) to save the besieged British garrison at Habbaniya and the British community at the British Embassy.

Mr. Churchill not only discloses to us these hitherto unknown facts about his difficulties with General Wavell, but also tells us, in his chapter on Hess, that one of the conditions proposed for an understanding with Germany was the evacuation of Britain from Iraq (pp. 52, 54). While Mr. Churchill might congratulate himself on the immediate and spectacular successes achieved by his intervention in Iraq and Iran — acts which undoubtedly helped to establish British prestige and power in the Middle East during the war — the xenophobia that swept that area after the war (especially the Arab countries) may be regarded, at least in part, as a result of the Prime Minister's interventionist policy. Viewed in retrospect, General Wavell's idea of a political settlement with the nationalists might have proved more beneficial for future friendship and cooperation between Great Britain and the Middle Eastern countries. It is interesting to note that Mr. Churchill himself had advised General de Gaulle to meet "Arab aspirations and susceptibilities" (p. 238) in order to achieve an understanding



between the Syrian nationalists and the Allied Powers.

In his discussion of the internal situation in Iraq, Syria, and Iran, Mr. Churchill omits a great deal of information, leaving many questions unanswered in the reader's mind. He says nothing about the controversy that had arisen between Britain and De Gaulle regarding the future relations of France with the Levant States, and passes in silence over the events that culminated in the Rashid Ali coup d'état, except to attribute it to Rashid Ali's pro-Axis sympathies. It is not clear why Mr. Churchill omitted such important material, which is certainly no longer confidential as he himself revealed some aspects of these events in his speeches in the House of Commons on May 7, 1941, and September 9, 1941. Mr. Churchill, likewise, fails to describe the internal development in Iran which led to the abdication of Reza Shah. The reader is left in the dark as to why the Shah abdicated at all.

The chapters dealing with the Middle East in Mr. Churchill's history of World War II may nonetheless be regarded as most valuable for students of Middle Eastern affairs, but it is to be hoped that Mr. Churchill will discuss this area with further detail in his forthcoming volumes.

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*Near East Panorama*, by Glora M. Wysner.  
New York: Friendship Press, 1950. 158  
pages. \$1.50 bound in cloth; \$1.00 bound  
in paper.

*Assignment: Near East*, by James Batal. New  
York: Friendship Press, 1950. 118 pages.  
\$1.75.

Miss Wysner's book does not pretend to be a thorough description of the innumerable complications of life in the Middle East. It suggests, rather than details, the conditions which exist at the present time, whetting the appetite of the reader.

Miss Wysner spent twelve years as a mis-

sionary in Algeria. Both in 1945 and in 1949 she visited the Middle Eastern countries as Secretary of the International Missionary Council. Her book is one of a series which have been written to encourage church missionary groups to study the area during the present year.

The first chapter sketches the lives of different types of men and women in an artistic and effective way, introducing the reader to individuals before taking up the more impersonal phases of the Middle Eastern life. The author follows with a description of the countries and regions which form the mosaic of the Middle East, as designs form an oriental carpet, with brief accounts of the cultures and backgrounds of history.

After describing the religious faiths, including the modern Evangelical movements, Miss Wysner goes on to deal with the political and economic problems. She sums up the basic difficulty of the ancient world in a striking paragraph:

Insufficient arable land, overpopulation, ignorance, primitive agricultural methods, non-ownership of land all add up to this: 80 percent of the people must farm in order to feed the other 20 percent. In the United States less than 15 percent of the population feeds more than 85 percent.

The closing chapters deal with petroleum, education, medical work, and the changing status of women, ending with an account of missionary work as a bridge to better understanding. Miss Wysner tries to be realistic rather than sentimental. Some Middle Easterners may feel that she is very sparing of flattery, and when she deals with Palestine the Zionists may regret that she has shown the liabilities as well as the assets of their movement. But the reader will appreciate her frankness and her attempt to be thoroughly honest. As few people have the money to buy technical books about the Middle East or time to read them, Miss Wysner's brief "panorama" of one of the most important parts of the modern world will meet one of the present-day needs of the reading public. Her book is so inexpensive, so readable, and so timely, that as many people as possible should profit by her work.

James Batal, the author of *Assignment*:

*Near East*, was born in Lawrence, Massachusetts, and graduated from Amherst College, but his parents came from the Lebanon Mountains. He has recently served as Executive Secretary of the big Syrian and Lebanese American Federation of the Eastern States, which is helping immigrants and their children to become loyal citizens of America. During 1943-44 Mr. Batal was sent to the Middle East on an assignment for the Government, and during the past summer he again went with a group of Americans of Syrian and Lebanese origin to visit the lands of their forefathers.

When James Batal went to Egypt and Western Asia he was immediately impressed by the great influence of Christian missions in those ancient lands. This first impression developed into such a profound interest that he wrote this book to tell his friends about the contribution that missions are making.

The story is in no way pedantic or sentimental. It is the straight-forward account of a trained journalist of what he heard with his own ears and saw with his own eyes. The subject covered is so great that the book cannot attempt to give a thorough picture of any one country or missionary field. But as a survey of the Arab world in general and the missionary activities in particular, it is an excellent introduction for the average reader to enjoy and profit by. As in the case of Miss Wysner's book there is a good map. Mr. Batal's book also has some interesting photographs of places and people.

During a time when the Middle East is being attacked by the Communist underground and menaced on its northern frontiers by Communist diplomacy, people are beginning to realize that Western ideals cannot be transmitted by the Marshall Plan and Point Four alone, but must also be interpreted by more personal contacts. Democracy cannot be bought, it must be taught. Thus Mr. Batal's book about the altruistic work of Americans overseas is as timely as it is interesting and easy to read.

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Princeton, New Jersey

## INDIA

*Interview with India*, by John Frederick Muehl. New York: John Day, 1950. 310 pages. \$3.00.

An Indian greeting of honor is the taking of the other person's dust upon oneself.

There have been many books on India written by Western writers but few by writers who have taken her dust. One must not blame them; her dust is not as pleasant, as idyllic as those who like to think of the East as a place of simplicity and wisdom would suppose; simplicity and wisdom are there but the dust gets into the throat and nostrils and eyes, it covers clothes and skin so that they are indistinguishable, and it is a dust that clings and gets into the heart.

Mr. Muehl went to India during the war and, as the comment on the jacket tells us, made up his mind to go back and discover more about it; the results of his second journey are in this book. It calls by contrast another book to mind, a book written by the British author Beverley Nichols after a tour of the same country. The same country? No, Mr. Nichols' is another country, the country of Westernized India, which is not India at all; an army of occupation, which is what the British rule in India virtually was, leaves its sycophants, Indians more Western than the West. I should think that Mr. Nichols met them all and his book is a finished, highly polished superficial account of them. He called it *Verdict on India*.

Mr. Muehl has no such skill, such polish; his book gives strongly the impression of being a beginning and after his patient arduous travels, deep into the countryside, deep into the heart of a people, he calls it *Interview with India*. The difference in title is indicative; this is the book of a modest, sincere and — as his Indian policeman friend told him — of a very observant young man; if his findings give the feeling of a few scattered grains, they are grains of truth.

It seems the first truth he learned was in the saying, "India is a village." India is a land of peasants; her life is in her villages and if you want to see what she is and understand

a little why she is as she is, you must go to the villages; Mr. Muehl went. Starting at Kathiawar, north of Bombay, he travelled through the dreary waste of the Rann (a desert marsh of unspeakable desolation), through the Gujerats, down through Southern India, ending after twenty-three hundred miles with heat exhaustion at Koornol on the borders of Hyderabad; it was an arduous toilsome way; he travelled as an Indian and a poor Indian at that, with a courage and hardihood, an indifference to comfort and food that seem almost superhuman; "for one week," he writes nonchalantly, "there was only flour and garlic roots," but he was upheld by an unflagging interest which the reader can share as we travel with him on foot, in the slow-moving wooden-wheeled bullock carts, on the swift-trotting little country pony, or pillion on a camel. The reader shares his companions: the impecunious durbar or petty chief, driving his bullock cart to the annual market to sell his straw mats, the filthy Muslim camel-driver, the policeman hunting an outlaw, the caravan of travelling actors; he met on equal terms the village people, the elders, the landlords, the beggars and the princes; he met the extreme Hindu movements of the Right, the orthodox Hindus to whom Gandhi was a dangerous radical; he met Communism running rife. He ate with the people, slept with them, talked with them, listened to them, thought about them: "There they were, four hundred million people," he writes, "the smells and the crying and the births and the dying were all round me and there was no escaping." He learned their poverty: "Even starvation and famine could not measure its depths, for it was like something malignant with a life of its own." He saw the stranglehold that the Brahmins and merchant caste had on the people, the corruption and the evils; and he saw the life that was in this suffering, and he wondered, and leaves his reader wondering, that life can still be there.

What is this life? This strange vitality surviving poverty, suffering, depression, degradation with a persistence that is like a wisdom of its own? Mr. Muehl does not attempt to answer that, in fact he shies off it into generalizations. It is this that makes me say the

book is like a beginning. There are faults in it, of course; it is strangely undescriptive; if Mr. Muehl writes anywhere of the beauty of the country, of the people, it escaped me; it evokes no picture, but the lack is more than that; he says himself that the poverty he saw made it difficult to look at anything else. Perhaps it is that he has found the worm eating the rose but he has not found the rose itself. I look forward, with eagerness and respect, to the book that will come when he has.

RUMER GODDEN  
Aylesbury, England

*The Life of Mahatma Gandhi*, by Louis Fischer. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950. 558 pages. \$5.00.

The announcement of Gandhi's assassination in January 1948 was followed by a worldwide expression of sorrow for the passing of a great personality. Kings, statesmen, soldiers, religious leaders, and common men everywhere felt the loss. Gandhi was a symbol representing the extent to which passionate and egocentric men could realize reason and spirit in a world of violence and discontent. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, the man, and Mahatma Gandhi, the myth, are in fact separable concepts, but it seems probable that with the passage of time the man will appear clothed more completely in the garb of the myth.

Louis Fischer has made an admirable attempt to capture the universal message of Gandhi in his *The Life of Mahatma Gandhi*. Fischer knew his subject intimately and could not be satisfied with writing about ideas or universal "messages" without placing the abstractions in the human and homely setting of Gandhi's daily routine of family, disciples, politics, purposeful hobbies, emotional responses, and intellectual searchings. The book which results is a political history of India in the twentieth century through which is intertwined the personal and political life of the man who more than any other shaped and inspired that history. The sheer quantity of detail which surrounds the biographical characterization tends to obscure Gandhi and to highlight the Indian independence movement. A much shorter book by Louis Fischer, *A Week with Gandhi*, written in 1942 and

fortunately reproduced in part in this new volume (pp. 363 ff), seems to this reviewer to have captured more successfully the delightful "illogic" of Gandhi's philosophy and to have probed more deeply his marriage to the brotherhood of men.

Gandhian literature already can be listed in hundreds of contributions. An expectation of scholarly and literary excellence therefore appears to be warranted from further books relating to the subject. Although Fischer has been careful to document his case thoroughly in "Notes to the Reader" (pp. 509-46), the history which he presents as the background to Gandhi's life is heavily weighted to the Congress' point of view and does not give a balanced picture of the forces opposed to Gandhi's position within the Congress or to the variety of reasons for the growth of the Pakistan demand of the Muslim League. Jinnah and his followers in the League, for example, are dismissed as fanatic rogues. Men holding views different from Gandhi were many. Jawaharlal Nehru, C. R. Das, and even Subhas Chandra Bose on occasion, succumbed to Gandhi's persuasion. That is the fact. But why? What was the force commanded by this leader? Only between the lines of Fischer's book does Gandhi's powerful attraction arise. It may be that interlinear insights are the best way to describe the subtle appeal of an "experimenter with truth."

None of the major phases of Gandhi's life has been overlooked. Somewhat more emphasis is given to the later years in India (1915 to 1948) than to the preceding years in South Africa, Europe, and during childhood. For his materials Louis Fischer searched through the available printed literature, wrote for additional data from Gandhi's associates, and gave considerable attention to Gandhi's letters, published and unpublished. Where written evidence was lacking, the author filled in with interviews. The bibliography reveals a method of painstaking research which assured a minimum of factual error.

The greatest contribution made by this book is a systematic, highly readable, and provocative elaboration of recent Indian history combined with biographical counterpoint concerning Gandhi. Louis Fischer's deft pen has made it possible for readers with little or no knowl-

edge of India to come to grips with the complexities of Indian life and politics without fear of boredom or of overburdening pedantry. The book is written in the style of journalism at its best, with shafts of insight and literary excellence entering every chapter. The fact that the author is seldom critical of his subject, and thus does not explore with enthusiasm the weaknesses of Gandhi as seen by his critics, gives the book a vigor of style based on a sense of personal conviction felt by the author.

Other writers at other times may produce biographies of Gandhi of higher excellence. For the time being, Louis Fischer holds the honors, at least in the field of biographical history.

RICHARD L. PARK  
Washington, D. C.

*Drums Behind the Hill*, by Ursula Graham Bower. New York: William Morrow and Company. 266 pages. \$4.00.

The tribal inherence to a collective awareness, the rising suspension and surrender of differentiations to a more mountainous need for certitude, the monolithic forbearance of the foreigner and the unknown, gives to tribal society its austere benignity, its rude romance and its simplification that almost seems a spiritual quality — but for the skull-garlands and the tooth-beads of the victorious. The question often is, is sweetness — the charming sweetness of the tribal people — the price one has to pay for an undivided, good society; and must individual-based society forever lead to the disputations and the disrepute of the common democracies of today? May there not be a voluntary awareness, a Christian or Buddhist sensibility to a collective need, which may but be the inner pulsation to the metaphysical principle; may not the act of fellowship be also the act of self-fulfillment; may not liberating duty be the exaltation in the egoless; may not tribal wholeness and civilized grandeur be united in one movement? That is the question of this age; hence our shameless inquiry into the mystery of the primitive, our anthropological self-discovery, our fellow-traveller sympathy. The far can but be the fearful path to the self. Miss Bower knows



it not, but marks this journey with the passionate poetry of the healthy innocent. She discovers the Naga tribes, their Morungs and marriages, their festive dances and their strict cruelty, their austere uprightness, also their distant simple confidence; she becomes their goddess and is worshipped by them; the collective looks at the white individual as divine as much as the cynical individualist finds the holiness of the Party Generalissimo; and through alarm and adventure, she moves back to her world, and to her comforts, a befitting bride. This beautiful book ends with a noble marriage.

For this is a very beautiful book. It has a quite natural acceptance as though emergent beauty were a natural part of the terrestrial scheme, and as though men and mountains (and rivers) did simple big things in a simple, natural way. "Back we went," she writes, "back we went through the arching wonder of the hold, that separates every curve framing the greens, the blues, the forests and the hills, away to the last pale mists beyond Tamen-glong. Out of the narrowing ledge we moved and over the rib, climbing backwards, carefully ladderwise. Now not a trace of the hold remained, then up the earthy slope, with struggle and slip and kick, back to the path again; and down and down through the trees, from mountain forest out to the open fields, to the evening light, to Barak's deep rift, to the village little and small and pale below; scrambling, running, laughing, hurrying down from an other-world of beauty and air and light to the sad, unkind, impermanent land of men."

And so Miss Bowers is back again amidst us with her Naga knowledge. Her innocence has touched the ultimate edge of goodness. From goodness came understanding, and from understanding the truth of a way of life.

RAJA RAO  
Washington, D. C.

## ISRAEL

*New Star in the Near East*, by Kenneth W. Bilby. New York: Doubleday and Company, 1950. 279 pages. \$3.00.

Here, with the story of Israel's victorious fight for effective existence as a state, is also

a sketch of the longer if less violent struggle that still lies ahead if it is to survive Arab hostility and its own tremendous economic problems.

From the end of Great Britain's mandate on May 14, 1948, to the time when fighting had been stopped more or less completely in the spring of 1949 was a turbulent period of war and intrigue. Intrigue among the Arabs, against each other, was one of Israel's strongest arms, as Mr. Bilby rightly remarks. Correspondent in the Middle East during that period for the *New York Herald Tribune*, he observed both fighting and intrigue and has presented the tangled story well and vividly. He sees it primarily from the Zionist point of view, for as he says himself, almost everybody in close touch with Palestine during those critical days seemed to develop a certain amount of bias, consciously or not, for one side or the other. He has done as objective a job, probably, as anybody could do who had been so closely involved in the day-to-day developments of the period.

Basically the book deals with three aspects of the picture. First, there is the development of the fighting and the intrigues connected with that. Second, there is the forging of a brand-new state out of the most weirdly heterogeneous elements, bound to each other really only by their common faith in the future of Israel. Involved in that there is also the problem of preventing internal schisms. Finally, looking back at that past history, the author considers the net result to date and speculates on Israel's future.

Three questions he leaves unanswered, because they are unanswerable up to the present: Can means be found to ensure that neither the Arabs, smarting under defeat, nor the Israelis, flushed with victory, will start new bloodshed? What, if anything, will be done for the three-quarter million Arab refugees, who seem to be fading into the limbo of forgotten D.P.'s? As Bilby remarks, they are one of the most active factors in keeping hate alive in the Middle East. And lastly, will Israel ever in the foreseeable future be able to stand on its own feet economically? Until those vital questions are answered, along with the sixty-four-dollar question of what the Soviet Union intends to do or not to do there,

nobody can say what the future of the Middle East will be.

As for peace in the Middle East, Mr. Bilby calls attention to one point that should not be forgotten: the terrorist Irgun Zvai Leumi, now transformed into a political party but still under its old leaders, never has dropped its demand for conquest of all Palestine and of King Abdallah's Jordan as well. No Jewish leader interviewed by this writer in Palestine, except the late Dr. Judah L. Magnes, ever strongly criticized that ambition. The Arab states on their side may nurse ideas of revenge, but they are not in any position to do anything about it, nor are they likely to be for some time.

In this book, for the first time, there is a documented study of the deliberate policy of provocation and aggression practiced by Israel leaders during the United Nations truces — making sudden advances into Arab areas on the plea of self-defense, and then refusing to withdraw. At the time it was hotly denied that such a policy existed, although UN observers were only too well aware of it. Mr. Bilby presents the facts and the explanation given by Colonel Moshe Dayan, highly respected by his enemies as well as his compatriots, that this was a policy of "calculated violations" of the truce balanced against the "political risks." While appearing to admire the "realism" of such a policy, the author remarks that if too-long continued it may alienate world sympathy from Israel leaders.

No unprejudiced observer could fail to admire the courage and resourcefulness with which the Israelis fought to win and hold the promised national home. With personal World War II experiences as his background, the author describes their spirit, their strategy, and their tactics effectively and without excessive complication. He seems, still, to show a certain bias in that although he insists on the Arab countries' dependence on the British, and reports the scrupulous observance of the UN truce by the British, he expresses astonishment that the Arabs did not (as Israel did) violate the truce by smuggling in arms and aircraft. The British seem also to get a little less than their due for preventing complete pandemonium up to the time of their withdrawal.

The picture of the political tangle of the adolescent state is remarkably clear and coherent, considering the great complexity of Israel's internal politics. Bibly tells the story, too little noticed abroad, of the courage and decisiveness with which Prime Minister David Ben Gurion crushed the terrorists of the Stern Gang and the Irgun Zvai Leumi, after a pitched battle on the waterfront of Tel Aviv with the latter, and a comic-opera prison break by the former. Long before the end of the mandate, Israel leaders knew that sooner or later they must stand or fall on the question of whether they could impose national unity and discipline on these groups, who had been living on blood and showed no inclination to change their ways. In the midst of the nation's most critical period, Ben Gurion had the courage to take the necessary drastic measures and, up to the present, seems to have won the fight.

The greatest battle that lies ahead, almost certainly, is the economic one, well presented here as the problem of reconciling large population and scanty resources with a high standard of living. Whether the answer is success or failure, it can be seen that it will be a long struggle whose continuance is made possible only by the fanatical determination of the Israelis and the huge remittances from their friends abroad.

One aspect of the book can be challenged: the constant reference to the Arab armies as "invasion armies." That is the Israel term for them, but the Arabs of Palestine looked on them as would-be liberators. It is true that at times the Egyptians and Iraqis, notably, were not locally popular for their conduct, but there were also Frenchmen who found the ways of liberating G.I.'s not entirely agreeable. As for Abdallah's annexation of Arab Palestine, the real opposition has always been not among Palestinians but among Abdallah's own subjects, who fear that the Palestine Arab, with superior education, will grab all the best jobs. The Palestinians see it almost as a question of taking over a colony.

Certainly the most important part of the book lies in the conclusions, where Mr. Bilby seems to be looking back and picking up for criticism points that he passed over with little comment or with approval in earlier chapters.

He leaves his major questions unanswered, because they are unanswerable, but he presents them well, and it is important that they should be presented and considered if developments in the Middle East are to be understood. And it is agreeable to report that the book is pleasantly easy reading, though there are a number of small errors of fact, mostly evident slips of the tongue.

SAM POPE BREWER  
Madrid, Spain

## PALESTINE

*The Struggle for Palestine*, by J. C. Hurewitz.  
New York: W. W. Norton and Company,  
1950. 404 pages. \$6.00.

Mr. Hurewitz first came to Palestine before World War II and started research into the connections between the United States and the Levant in the nineteenth century. The specialized knowledge of the area in the twentieth century which he also acquired, led later to his appointment as one of the small group of Middle East experts in the Office of Strategic Services. He subsequently served in the Department of State and in the United Nations Secretariat. For the past few years, however, his major work has been the completion of this massive study of over 400 well-packed pages, of which 25 alone are accorded to a bibliography. When one considers that the work is concerned only with the recent years of Palestine's history — those between 1936 and 1949 — and only with their political aspect, the thoroughness of this undertaking can well be appreciated.

It is not easy to write contemporary history at the best of times. Published documents tell only part of the story, and the motives that inspired them, even if recorded, are still locked up in the secret archives of the Ministries concerned. Even when the motives are known, it is extremely hard to arrive at a balanced picture — to assess the influence of this or that on the course of events as a whole.

In the case of Palestine, truth has been drowned by a flood of polemic literature. In the 1920's and the 1930's, when each com-

mission of inquiry let loose a further spate of partisan declamation, someone — whose name is now forgotten — said in Jerusalem, "If all the articles and pamphlets published on Palestine were placed side by side across the Atlantic, they'd sink to the bottom, and a good thing too." Yet out of this mass of material, Mr. Hurewitz has extracted the granules of truth. His own objectivity is never in doubt, and his book is the best practical history of modern Palestine yet found by this writer. It is an able and factual record of what happened. Every word has been carefully weighed, and the author has not sacrificed one iota of accuracy for the sake of the brilliant epigram or the facile generalization.

The struggle for Palestine began with a struggle for ascendancy between Arabs and Jews. Victory in this struggle depended largely on the extent to which Jews could or could not become a majority in the whole or part of Palestine. As the ethnic composition of the country was determined by immigration, the struggle for Palestine became a struggle for immigration. And as the rate of immigration was determined by Great Britain, the struggle between Arabs and Jews developed into a struggle between the Arabs and the British, and between the Jews and the British. The extent of British resistance to pressure from both sides, however, depended in part on the international situation. Hence the struggle for Palestine was involved further in the rise and fall of Italian and German totalitarianism and imperialism. Of these two countries, Germany was by far the more dangerous. German totalitarianism increased the Jewish pressure on Palestine, while German imperialism made use of Arab intransigence to resist that pressure.

These tangled threads have all been patiently disentangled by Mr. Hurewitz. His book now becomes an essential volume for all university and public libraries with Middle East sections, and for all persons with Middle East interests. One might safely predict that its objectivity and sanity will enhance its value as time goes on. There are few experts in this field with Mr. Hurewitz's knowledge or self-discipline.

EDWIN SAMUEL  
London, England

## TURKEY

*Celal Bayar: Bir Türkün Biyografisi*, by Cemal Kutay. Istanbul: Onan Matbaası, 1950. 121 pages. TL 1.00.

Cemal Kutay, author of a four-volume work entitled *Celal Bayar* (Istanbul, 1939-1941), was fortunate enough to have ready for publication a short biography of President Bayar soon after the Turkish national election of May 1950. The title of this book is *Celal Bayar: Bir Türkün Biyografisi* (*Celal Bayar: The Biography of a Turk*). As the author himself states, this is merely a short biography and is based to a large extent on the larger work he published in 1941. This book, similar to his previous work, is more a story of the modernization of Turkey than an analytical biography of the new President of the Republic.

It traces the life of Celal Bayar from his student days and briefly discusses his activities as a bank clerk, as a leader of the Young Turk Movement of 1908, and as one of the first Turkish patriots to fight in the Turkish War for Independence. Kutay describes developments in modern Turkey under Atatürk and the part that Bayar played in them — an important role in the development of the program of Westernization and industrialization of Turkey. As head of the İş Bankası and later as Prime Minister under President Atatürk, he helped materially in the economic development of Turkey.

There are 44 photographs of the new President participating in various activities from the early days of the War for Independence to more recent times, as well as several reproductions of historical letters and documents. One weakness of the book may be noted: the lack of material pertaining to the period since 1946 and the development of the Democratic Party.

Although this small volume is a timely and useful brief history of the career of one of the great leaders of modern Turkey, it is not a critical biography. It is rather a chronological survey of the activities of Celal Bayar during various periods of modern Turkish history. The author does not seem to analyze and discuss the ideas or personality of his

subject adequately. It is to be hoped that a more analytical biography of President Bayar will be written in the near future.

KERIM K. KEY  
Washington, D. C.

## ISLAM

*Outlines of Muhammadan Law*, by Asaf A. A. Fyzee. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1949. xvi + 443 pages. \$5.00.

This book of Principal Fyzee, now Indian Ambassador in Egypt, is one of the best in a long series of works written by English and Indian authors on Islamic law as applied in the continent of India. It is not a handbook of pure Muhammadan law; the learned author explains that by "Muhammadan law" he means not the pure theory of the *shari'a* but its modified form which is applicable to the Muslims in India and Pakistan — in other words, the result of the symbiosis of British and Islamic law for more than 170 years, which is commonly known as Anglo-Muhammadan law. The author modestly describes his work as an elementary textbook for university students. It is true that for the more recondite details he generally refers to more detailed works; but the book, well documented as to literature and cases, is detailed enough to guide a serious student a long way.

The introductory chapters can be recommended as a first introduction to the study of any of the aspects of Muhammadan law. They represent, naturally and justifiably, the common opinion of Anglo-Indian lawyers in the last few decades, and it is not the fault of the author that the resulting picture of the development of Muhammadan jurisprudence lags occasionally behind the contemporary stage of research. In its technically legal parts, however, Principal Fyzee's book is fully up-to-date.

The most important single act of recent years, with which the author deals in detail, is the Shariat Act of 1937, which abolished the legal authority of custom among the Muslims of India and imposed upon them the official doctrine of the *shari'a* as modified by



statute and interpreted by Anglo-Indian jurisdiction. In order to understand its importance one must realize that almost everywhere in Islam, in the middle ages as well as in modern times, the ideal theory of the *shari'a* was followed only as far as custom endorsed it. To enforce the pure theory of the *shari'a* as against custom, in a country in which the *shari'a* itself is very restricted in its validity and deeply anglicized even in its central chapters, is an act of deliberate archaism and purism which has its parallels elsewhere in the British Empire and in other colonial systems.

Another interesting recent act, to which the author does full justice, is the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act of 1939. It is generally inspired by the doctrines of the Maliki school of law — doctrines which were considered more in keeping with contemporary ideas than the teaching of the Hanafi school to which most Indian Sunni Muslims adhere. (On these recent developments in *shari'a* law see two papers of mine, in *Der Islam* XX [1932], and in *Mélanges Maspéro* III [1935-40].) This free and arbitrary choice between the several traditional schools of Muhammadan law is typical of legal modernism as practiced in Egypt, and subsequently in other Islamic countries in the Middle East, from 1920 onwards. What is interesting in this connection is that statutory legislation in India, which had followed an independent modern course, with jurisprudence in its wake, in its latest stage has come around to adopting an essentially timid and half-hearted device.

Principal Fyzee's book appears at a turning point in the history of modern Muhammadan law — at the moment when the direct English influence has ceased and when the stream of Anglo-Muhammadan law is dividing into the twin rivers of Islamic law as applied in India and as applied in Pakistan. By its competence, clarity, and serenity (hardly ever marred by some faintly apologetic turn of phrase) Principal Fyzee's book is a worthy monument to a noble period of Anglo-Muhammadan legal history.

J. SCHACHT  
Oxford University

*Conversion and the Poll Tax in Early Islam*,  
by Daniel C. Dennett, Jr. Cambridge,

Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950.  
(Harvard Historical Monograph No. 22).  
136 pages. \$2.50.

This posthumous work eloquently documents the loss suffered by Near Eastern studies in America and elsewhere by the untimely death of Dr. Dennett in an air accident after World War II. On setting out to investigate the causes of the breakdown of the Arab empire, he found himself involved in the tangled subject of the taxation of the provinces. With characteristic thoroughness and independence of mind, he marshalled the evidence afresh and challenged the conclusions of such masters as Wellhausen and Becker.

It is true that the accumulation of new materials had already led historians to question some of their assumptions and statements, but Dennett went much further. He rejects their assertion that the Muslim jurists tried to present a theoretical and stereotyped picture of the early taxation systems and argues that the historians did nothing of the sort: "The fact of the matter is that they present too many facts, too many conflicting stories." The two arguments are not inconsistent with one another, but some cause must be assigned for the conflicts of evidence. Moreover, the influence of legal theory upon apparently straightforward historical narratives has been too often and too securely demonstrated to be disproved by the occasional agreement of legal theory and certain fact. More especially, however, Dennett rejects the view that *kharāj* and *jizya* were originally synonymous in all cases, and argues that, although the usage of these terms was not yet fixed in a technical sense, the distinction between land tax and poll tax was implicit or explicit from the first. Subject to some modification in detail, he has made out a good case here and has rehabilitated the jurists against too sweeping a condemnation.

The weakest link in his chain is the attempt to refute Becker's statements on the original taxation imposed by 'Amr in Egypt. The confusion of data in the works of the Arabic historians on the conquest of Egypt is notorious, but the vast weight of evidence is that 'Amr and his successor imposed a tax "by population," along with grain deliveries for the needs of the army, and Becker's phrase *kopfsteue-*

*rartig*, to which Dennett takes so much exception, precisely expresses the explanation given by al-Māwardī (p. 256, 1-2). That 'Amr also restored the Byzantine system of assessment, *bi't-ta'dīl* (rather oddly rendered by "which was just" in the translation of the passage in question on p. 88, although correctly interpreted as "assessment by survey" on p. 45), is most probably to be related to his second governorship, when he "assured himself possession of the land of Egypt" in 659. For the later developments careful study of the papyri has enabled Dennett to present new and convincing data on the system in force under the Umayyad Caliphs, and to correct several of Becker's conclusions.

He also rejects the view that the early fiscal problems arose from the freeing of converts from all tribute. He argues that (a) the influx of peasantry to the cities proves that converts were not exempted from land tax; and (b) the number of conversions reported when the first 'Abbasid Caliph promised relief from poll tax to converts shows that this alone constituted a sufficient inducement to conversion. The difficulties here arise from the fact that the evidence as to the incidence of taxation is almost entirely indirect, except for Egypt, and even the Egyptian papyri yield little or no evidence on the two points mentioned. More recently published works not available to Dennett (such as Ibn Sallām's *Kitāb al-Amwāl* and the Persian *History of Qumm*) show that the situation in Iraq was much more complex than he assumed. Even allowing that the general principles of taxation remained unchanged, such factors as the effects of repeated rebellions and civil war on cultivation, the practice of tax-farming, problems of currency, and the phenomenal growth of the city populations all have their bearings on the problem.

For the three other provinces — Syria, Mesopotamia and Khurasan — the materials are still scantier, and Dennett's analyses here, as elsewhere, are carried out with a fine discrimination that has enabled him to throw much new light upon their tax systems. Some matters of detail may be disputable in these, as in the other chapters, but they do not detract from an achievement for which future historians of the Arab empire will be grateful,

and which has fully justified the department of history at Harvard University in publishing this study in its series of Historical Monographs.

H. A. R. GIBB  
Oxford University

*Bridge to Islam*, by Erich W. Bethmann.  
Nashville: Southern Publishing Association,  
1950. 284 pages. \$2.25.

The main aim of this book, as the preface says, is to throw light on the spiritual background of the Middle East and to underscore the influences which have created the delicate relationship between Islam and Christianity. Not intended for the specialist, the volume is for the general reader and more particularly for those who look forward to a life of usefulness in the lands where Islam prevails. The author brings to his task the experience and wisdom of 20 years of missionary service, and it is abundantly clear that behind his brief sketch of Islam and Christian missions in the Middle East are extensive researches and long contemplation of the issues at stake. In reading these pages one is gratified by the fact that an author of this standing has taken pains to record his reflections on a great theme and that his conclusions are in such good taste.

Mr. Bethmann undertakes to tell in simple words as much as seems to be relevant about the genesis and the genius of Islam, its founder's career, its theology, and its historic relations with Christianity. To all this he adds up-to-date summaries of the cultural, religious, and political aspects of life in the several countries of the Middle East. Having traced the development of Islam and surveyed the territory in general, he devotes his final chapter to the subject of the "bridge" which Christianity ought to build into Islamic religious consciousness.

How well does the author's understanding of Islam and Christianity stack up? Has he grasped the essence of the two faiths and is he successful — from a comparative religious standpoint — in the imposing task which he sets for himself? The answer to these questions is mixed. While Mr. Bethmann might in general be given the benefit of the doubt, it is not always certain that he has properly assimilated or uniformly mastered the materials gar-

nered for the narrative. The primary difficulty which the present reviewer finds with the treatment stems from the fact that a number of vital problems intimately related to the subject of this book have been side-tracked.

Of these problems, space permits reference to only two in passing. First, although Mr. Bethmann is chiefly concerned in this text with the impact of Protestant Christianity upon the Muslim mind and spirit, he has hardly anything to say about the divided counsel which the Protestant churches would represent — in the view of the Muslim at least — if their efforts were not unified under an ecumenical program which guaranteed a modicum of unity in evangelistic operations. Second, whereas the argument in favor of a "bridge to Islam" is well taken, little is said about the realistic aspect of implementation. To be more precise, the participation of national Christian bodies in the grand strategy of communicating the Christian religion to those among their Muslim countrymen who might desire to know more about this faith apparently has not occurred to the author. And yet it is true that apart from this participation and partnership, the whole enterprise must ever remain alien and subject to grave doubts.

It would appear, therefore, on the strength of strictures such as those cited above that the author has allowed his essay to remain behind the times. Steeped as it is in the literature of the subject, his analysis may be said to lack just that element of timeliness which must leave even the lay reader who belongs to the mid-twentieth century somewhat unimpressed.

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## BOOKS ALSO NOTED

### General

- A History of Exploration: From the Earliest Times to the Present Day*, by Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes, Gold Medallist of the Royal Geographical and Royal Empire Societies. Third Edition. New York: Macmillan Company, 1950. xiv + 426 pages. \$6.00. An appendix brings this edition up to the outbreak of World War II.
- Al-dawlah wal-nizan al-igtisadi bil-sharq al-awsat*,

by Alfred Bonné. Cairo: Egyptian Renaissance Library, 1950. 400 pages. 45 piastres. Arabic translation of Bonné's *State and Economics in the Middle East*.

*Land der Traume*, by Franz Carl Endres. Zürich: Rascher, 1949. 200 pages. Sw. Fr. 10.80. Essays on Middle Eastern culture and history.

*The Middle East: A Physical, Social and Regional Geography*, by W. B. Fisher. London: Methuen and Company Ltd.; New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1951. xiii + 514 pages. \$5.75.

*The Security of the Middle East: A Problem Paper*. Washington: The Brookings Institution. v + 66 pages. \$60. The first of a number of detailed and self-contained studies of problems of foreign policy that confront the United States, this pamphlet discusses in concise form the background, issues, and alternatives for American policy in the Middle East.

*Seven Fallen Pillars: The Middle East, 1915-50*, by Jon Kimche. London: Martin Secker and Warburg, 1950. 326 pages. 15s. A Reuters correspondent writes this sustained indictment of the policies pursued by various British Governments toward the Arab and Jewish peoples since the end of World War I.

*Somewhere South of Suez*, by Douglas Reed. New York: British Book Centre, 1950. 428 pages. \$3.00.

*Al-wad al-sadiq (The True Promise)*, by Taha Husayn. Cairo: Al-Ma'arif Press, 1950. 176 pages. 76 Piastres. Historical novel of pre- and early Islam.

*West-Asia Trade Directory, 1950*, edited by Rahman Sion. Baghdad. £2 15 s.

*World Geography of Petroleum*, edited by Wallace E. Pratt and Dorothy Good. American Geographical Society Publication No. 31. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950. xvii + 464 pages. \$7.50. Twenty experts have contributed detailed descriptions based largely on on-the-spot knowledge.

### Afghanistan

*Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments in Central Asia*, by Sir Kerr Fraser-Tytler, K.B.E. London: Oxford University Press, 1950. 344 pages. 21s.

*Afghanistan: Structure Économique et Sociale; Commerce Extérieur*, by Vladimir Cervinka. Lausanne: Office Suisse d'Expansion Commerciale, 1950. 83 pages, 10 Sw. Fr.

### Arab World

*Cairo to Riyadh Diary*, by George Bilainkin. London: Williams and Norgate, 1950. x + 230 pages, 15 photographs. 10s.

*Histoire Militaire de l'Époque de Mohammed Ali el-Kebir*, by Abdel Rahman Zaky. Cairo: Al-Ma'aref, 1950.

*L'Industrialisation en Syrie*, by Adnan Farra. Geneva: Imprimerie P.-E. Grivet, 1950. 262 pages.

- Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt*, by James Heyworth-Dunne. Washington: Published by the author, 1950. x + 126 pages. \$3.00.
- Mémento Economique: L'Égypte*. Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950. 208 pages. 700 fr.
- Tales from Arab Tribes*, by Major C. G. Campbell. London: Lindsay Drummond, 1949. 12s. 6d.; New York: Macmillan, 1951. \$2.50. 252 pages.

### India

- Bengal in Maps*, by S. P. Chatterjee. Calcutta: Orient Longmans, 1949. 105 pages. Rs. 18.
- India and Pakistan in World Politics*, by Josselyn Hennessy. London: Chiswick Press, 1950. 88 pages. 3s. 6d. This National News Letter Report summarizes the organization of the present states of India and Pakistan, their economic and other problems, with some notes on the future of the two states.
- India: A Pictorial Survey*. New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1950. 185 pages. \$5. Over four hundred pictures tell the story of various aspects of India — scenic beauty, cultural heritage, the people, entertainment, festivals, etc.
- In the Path of Mahatma Gandhi*, by George Catlin. Chicago: Henry Regnery. 332 pages. \$3.50. An account of a trip through India and a study of Gandhi and his ideas.
- Monsoon*, by G. H. Johnston. New York: Dodd Mead and Company, 1950. 274 pages. \$3.00. A novel about India, written by an Australian.
- Second Year of Freedom: August 1948–August 1949*. Foreword by Kala Venkato Rao. Preface by Cherian Thomas. New Delhi: Indian National Congress, 1949. 128 pages. Rs. 3/8. Political, economic, and administrative progress report of the Central and State Governments in India issued by the Indian National Congress.
- Universities and the Future in India*, by Kewal Motwani. Bombay: New Book Company, 1949. xxv + 168 pages.
- The Young Emperor*, by Robert Payne. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950. 357 pages. \$3.50. Historical romance of India in the 17th century.

### Iran

- Iran: Past and Present*, by Donald N. Wilber. Revised Edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950. 244 pages. \$3.00.

### Iraq

- Al-qaryah al-iraqiyyah (The Iraqi Village)*, by Jafar Khayyat. Beirut: The Kashaf Press, 1950. 98 pages. The winner of the Iraq Academy award for 1949 has written a critical study of rural life in Iraq with proposals for the improvement of living conditions.

### Israel

- Israel Revisited*, by Ralph McGill. Atlanta: Tupper and Love, 1950. 116 pages. \$2.00. A collection of the articles written for the *Atlanta Constitution* from Israel in the spring of 1950 by its editor.
- Israel Without Tears*, by Ruth Gruber. New York: A. A. Wyn, 1950. 240 pages. \$3.00. A report on the spirit of Israel today.

### Pakistan

- The Making of Pakistan*, by Richard Symonds. London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1950. 227 pages. 12s. 6d. A former member of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan gives a first-hand picture based on visits to each of the provinces of Pakistan and on discussions with a wide variety of Pakistanis.
- Pakistan and the Commonwealth*, by K. S. Hasan. Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1950. 36 pages. Rs. 1/8.
- Pakistan: The Heart of Asia*, by Liaquat Ali Khan. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950. xii + 151 pages. \$3.00. Speeches made during the U.S.-Canadian tour of 1950, with an appendix by Begum Liaquat Ali Khan, preface by Walter Lippmann, and epilogue by George Kennan.

### Palestine

- Experiment in Anarchy*, by R. M. Graves. London: Victor Gollanz, 1949. 328 pages. 15s. The political complexities of Palestine and Israel.
- Jerusalem Calling*, by Pierre Van Paassen. New York: Dial Press, 1950. 337 pages. \$3. A history of Jerusalem through 6000 years.
- Palestine Under the Mandate*, by A. M. Hyamson. London: Methuen and Company, 1950. 204 pages. 12s. 6d. The former head of the Department of Immigration for 14 years presents the British point of view about Palestine.

### Turkey

- Operation Cicero*, by L. C. Moyzisch. New York: Coward-McCann, 1950. 209 pages. \$2.75. The true story of a Nazi agent in Ankara during the latter days of World War II.
- Portrait of a Turkish Family*, by Irfan Orga. New York: Macmillan Company, 1950. 306 pages. \$4.00. The former assistant air attaché of the Turkish Embassy in London writes an account of life in Turkey from before World War I until the 1940's.



## Literature

*Azharu 'al-ash'ar (Modern Arabic Poetry)*, translated by Arthur J. Arberry. Cambridge Oriental Series No. 1. London: Taylor's Foreign Press, 1950. 70 pages in English, 70 pages in Arabic. 30s.

*Essai de Bibliographie Avicennienne*, by G. C. Anawati, O. P. Ligue Arabe, Direction Culturelle. Millenaire d'Avicenne. Cairo: Dar al-Ma'aref, 1950. 20-page preface in French and 332 pages in Arabic. A collection of the writings of this Arab scholar, including a bibliography of Arabic and other sources.

## Religion

*Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament*, edited by James B. Pritchard. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950. xxi + 526 pages. \$15.00. The most significant texts found by archeologists in Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Asia Minor, and Mesopotamia are here newly or for the first time translated by leading scholars.

*Readings from the Mystics of Islam*, by Margaret Smith. London: Luzac and Company, Ltd., 1950. 141 pages. 12s. 6d.

# BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE

Prepared by Sidney Glazer, Consultant in Near East Bibliography, Library of Congress

*With contributions from:* Elizabeth Bacon, Richard Ettinghausen, Sidney Glazer, Harold W. Glidden, Harvey P. Hall, George C. Miles, Leon Nemoy, M. Perlmann, William D. Preston, C. Rabin, Mohammed Rashti, Dorothy Shepherd, and Andreas Tietze.

*Note:* It is the aim of the Bibliography to present a selective and annotated listing of periodical material dealing with the Middle East generally since the rise of Islam. In order to avoid unwarranted duplication of bibliographies already dealing with certain aspects and portions of the area, the material included will cover only North Africa and Muslim Spain, the Arab world, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Turkey, the Transcaucasian states of Soviet Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkestan. An attempt is made to survey all periodicals of importance in these fields. The ancient Near East and Byzantium are excluded; so also Zionism, Palestine, and Israel in view of the current, cumulative bibliography on this field: *Zionism and Palestine*, a publication of the Zionist Archives and Library in New York.

For list of abbreviations, see page 136.

## GEOGRAPHY

(General, description, travel and exploration, natural history, geology)

- 3839 FRYE, RICHARD N. "Report on a trip to Iran in the summer of 1948." *Oriens* (Leiden) 2 ('49) 204-15. The Report contains a variety of interesting material: notes on the libraries of Tehran; an Achaemenian cuneiform inscription from Persepolis; notes on the inscription beneath the basrelief of Bahram II at Sar Mašhad; a small vocabulary and notes on Fārvī, a dialect of Biyābānak.
- 3840 JIMÉNEZ, FELIX HERNÁNDEZ. "Estudios de geografía histórica española, VIII." *Andalus* (Madrid) 14 ('49) 321-37.

See also: 3841

## HISTORY

(Ancient, medieval)

- 3841 AFSHAR, IRAJ. "The city of Yezd." (in Persian) *Ettela'at* (Tehran) 3 (S '50) 16-8. The geographical and cultural background of this central Iranian town.
- 3842 CAHEN, CLAUDE. "Le Malik-nāmeḥ et l'histoire des origines Seljukides." *Oriens* 2 ('49) 31-65. The early history of the Seljuks, from the 10th century to 1040.

Discussion of the sources on this period, specifically the principal, and now lost, *Malik-nāmeḥ*.

- 3843 CANARD, M. Les Hamdanides et l'Arménie." *Annales de l'Inst. des Études Orientales* (Algiers) 7 ('48) 77-94. A study of the political constellation of the 10th century Middle East.
- 3844 CASKEL, WERNER. "Eine 'unbekannte' dynastie in Arabien." *Oriens* 2 ('49) 66-71. Notes on the powerful Ibn Gabr family in eastern Arabia in the first quarter of the 16th century.
- 3845 HAENISCH, ERICH. "Zu den Briefen der mongolische Il-khane Argun und Öljeitü an den König Philipp den Schönen von Frankreich (1289 und 1305)." *Oriens* 2 ('49) 216-35. The author offers new readings of the two famous letters. The texts and translations are heavily annotated.
- 3846 HUICI, AMBROSIO. "La leyenda y la historia en los orígenes del imperio almohade." *Andalus* 14 ('49) 339-76. Ibn Tumart was sincere and his success must have assured him of his providential mission.
- 3847 JACOBS, EMIL. "Mehemmed II, der eroberer, seine beziehungen zur Renaissance und seine büchersammlung." *Oriens* 2 ('49) 6-30. The Ottoman sultan Mahomet II's relations to humanists and important men

of the Italian renaissance, specifically Ciriaco Pizzocolli, Francesco and Giovanni Mario Filelfo, Kritobulos, Georgios Amirutzes, and Giovanni Maria Angiolello. The author underlines the influence of these men on the sultan, and concludes that a group of 50 important occidental manuscripts in the Seraglio had once belonged to Mahomet's library.

- 3848 LOCKHART, L. "Isfahan." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 37 (Jl-O '50) 248-61. A vivid description of this historic Iranian city.
- 3849 MARÇAIS, GEORGES. "Ibn Khaldoun et le livre des Prolégomènes." *Rev. de la Méditerranée* (Algiers) 4 (Jl-Ag '50). An extremely interesting account of the ideas of this great Arab historian who is "more celebrated than known."
- 3850 STERN, S. M. "Ismā'ili propaganda and Fatimid rule in Sind." *Islamic Culture* (Hyderabad) 23 (O '49) 299-307. Edition and discussion of an Arabic account, written ca. 351 A.H., of the establishment of a Fatimid government in Sind and the suppression of an heretical propagandist who apparently tried to create a hinduizing shade of Isma'ilism.
- 3851 STRAUSS, ELI. "Prix et salaires à l'époque mamlouke." *Rev. des Études Islamiques* (Paris) (1949) 49-94. Richly documented survey of the economic decline of Egypt under the Mamluk rulers.
- 3852 WRIGHT, EDWIN M. "Ancient Azarbaijan—an Iranian stronghold." *Iran Rev.* (New York) 2 (Ja-F '50) 15-9. A sketch of its military history up to the arrival of the Seljuk Turks in the 11th century A.D.

See also: 3840.

## HISTORY AND POLITICS (Modern)

- 3853 "In North Africa today." *New Times* (Moscow) No. 42 (O 18, '50) 28-31. A delegation of the "North African Friends of the Soviet Union" recently traveled through parts of Uzbekistan, the main visible result being apparently the text of the "interview" included in this article.
- 3854 AMIR. "Governments of Iran from the earliest days of the constitutional movement to the present." (in Persian) *Ettela'at* 3 (S '50) 14-22. A chronological sketch of Persian governments in the 20th century, including a discussion of the various special missions and foreign power involvement.
- 3855 ANTHEM, THOMAS. "The Near East danger." *Contemp. Rev.* (London) 1018 (O '50) 201-6. UN military forces should be strategically disposed throughout the Near East if there is serious intention to defend it. If Russia is not planning a war, these forces will not provoke it. If Russia is really bent on aggression, common sense dictates that there be from the outset as few strategic disadvantages for the West as possible.
- 3856 BURR, MALCOLM. "Change in Turkey." *Fortnightly* (London) 1005 (S '50) 149-54. Interpretation of the recent election victory of the Democrat Party and a sketch of its economic plans.
- 3857 CATTAN, SELIM. "La Leya Araba nel suo primo quinquennio." *Oriente Mod.* (Rome) 30 (Jl-S '50) 105-9. A brief history of the first five years of the Arab League's existence, concluding that it has a function to discharge in the Near East, despite the meager results to date.
- 3858 DEARDEN, ANN. "Independence for Libya: the political problems." *Middle East J.* 4 (O '50) 395-409. Reactions of the three divisions of Libya and the interested powers relative to the UN resolution for independence.
- 3859 ELIAV, PINHAS S. "The Arab states at the U.N. assembly, II." (in Hebrew) *Hamizrah Hehadash* (Tel Aviv) 1 (Jl '50) 264-76. The activities of the Arab states in connection with the discussion on the former Italian colonies and on Palestine; their behavior in the East-West conflict. Apart from Lebanon, the Arab states showed little interest in general economic, social, and legal matters.
- 3860 FALUKNER, BRIAN. "Is Egypt planning a second round?" *Commentary* (New York) 9 (Ag '50) 308-14. In an astute analysis the author sees no likelihood of resumption of hostilities in the near future—this because Anglo-American policy requires stability in the area. However, war is inevitable, largely owing to King Faruq, who is bent on revenge.
- 3861 FITZGERALD, SIR WILLIAM. "An international regime for Jerusalem." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 37 (Jl-O '50) 273-83. Historical arguments for the internationalization of the city.
- 3862 FLETCHER, ARNOLD. "Afghanistan: highway of conquest." *Current Hist.* 18 (Je '50) 337-41. Describes its position in relation to East and West. If the dispute with Pakistan can be settled and the economy shored up, the Afghans will prove loyal allies to America. In addition, they can be useful in the propaganda war with the Soviet Union owing to their influence on the peoples in the Soviet republics lying to the north.
- 3863 FRANCK, DOROTHEA SEELYE. "The interchange of government experts." *Middle East J.* 4 (O '50) 410-26. The various U.S.

- programs are reviewed with relation to the Middle East.
- 3864 LENCZOWSKI, GEORGE. "Soviet policy in Iran during World War II." (in Persian) *Ettela'at* 3 (Jl '50) 1-6. From the day of their arrival in northern Iran, Soviet military and political forces did their utmost to effect fundamental changes in the country. To obscure the various developments the first "iron curtain" was hung and a far-flung propaganda campaign set in motion.
- 3865 MOYAL, MAURICE. "The Middle East and the western World." *World Aff.* (London) 4 (O '50) 460-7. The Korean war has demonstrated that the Arabs cannot be relied upon in a crisis between the West and East.
- 3866 NALLINO, MARIA. "Islam e minoranze religiose nella nuova costituzione siriana del 1950." *Oriente Mod.* 30 (Jl-S '50) 110-7. Violent Christian opposition resulted in modifying a recent proposal to make Islam the religion of the State to read: "The religion of the President of the Republic is Islam and Muslim law is the principal source of legislation." The latter provision is an innovation with respect to the constitution of 1930 and portends ultimate victory over the non-Muslims, with inevitable damage to Syrian national unity.
- 3867 NAVA'I, ABDOL HOSSEIN. "The alliance of Napoleon and Fath Ali Shah against Russia and England." (in Persian) *Ettela'at* 3 (Jl '50) 19-23. An account, based on archival records, of Napoleon's attempt to exploit Iran in his plan to attack England through India.
- 3868 SERJEANT, R. B. and WICKENS, G. M. "The Wahhābis in Western Arabia in 1803-4 A.D." *Islamic Culture* 23 (O '49) 308-9. A short account in Persian, preserved in a British Museum Ms.
- 3869 SIMON, ERNST. "The costs of Arab-Jewish cold war." *Commentary* 10 (S '50) 256-62. *Ihud*, an organization devoted to Arab-Jewish understanding and cooperation, has as often been right as it has been wrong in its various assumptions during the past 20 years. The author, a prominent member, ponders the future role of the newly revived organization.
- 3870 TASHJIAN, JAMES H. "The American military mission to Armenia, VII." *Armenian Rev.* 3 (O '50) 116-33. Presents the text of the appendix to the final report made by the Mission.
- 3871 VIDAL, F. S. "Religious brotherhoods in Moroccan politics." *Middle East J.* 4 (O '50) 427-46. The brotherhoods are currently at odds with the Nationalists, but if they should ever get together the combination would be an extremely potent force.
- 3872 VRATZIAN, SIMON. "The Armenian revolution and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation." *Armenian Rev.* 3 (O '50) 3-31. The A.R.F. was a militant organization set up in Turkey in 1890 aiming minimally at self-defense against physical and economic attack and maximally at re-establishing the total independence of Armenia. This article, the first in a series of three, is filled with details about the factors that led to the establishment of the A.R.F. and its earliest activities.
- 3873 WASHITZ, YOSEF. "Changes in the life of Israel's Arabs." (in Hebrew, English summary) *Hamizrah Hehadash* 1 (Jl '50) 257-63. Describes the impact on the Arabs effected by their changing from a 3 majority to a small minority of some 15% of the total population. These Arabs are mainly workers, fellahen, and lower middle class. The central place in this society is held by workers' organizations. The government policy toward them is too restrictive. (Washitz is a member of the Mapam political party.)

## ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(General, finance, commerce, agriculture, natural resources, labor, transportation, and communications)

- 3874 "The modern oil industry of Persia." *Gt. Brit. and East* 66 (Ag '50) 30-2. The experience gained in Abadan, the world's largest refinery, has served as a basis for servicing most of the other oilfield communities in the Middle East.
- 3875 "The sterling-dollar oil problem." *Middle East J.* 4 (O '50) 484-6. The American oil companies in the Middle East have felt keenly the effects of British efforts to increase the consumption of sterling oil. Their own efforts to solve the problem are discussed.
- 3876 BAER, GAVRI'EL. "Agrarian reform in Egypt." (in Hebrew, English summary) *Hamizrah Hehadash* 1 (Jl '50) 285-91. Survey of the present situation. The Five Feddan Law of 1913 is said to harm the fellah rather than protect him. The author is sceptical as to the willingness of the government to interfere with the big estates.
- 3877 FARAJ, FU'AD. "The Fārūq canal." (in Arabic) *al-Kitāb* (Cairo) 5 (O '50) 708-15. A new branch of the Suez Canal is being projected. Map, charts.
- 3878 SYKES, EDWARD. "Some economic problems of Persia." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 37 (Jl-O '50) 262-72. A concise analysis of



the major problems now facing Iran, including a discussion of the Seven Year Plan.

## SOCIAL CONDITIONS

(General, education, population and ethnology, medicine and public health, religion, law)

- 3879 ANDERSON, J. N. D. "Recent developments in *shari'a* law." *Muslim World* 40 (O '50) 244-56. The first of a series of articles describing in full the more interesting reforms in Muslim jurisprudence. These not only show the *shari'a* to be a living system of law, but provide insight into the progress of modernism in Islam.
- 3880 ASIN PALACIOS, MIGUEL. "Sadilies y alumbados." *Andalus* 14 (1949) 1-28, 253-72. Parts four and five of this posthumous study.
- 3881 BENOR, J. L. "Arab education in Israel." *Middle Eastern Aff.* (New York) 1 (Ag-S '50) 224-9. Coeducation and abolishment of corporal punishment are the two main innovations in Arab education to date. The Israel Government lays considerable emphasis on education as a means of gaining the goodwill and loyalty of the Arabs.
- 3882 BIGGS-DAVISON, JOHN. "Dera Ghazi Khan: the Baloch tribal area." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 37 (Jl-O '50) 284-92. Gives new and interesting information on the Baloch tribes living in the area between Sind and Baluchistan proper.
- 3883 BOUSQUET, G. H. "L'Islam et la limitation volontaire des naissances." *Annales de l'Histoire des Études Orientales* 7 ('48) 95-104. Some peculiar cases foreseen by the jurists.
- 3884 COLOMBE, MARCEL. "L'Islam dans la vie sociale et politique de l'Égypte contemporaine." *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemp.* (Paris) 7 ('50) 1-26. Surveys various attempts at harmonization of traditional religion and modern society. A rather gloomy view of the Egyptian scene.
- 3885 EISENSTADT, SHMU'EL. "Development of new elites in Asiatic countries." (in Hebrew, English summary) *Hamizrah Hehadash* 1 (Jl '50) 277-84. The new elites are a by-product of the agrarian problem. They use westernization in an attempt to rise into the traditional aristocracy but succeed only in becoming an inflated and futile middle class. In ex-colonial countries like India, the new elite, trained realistically in western methods, is more effective.
- 3886 FARYAR, ABDULLAH. "Rural education in Iran." *Iran Rev.* 2 (Ja-F '50) 20-8. A survey of the elementary education system, with little attention paid to rural education as such, for there are no essential differences between schools in rural and urban areas.
- 3887 JEFFERY, ARTHUR. "The Qur'an as scripture, IV." *Muslim World* 40 (O '50) 257-75. A detailed analysis of the way Mohammed utilized what he had learned from other religions for his own mission and for the use of the community after him.
- 3888 HERBERT, ABDEL KARIM. "Pilgrimage to Mecca." *Islamic Rev.* (Woking) 38 (O '50) 14-8. Interesting account of the experiences of an English convert to Islam.
- 3889 KALFON, B. "The Jews of Turkey." (in Hebrew) *Yalqut Hamizrah Hatikhon* (Jerusalem) 2 (Ag '50) 124-36. Their centers of settlement, institutions, groupings, migrations.
- 3890 NIZAMI, KHALIQ AHMAD. "Early Indo-Muslim mystics and their attitude toward the state, cont." *Islamic Culture* 23 (O '49) 313-21. This installment brings five instances of conflict between Sufi teachers and worldly rulers.
- 3891 RENNER, GEORGE T. "Arab education in the Near East." *Middle Eastern Aff.* 1 (Ag-S '50) 215-24. Educational reform is an important part of the general pattern of change now slowly taking place in the Arab world. The strength and weak points of the system are outlined.
- 3892 ROBSON, JAMES. "Stories of Jesus and Mary." *Muslim World* 40 (O '50) 236-43. An 18th century Arabic Ms. consisting of anecdotes concerning Jesus and Mary and of miracles performed by the former. Of interest as showing Muslim attitudes and beliefs.
- 3893 SELTZER, M. "The population of Iran." (in Hebrew) *Yalqut Hamizrah Hatikhon* 2 (Ap '50) 55-9. This section of Seltzer's study is devoted to the Turkish-speaking peoples, Christians, Bahais, and Parsis.
- 3894 THOMSON, WILLIAM. "Free will and predestination in early Islam, II." *Muslim World* 40 (O '50) 276-87. Concludes a critical and invaluable review of W. Montgomery Watt's book of this name.
- 3895 TRITTON, A. S. "The Mutarrifiya." *Muséon* (Louvain) 63 ('50) 60-7. Some light on this obscure Muslim sect that is frequently mentioned in Zaidi histories.

See also: 3871.

## SCIENCE

(General, history)

- 3896 DUBLER, CÉSAR E. "Los caminos a compos-tella en la obra de Idrisi." *Andalus* 14 ('49) 59-122. Stresses Idrisi's originality in his description of the Iberian peninsula.
- 3897 RODINSON, MAXIME. "Recherches sur les documents arabes relatifs à la cuisine."

- Rev. des Études Islamiques* 9 ('49) 95-165. Culinary art in the Near East studied by a philologist with sociological interests. A general survey of Arabic literature on the subject is followed by an analysis of a 13th (?) century *K. al-Wuṣṣā ilā 'l-ḥabīb*, probably re-worked by several hands. Includes a sketch of the Arab princely kitchen and a 12-13th century menu.
3898. WALZER, RICHARD. "The rise of Islamic philosophy." *Oriens* 3 (Je '50) 1-19. The author sketches the starting-point of Muslim philosophy by a characterization of the different attitudes taken toward the reception of Greek thought by the two main representatives of early Islamic philosophy, al-Kindī and al-Fārābī.
- ### ART
- (*Archeology, architecture, epigraphy, numismatics, minor arts, painting and music, manuscripts and papyri*)
- 3899 ALFÖLDI, A. "Der iranische weltreise auf archäologischen denkmälern." *Jahrbuch d. Schweizerischen G. für Urgeschichte* 40 ('49-'50) 17-34, 4 text figures and 10 plates. Iconographic study of the cosmic giant and his various transformations in the art of Iran (Luristan bronzes, art of the Achaemenids and Sasanians), of central Asia, and of the classical world.
- 3900 HAMILTON, R. W. "A mosaic carpet of Umayyad date at Khirbat al Mafjar." *Quart. Dept. of Antiquities in Palestine* 14 ('50) 120ff. 6 color plates, 1 figure. Floor mosaic found in the bath of the Umayyad palace showing animals under a large tree, inspired by Hellenistic painting as well as the mosaics of Antioch and Constantinople.
- 3901 HAMILTON, R. W. "The sculpture of living forms of Khirbat al Mafjar." *Quart. Dept. of Antiquities in Palestine* 14 ('50) 100-19. Discusses the great variety of plastic figures of men and animals found in the Umayyad palace up to 1948.
- 3902 JOHNS, C. N. "The Citadel, Jerusalem." *Quart. Dept. of Antiquities in Palestine* 14 ('50) 121-90. A summary of work since 1934. Deals with finds from the ancient Jewish until the Mamluke and Turkish periods. Well illustrated.
- 3903 KÜHNEL, ERNST. "Der mamlukische kas-settenstil." *Kunst des Orients* 1 ('50) 55-68. Discusses the development of the geometric star designs from the middle of the 12th till the end of the 15th century in Egyptian carpentry and metal work. 20 illust.
- 3904 LAMBERT, ÉLIE. "Les mosquées de type andalou en Espagne et en Afrique du Nord." *Andalus* 14 ('49) 273-89.
- 3905 LÉVI-PROVENÇAL, E. "Sur une inscription arabe de Denia." *Andalus* 14 ('49) 183-6.
- 3906 MARÇAIS, W. "Sousse et l'architecture musulmane du IX siècle." *Annales de l'Institut des Études Orientales* 7 ('48) 54-6.
- 3907 MATEN Y LLOPIS, FELIPE. "Hallazgos numismáticos musulmanes." *Andalus* 14 ('49) 201-7.
- 3908 MURAYAMA, S. "Über die inschrift auf dem 'Stein des Cingis.'" *Oriens* 3 ('50) 108-12. The author offers a new reading of the Uiguro-Mongolian inscription of about 1225.
- 3909 NAVA'I, ABDOL HOSSEIN. "Kamal ol-Molk, I, II." (in Persian) *Ettela'at* 3 (Jl, Ag '50) 9-13; 17-20. Kamal ol-Molk, "creator of beauty," was the greatest of 20th century Persian artists. Distinguished for his realism and achievements as a portraitist, he was largely responsible for the introduction of modern painting to the Iranians.
- 3910 OCAÑA JIMÉNEZ, MANUEL. "La inscripción fundacional de la mezquita de Bib al-Mardūm en Toledo." *Andalus* 14 ('49) 175-83.
- 3911 PATMAGRIAN, ACHOT. "The music of Iran." *Iran Rev.* 2 (Ja-F '50) 29-31. The author, a former professor at the Tehran Conservatory of Music, notes that Iranian music, through the Arab conquests, made a considerable impact on European music, traces of which are clearly perceptible in modern compositions.
- 3912 POPE, ARTHUR UPHAM. "The first photographs of a group of outstanding Sasanian silver." *Illust. London News* 216 (F 11, '50) 206-7; with 6 figures. Announcement of 5 silver vessels attributed to the Sasanian period now in the possession of a collector and art dealers in the United States.
- 3913 RITTER, HELLMUT. "Philologika, XIII: Arabische handschriften in Anatolien und Istanbul." *Oriens* 3 (Je '50) 236-314. A descriptive catalog of Arabic Mss. in the libraries of Istanbul, Bursa, Kayseri, and Ankara, including 75 works on grammar, lexicography, poetry, theology, law, history, geography, medicine, mathematics, astronomy, and astrology.
- 3914 SAUVAGET, J. "Des épitaphes royales de Gao." *Andalus* 14, no. 1 ('49) 123-41. Continuation of a study published in the *Rev. des Études Islamiques* ('48). Full texts are here given. Exploration might yield invaluable data on the early penetration of Islam into negro Africa.
- 3915 SAUVAGET, J. "Sur un papyrus arabe de la bibliothèque Egyptienne." *Annales de l'Institut des Études Orientales* 7 ('48)

- 29-38. Brilliant reconstruction of a short text on sugar production.
- 3916 SECO DE LUCENA, LUIS. "Hallazgos de monedas árabes." *Andalus* (Madrid) 14 ('49) 467-9.
- 3917 LEONARD, H. STEWART. "Medieval antiquities from the estate of the late Joseph Brummer." *Bull. of the City Art Museum of St. Louis* 35 (Spring '50) 4-26. Discusses an illustrated and important covered steatite box from 9th century Iran.
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- 3919 TORRES BALBÁS, LEOPOLDO. "Las casas del portal de la Alhambra de Granada." *Andalus* 14 ('49) 186-201.
- 3920 TORRES BALBÁS, LEOPOLDO. "Nuevos datos sobre la mezquita de Córdoba cristianizada." *Andalus* 14 ('49) 455-7.
- 3921 TORRES BALBÁS, LEOPOLDO. "La supuesta puerta de los panderos y los puentes de la Granada musulmana." *Andalus* 14 ('49) 419-30.
- 3922 VAN DEN BRANDEN, A. "Une inscription thamoudéenne (pseudo-chrétienne?)." *Muséon* (Louvain) 63 ('50) 47-51. Discussion of Littmann's article on the subject published in the *Muslim World* 40 ('50) 16-8.
- See also: 3839.

## LANGUAGE

- 3923 BEESTON, A. F. L. "Notes on old south Arabian lexicography, I." *Muséon* 63 ('50) 53-7. (1) *m'gl* (2) *blacblly* (3) *hhy* (4) 'rs.
- 3924 KRAMER, JÖRG. "Theodor Nöldekes sammlungen zum arabischen wörterbuch." *Z. d. Deutschen M. G.* (Wiesbaden) 99 ('49) 93-102. For some 70 years the great scholar collected notes on Arabic lexicography which he inserted in his copy of Freytag's lexicon and elsewhere in the books he read. A new dictionary of classical Arabic will incorporate this material.
- 3925 MARÇAIS, P. "L'articulation de l'emphase dans un parler arabe maghrébin." *Annales de l'Institut des Études Orientales* 7 ('48) 5-28.
- See also: 3839.

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- 3926 ALONSO, MANUEL ALONSO. "Homenaje a Avicenna en su milenario: las traducciones de Juan González de Burgos y Salomón." *Andalus* 14 ('49) 291-319.
- 3927 BAKOS, J. "Introduction d'Avicenna à sa 'Psychologie.'" *Archiv Orientalni* (Prague) 17 ('49) 27-30. Excerpt from an edition in preparation.
- 3928 CABANLAS, DARIO. "Juan de Segovia y el primer Alcorán trilingüe." *Andalus* 14

- ('49) 149-73. The eminent 15th century scholar who insisted on dealing with the Muslims *per viam pacis et doctrinae* procured a Spanish translation and then proceeded to work on a Latin version.
- 3929 DELLA VIDA, G. LEVI. "Nuova luce sulle fonti islamiche della Divina Commedia." *Andalus* 14 ('49) 377-407. Recent publications by José Muñoz Sendino and Enrico Cerulli reopen the discussion on the thesis of Asín Palacios developed 30 years ago.
- 3930 DERMENGHEM, E. "Al-Hirrālī." *Annales de l'Institut des Études Orientales* 7 ('48) 39-53. Life and works of a 13th century thinker and poet who was born in Marrakesh and died in Egypt.
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- 3933 GABRIELI, FRANCESCO. "Nel millenario di Avicenna." *Oriente Mod.* 30 (Jl-S '50) 149-60. A glowing tribute to one of the greatest intellects in Islam.
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- 3935 GARCIA GOMEZ, EMILIO. "Nuevos testimonios sobre 'el odio a Sevilla' de los poetas musulmanes." *Andalus* 14 ('49) 143-8. Additions to a paper published in the same journal in 1945.
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- 3939 ROSSI, ETTORE. "Nuove pubblicazioni di Maḥmūd Taimūr." *Oriente Mod.* 30 (Jl-S '50) 161-2. Brief review of the two latest works of one of Egypt's greatest writers who began by writing in the colloquial but who ultimately, like many others, was "conquered by the literary Arabic."
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- 3947 LITTMANN, ENNO. "Drei Nöldeke Briefe." *Z. der Deutschen Morgenländischen G.* 99 ('49) 63-6. Letters from Fleischer and Hammer-Purgstall to Nöldeke about the latter's thesis and facsimile of a letter from Nöldeke in which he reminisces shortly before his death, about his Turkish studies.

## BOOK REVIEWS

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## ABBREVIATIONS

Acad., Academy  
 Aff., Affairs  
 Amer., American  
 Bull., Bulletin  
 Cent., Central  
 Contemp., Contemporary  
 D., Deutsch  
 Dept., Department  
 East., Eastern  
 G., Gesellschaft  
 Geog., Geographical  
 Gt. Brit., Great Britain  
 Hist., Historical  
 Illust., Illustrated  
 Inst., Institute  
 Internat., International  
 J., Journal

Mag., Magazine  
 Mod., Modern, Moderno  
 Mus., Museum  
 Natl., National  
 Numis., Numismatic  
 Orient., Oriental  
 Pal., Palestine  
 Philol., Philological  
 Polit., Political  
 Quart., Quarterly  
 Res., Research  
 Rev., Review, Revue  
 Soc., Society  
 Stud., Studies  
 Trans., Transactions  
 Z., Zeitschrift

### *Arabic*

K., Kitāb  
 Maj., Majallah, Majallat

### *Russian*

Akad., Akademii  
 Fil., Filosophi  
 Ist., Isotorii  
 Izvest., Izvestiya  
 Lit., Literaturi  
 Otdel., Otdeleniye  
 Ser., Seriya  
 Sov., Sovetskoye  
 Yaz., Yazika